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The dissertation examined the cues filtered out and Social Information 
Processing (SIP) approaches to relationship development in an intra-organizational 
dyadic negotiation by comparing the use of face-to-face (FTF) and e-mail channels.  
The study further examined the effect of power difference on dimensions of 
relationship development such as dominance, trust, affect, depth, formality, and 
task/social orientation.  Individuals in organizations use technology based tools such 
as e-mail to perform a variety of communication tasks.  The dissertation provides a 
test and expansion of SIP with regard to the effects of time on relationship 
development by testing the theory within a highly social process like organizational 
negotiation where there is mixed channel use.  This dissertation also provides a test of 
e-mail’s unique characteristics and their effects on the development of relationships 
in an intra-organizational environment.  The hypotheses were tested using a dyadic 
data analysis technique know as the Actor-Partner Independence Model (APIM).  
   One hundred and forty-eight students (74 dyads) participated in the study 
and negotiated three times.  For the first negotiation, all participants used FTF to 
establish a baseline relationship measure and for the next two negotiations half of the 
participants used e-mail and the other half FTF.  For the last two negotiations, a 
power difference also was introduced so that in half of the dyads in each group the 
seller had greater power than the buyer. 
The study produced results in three main areas related to negotiation and 
computer mediated communication:  (1) interpersonal relationships develop over lean 
media like e-mail; (2) the characteristics of e-mail affect relationship development 
when compared to FTF; and (3) the preference to use e-mail for future negotiations is 
affected by prior e-mail negotiation experience with one’s partner, computer 
mediated communication comfort, and the level of dominance one’s partner exhibits 
in e-mail negotiations.  With regard to interpersonal relationships and negotiation, the 
study suggests that individuals learn to manage their interpersonal relationships via e-
mail because it can be a useful tool for managing one’s persona.  Bargaining power 
and bargaining role were only of limited influence on the development of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The study of Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) is still in its early 
childhood stage and its use by organizational members is in its early adulthood.  
Competing theories attempt to address the need to understand the effect of media 
selection and media characteristics on negotiation.  Can electronic mail (e-mail) help 
to level the playing field when one party has greater power (influence) over another 
party?  What effect does CMC have on the development of relationships between 
parties?  Do the lack of social cues result in less domination, greater trust, more 
formality, or more efficient negotiations due to a greater task focus?   Are parties 
more or less satisfied with the outcomes of face-to-face (FTF) or CMC negotiations?  
What differences are there in satisfaction with the CMC as opposed to the FTF 
process? 
 The body of research that currently addresses when to use CMC is mixed and 
contradictory for CMC use in negotiation.  The early years of study, when CMC 
media were very new and rare in organizations, are dominated by the view that the 
media other than FTF lack nonverbal cues, which make them unacceptable for 
negotiation (McGrath & Hollingshead, 1994).   
  E-mail offers some unique characteristics such as rapid transmission and 
reply without an individual needing to be physically present, text that is stored and 
available for reexamination throughout the negotiation with regard to previous offers, 
and the ability to give a negotiator time to think, reflect, strategize, and plan prior to 
responding to offers (Poole, Shannon, & DeSanctis, 1992).  Some research has 




and in more equal division of resources (Croson, 1999; Shell, 2001; Suh, 1999), 
whereas other research has found e-mail results in unequal division of resources 
(Arunachalam & Dilla, 1995). 
Rationale for Studying Negotiation, Power, and Electronic Mail 
Despite the varied findings regarding the effects of e-mail on negotiation, e-
mail is used for negotiations every day in organizations around the world.   A key 
issue that has yet to be explored regarding the use of CMC for negotiation is its 
interaction with the relative power positions of the parties.  A primary purpose of this 
study, therefore, is to examine the role that power differences and media play on the 
development of relationships and the desire to use e-mail for future negotiations 
through empirical research.  These issues will be examined within a dyadic intra-
organizational setting with a special interest in the process of communication 
relationship development within an organizational setting (Burgoon & Hale, 1987). 
Negotiation and Electronic Mail 
Negotiation and electronic mail have generally been considered an illogical 
task-media pairing in the field of communication studies, with many researchers 
ignoring the use of e-mail for negotiation tasks (Rice, 1992; Trevino, Lengel, & Daft, 
1987).  Only in the last few years have researchers begun preliminary studies into the 
effect of CMC on negotiation and no accepted theoretical model exists yet (McGinn 
& Croson, 2004).  The traditional approach for selecting media channels for 
negotiation has been based on social presence theory (Short, Williams, & Christie, 
1976) and information(or media) richness theory (Daft & Lengel, 1984; Trevino et 




is limited in its ability to carry socio-emotional content (Hiltz & Turoff, 1978; 
McGrath & Hollingshead, 1994; Siegal, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986; 
Sproull & Kiesler, 1986).  These theories view the media selection decision as one 
that is objective and rational.  For example, information richness theory arranges the 
various communication mediums along a continuum from rich to lean according to 
each medium’s ability to reduce ambiguity.  Ambiguity reduction is a function of the 
media’s ability to facilitate feedback, communicate multiple cues, present 
individually tailored messages, and use natural language to convey subtleties (Daft & 
Lengel, 1984).  From this perspective, negotiators have been advised that rational 
individuals would not use e-mail to conduct negotiations because e-mail did not 
provide the necessary characteristics required for a highly interactive, ambiguous, 
social process like negotiation.  Despite this theory-based advice, negotiators still use 
e-mail to negotiate, which suggests that further exploration of the media selection 
process for negotiation is needed. 
Computer Mediated Communication Theories 
Media richness, along with the work of the other researchers cited above, has 
been grouped into a research perspective labeled the cues filtered out approach 
(Culnam & Markus, 1987).  Theories within this perspective propose that the 
nonverbal cues and language transmitted via the limited bandwidth of CMC media 
are a fixed property.  As ability to carry nonverbal cues decreases, the ability to 
effectively communicate complex ideas, thoughts, and emotions decreases.  These 
media may also make individuals less aware of others, more aggressive, more task 




and Lengel’s (1984) media richness theory proposes that the medium’s degree of 
bandwidth has an optimal match to message equivocality or uncertainty such that 
efficient and effective managers match the message to the best media. 
 Questioning the cues filtered out approach, several researchers have taken the 
opportunity to look at the role of Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) and 
negotiation (Arunachalam & Dilla, 1992; Croson, 1999; Hollingshead, McGrath, & 
O’Connor, 1993; Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999; Morris, Nadler, 
Kurtzberg, & Thompson, 2002; Sheffield, 1995; Thompson & Nadler, 2002; Suh, 
1999; Valley, Moag, & Bazerman, 1998; Walther, 1995).  Many of these studies have 
focused on group decision making processes rather than dyads.  The findings by these 
researchers have been mixed, but in general, have found that relationships develop via 
computer mediated media in much the same way they do in FTF situations except that 
they take more time (Walther, 1992, 1994; Walther & Anderson, 1994; Walther & 
Burgoon, 1992).  Thus, e-mail negotiation is a viable alternative to FTF at least in 
some negotiation situations. 
Croson (1999) has reported that more equal and integrative solutions can be 
achieved with CMC than with FTF.  Other researchers studying CMC have reported 
that users generate more original and higher-quality ideas than FTF groups (Valacich, 
Paranka, George, & Nunmamaker, 1993), but they reach consensus with more 
difficulty than FTF groups (Hiltz, Johnson, & Turoff, 1986).  Sheffield (1995) has 
found that CMC negotiators are better able to focus on the negotiation task and 
achieve better joint outcomes when not distracted by socio-emotional content and not 




(1992) reported that CMC negotiations resulted in less favorable joint solutions for 
the negotiators creating a more individualistic orientation.  Other research has 
indicated that liking or a sense of similarity with one’s negotiation partner increases 
satisfaction with the negotiation process and increases the likelihood of reaching an 
agreement (Moore et al., 1999).  These mixed results and sometime contradictory 
findings suggest a need for further study of not just CMC, but more specifically how 
negotiations conducted via e-mail are affected under a variety of conditions.    
Power, Negotiation, and CMC 
  One condition that has not been well researched, but is a critical part of any 
social relationship is power.  Little work has been done to examine the role that 
power plays in negotiations.  Kiesler and Sproull (1992) found that e-mail could 
encourage more equal participation and result in decisions made more on knowledge 
rather than on the influence of high-status members.  Among more experienced CMC 
users, Adkins and Brasher (1995) found that power relationships present in the 
organizational culture replicated those found in FTF interactions.  The role of power 
is inherent in any exchange relationship and none more so than in intra-organizational 
negotiations.   This study examines the effect of power differences and media on the 
interpersonal relationships of colleagues in an intra-organizational environment.  It 
provides the opportunity to not only fill a void in the empirical literature, but to 
provide advice to negotiators. 
Implications for E-mail Negotiators  
With the mixed and often conflicting findings regarding e-mail, organizational 




organizational relationships.  Inherent in intra-organizational relationships is the need 
to cooperate to achieve organizational goals: A communication medium that creates 
distrust between members, results in an individualistic orientation, or exploits 
organizational members to achieve short term-goals will result in a weaker 
organization.  If e-mail negotiations have the potential to achieve interpersonal 
relationships similar to those achieved by FTF but at a lower cost of time and money 
where these issues may be of concern, then organizations need to better understand 
the process.  This study looks at the effect of e-mail and relational power on several 
aspects of interpersonal relations (dominance, trust, affect, formality, task orientation, 
and depth of relationship) and makes recommendations for conditions when e-mail 
negotiations may be are most favorable.   
Contributions to Theory  
This dissertation answers the call Walther (2004) made, in his introduction to a 
special issue of The Journal of Language and Social Psychology, for more research 
that moved beyond media selection to take into account mixed channel use and 
channel switching.  This dissertation does this by having all the negotiators conduct 
their first negotiation FTF to establish baseline relationship.  The participants are then 
randomly assigned to conduct their next two negotiations either FTF or via e-mail.  
The dissertation examines how the relationships develop over time, but also provides 
information on preferred channel use for future negotiations.  Although some studies 
have been conducted regarding CMC and negotiation, none of them have looked 
specifically at the development of relationships, have used mixed channels, or have 




Finally, this work provides a further test of Walther’s (1996) study that found support 
for the idea that CMC relationship development in organizational settings is affected 
by prior technology experience and prior relationships. 
Walther (2004) also points out the value of continuing to study the role of the 
internet on relationship development: 
… interpersonal goals and relational behavior of the most mundane yet 
fundamental nature deserve attention, for the electronic environment, 
once again, may change how they are done or bring them into focus by 
showing how individuals work through the change in codes.  ….  How 
do individuals assert dominance in a group, when the conversational 
environment is not amenable to “controlling the floor”? Much research 
has claimed that CMC equalizes participation in groups, measuring 
participation frequency to support the claim (p. 393). 
Walther is not alone in this call for further study into relationship development 
into the internet and more specifically into CMC negotiation.  McGinn and Croson 
(2004) proposed that studies of media effects in negotiation need to “investigate the 
role of social awareness in the interaction” (p. 345).  They define social awareness as 
“the degree of consciousness of and attention to other in the interaction” (p. 334).  
This study explores the social awareness of the negotiators by not only asking about 
their own communication behaviors, but collecting perceptions of their partner’s 
behaviors.  These measures explore different dimensions of relationship development 
such as dominance, trust, affect, depth, formality, and task orientation (Burgoon & 




This dissertation explores some of the newest and most recent trends in 
relationship development and media use in CMC negotiation while at the same testing 
long standing theories, like the cues filtered out ones that are still included in 
organizational communication textbooks (Miller, 2006) despite having limited 
support.  The dissertation provides a further test and expansion of Walther’s work 
(1992, 1994) on the effects of time on relationship development by testing his theory 
within a highly social process like organizational negotiation where there is mixed 
channel use.   
Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of six chapters.  The first chapter is an introduction 
to the study and an overview of the dissertation’s organization.  Chapter two contains 
reviews of the relevant literature on CMC and negotiation focusing on the competing 
theories of media effects, the role of relationships, and the effect of power.  Chapter 
three provides the hypotheses and the rationale leading to each hypothesis and 
research question.  Chapter four presents the method, including a description of the 
participants, research design, procedures, and the scale construction.  Chapter five 
provides the results of the study including the tests of hypotheses, research questions, 
and other findings.  Chapter six discusses the results of the findings and explores 
them in light of previous research regarding CMC and negotiation.  Chapter six also 
discusses the implications and contributions of this research and provides directions 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Media Selection – Cues Filtered Out and Social Information Processing  
Media richness theory (Daft & Lengel, 1984; Trevino et al., 1987) has 
provided a compelling argument for using rich media such as face-to-face (FTF) for 
negotiations.  Because negotiations are often complex discussions involving 
persuasion and the exchange of personal information, rich media are proposed to be 
better than lean media for conducting negotiations, according to this theory.  Rich 
media, like FTF, are characterized by the availability of instant feedback, the use of 
multiple cues, the use of natural language, and the personal focus of medium.  These 
characteristics would seem to make rich media a good match with negotiations – the 
theory has a high degree of construct validity making it easily understood and 
acceptable to most researchers.  Many researchers subscribe to the media richness 
theory and assume that e-mail neither provides enough nonverbal cues nor allows the 
high quality exchange of information required for a successful negotiation outcome 
when the task is ambiguous.  These assumptions have led most researchers to ignore 
the role of new communication media such as e-mail for negotiation tasks.   
As the most common theory for media selection, media richness advocates an 
objective and rational approach to media selection purporting that for each 
communication task there is a matching media to use (Daft & Lengel, 1984; Rice, 
1993; Trevino et al., 1987).  According to media richness, this matching media will 
be the same for all efficient and effective communicators; it is not dependent on the 




media in terms of richness is also considered fixed regardless of the task, the 
individuals involved, or the organizational or social culture.  The order from most to 
least rich is face-to-face, telephone, electronic mail, personal written text (letters, 
memos), formal written text (documents, bulletins), and formal numeric text 
(computer output) (Schmitz & Fulk, 1991).  Although these rankings have been fairly 
consistent across studies, the research approach to studying these channels also has 
been fairly consistent in its dismissal of social and cultural influences on perceptions.   
 This media richness perspective tends to ignore many of the unique 
characteristics associated with e-mail (Poole, Shannon, & DeSanctis, 1992) such as 
the communication relationships between the individuals involved (Walther, 1995; 
Walther & Burgoon, 1992),  the social influences of superiors and co-workers ( Fulk, 
Schmitz, & Steinfield, 1990; Fulk, Steinfield, Schmitz, & Power, 1987), a person’s 
prior media use experiences ( Fulk, Schmitz, & Ryu, 1995; Schmitz & Fulk, 1991), 
and the nature of the task (Rice, 1992).  In the interest of clarity and parsimony, 
media richness studies have assumed a medium’s richness to be fixed for all 
individuals and for all situations and largely ignored these other factors (Rice, 1992). 
There are several other media theories that hold similar beliefs about the 
objective characteristics of media.  For example, Short, Williams, and Christie’s 
(1976) social presence theory dealt with traditional media such as letters and the 
telephone and described the communication channel in term of bandwidth.  When the 
bandwidth is wide, there is an ability to carry many nonverbal cues which allows the 
presence of individuals to come through and create a warm, friendly interaction 




Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986; Sproull  & Kiesler, 1986), have found 
that the lack of nonverbal cues in CMC created a task focused interaction that was 
devoid of self-awareness.  This lack of self-awareness, the researcher argued, creates 
a more hostile individual who is more likely to violate social norms of politeness and 
reciprocity.  The best example of this has been termed “flaming,” whereby internet 
users send hostile e-mail messages that are “on fire.”  Sproull and Keisler (1986) 
believe that these “flaming” messages would not occur if someone had to deliver 
them FTF.  Together these various perspectives have been named the cues filtered out 
approach by Culnan and Marcus (1987).  
One attempt to address the influence that superiors and co-workers have on 
media selection decisions and to consider the organizational culture was made by 
Fulk and various associates in the development of the Social Influence Theory (SI) 
(Fulk et al., 1990; Fulk et al., 1987).  Social influence theory is “grounded in the 
belief that social interaction in the workplace shapes the creation of shared meanings 
and that these shared definitions provide an important basis for shared patterns of 
media selection” (Schmitz & Fulk, 1991, p. 488).  This theory takes into account the 
influences that superiors, co-workers, and the general culture of the organization have 
on which media are viewed as the most effective given the history and status of 
relationships in a given organization.   
  SI theory, according to Fulk and her associates (1987, 1990), states that 
although objective characteristics and constraints in the work environment influence 
perceptions and behavior, information provided by the social environment is at least 




influenced by the attitudes about media characteristics and use behaviors of their co-
workers and supervisors.  An important assumption of SI theory is that individuals are 
rational when forming attitudes and taking action.  However, the rationality used for 
decisions about media selection is not based simply on the richness characteristics of 
the media but also on the nature of the task, situational constraints, social influences 
and norms, and similar past personal experiences or experiences of relevant others. 
SI theory was the first theoretical concept that was developed as an alternative 
approach to media richness theory.  Fulk and her associates (1987, 1990, 1991, 1995) 
conducted a series of studies to look at the media selection process in organizational 
settings.  These studies found support for the theory in that CMC use was affected by 
prior experience with e-mail and the computer, supervisor and co-worker attitudes 
regarding media and these colleagues media use behaviors, as well as the objective 
characteristics of the media (e.g., storage of e-mails, speed of transmission, 
asynchronous nature).  SI theory has its roots in media richness theory in that it starts 
with some of the same characteristics of a rich media, but it allows for individual and 
organizational differences to influence the matching of the “right” media to use in any 
situation.  SI theory opened the theoretical door for other approaches to media 
selection including examining the effect on relational communication and CMC 
impression management (Lea & Spears, 1992; Parks & Floyd, 1996; Walther, 1996).  
Relational Communication in Computer Mediated Communication  
Related to the importance of past experiences and organizational culture is the 
understanding that negotiations do not simply accomplish task goals but also serve to 




others in a process known as relational communication (Walther, 1995; Walther & 
Burgoon, 1992).  Walther (1995) provides the following: 
Relational communication consists of the messages and message 
dimensions people use to define or redefine relationships (Millar & 
Rogers, 1976; Parks, 1977), how they regard their relationships, and 
how they regard themselves and their partners within their 
relationships (Burgoon & Saine, 1978). (p. 187). 
Moving beyond prior experiences and organizational culture to examine CMC 
relationships is necessary. As people become more skilled at using CMC to form and 
maintain relationships, they will use the media more often and use it to communicate 
in new ways, such as negotiation.  Their success or failure at these new skills will 
often determine the nature of their relationships and, in the case of negotiation, their 
satisfaction with the process and their outcome.  Successful negotiators develop and 
manage their persona in CMC, take advantage of the unique characteristics of the 
media, and learn how other’s use CMC to manage their relationships (Floyd & Parks, 
1996; McGinn & Croson, 2004; Tidwell & Walther, 2002; Walther & Boyd, 2002).    
The negotiation relationship illustrates the importance of relations between  
parties because people must work together to achieve their goals.  An individual’s 
approach to negotiations will be shaped by past interactions and experiences with the 
other party, such as whether trust has been built with the other party, whether the 
other party has attempted to dominate the negotiation, and whether there is a task 




among others that contribute to relational communication, should have a significant 
influence on the negotiators’ satisfaction with the negotiation process and outcome. 
The cues filtered out approaches (Culnam & Marcus, 1987) suggest that e-
mail is not rich enough to carry socio-emotional content.  These approaches imply 
that negotiations are primarily task related and that relationships do not develop or 
change while using e-mail.  However, conflicting results have begun to appear, in the 
field with some studies reporting the appearance of socio-emotional content in CMC 
discussions.  A few early researchers (Hiltz & Turoff, 1978; Rice & Love, 1987) have 
postulated that over time, as e-mail users gained experience, they may learn to 
include more of this content.  Later researchers who worked with more experienced e-
mails users found more socio-emotional content and relational communication 
included in the interactions (Tidwell & Walther, 2002; Walther, 1992, 1996).  
However, they reported that more experience with CMC alone does not fully explain 
how and why relationships develop when using CMC.     
Walther and his associates (Tidwell & Walther, 2002; Walther, 1992, 1994, 
1995, 1997; Walther & Anderson, 1994; Walther & Burgoon, 1992) have proposed 
the Social Information Processing (SIP) theory to explain why relationship 
development occurs in some exchanges and not in others while using CMC.   SIP 
looks at the process of social cognition and interpersonal relationship development 
(Walther, 1992), and proposes that online communicators are just as driven as FTF 
communicators to form relationships, control the image presented to others, learn 
more about their communication partner, and develop ongoing, meaningful 




communicators adjust their text messages with attention to the content, style, and 
timing.  Despite the special attention given to the textual messages, relationship 
development is expected to take longer than in FTF interactions not only due to the 
task and relational content that is conveyed over the limited bandwidth but due to the 
additional time required to develop, send and read written messages.  An example of 
how communicators may adapt their messages is by using emoticons (e.g., graphical 
smiles, frowns, and other facial expressions created with keyboard characters), 
sending messages at a certain time of day (e.g., 5 a.m. or 1 a.m.), responding to 
messages at variable times (5 minutes or making someone wait an entire day, or make 
a concerted effort to include social content in their messages (e.g., “I just got in from 
a run – I’ve tuned up my brain and body and am ready to get down to work.  Do you 
ever run?”).   SIP suggests that CMC relationships will develop to comparable FTF 
levels but will simply take more time to reach the FTF level (Walther, 1996; Walther, 
Anderson, & Park, 1994; Walther & Parks, 2002).   Strong support for this temporal 
aspect of SIP comes from Walther, Anderson, and Park’s (1994) meta-analysis of past 
CMC studies that were reinterpreted by looking at whether time constraints were 
imposed on CMC users.  Their review supported SIP’s view that when provided 
additional time the relationships of CMC users will develop but take more time than 
for FTF communicators. Topi, Valacich, and Rao (2002) also found the CMC users 
needed more time in a dyadic negotiation task to reach agreement than FTF users. 
This SIP theory that Walther advocates shares similar roots with the social 
influence (SI) theory of Fulk and associates (1990) that relates to media selection in 




one’s network (e.g., co-workers and supervisors) have on media selection decisions 
whereas SIP expands this idea to look at how individuals manage their relationships 
with their network.  At the heart of Walther’s SIP model is the belief the people 
gather and store information from previous communication encounters to develop 
strategies and scripts for future messages; CMC communicators actively monitor their 
communication messages and carefully craft them to compensate for the lack of 
nonverbal cues (Walther, 1992).  This expansion beyond the limited view of SI theory 
means that for Walther, people are not just influenced by their networks media 
selection decisions but people’s media selection decisions are influenced by the prior 
communication experiences using the media with their network.  For example, even 
though a co-worker may communicate with a recipient via voice messages, that 
recipient may choose to respond via e-mail because it allows the recipient to convey 
more social content, craft a more detailed response, and create a written record of 
responses.  SI theory would recommend that the recipient respond with a voice 
message, but SIP theory suggests that the recipient analyze the state of the 
relationship and choose the medium that best supports developing the relationship 
desired. 
The Role of Relationships in Negotiation 
Walther and Burgoon (1992) found that CMC groups adapted their text 
messages to include relational factors.   Further, they found that the relational 
communication factor scores reported by the FTF and CMC groups were similar.  
They measured these relationship dimensions using the Relationship Communication 




of the communication relationship: immediacy/affection, similarity/depth, 
receptivity/trust, composure, formality, dominance, equality, and task orientation. 
(Note: The methods section contains a further explanation of Burgoon and Hale’s, 
1987, scale and its application to CMC studies.)  Although SIP theory supports the 
expectation that FTF and CMC relationships will reach similar levels when 
experienced CMC communicators attend to message development, what is unknown 
is whether the characteristics of a medium like e-mail may allow a person to have 
greater control over relationship development than using FTF communication.  For 
example, in the case of a negotiation with a very social person with whom 
conversations generally last longer than 30 minutes, e-mail may provide the ability to 
control the amount of time invested in the negotiation and may provide to the ability 
to move the relationship to a more task orientation through e-mail messages.  This 
dissertation explores the changes that occur in negotiation relationships using FTF 
versus CMC in terms of both magnitude and direction of relationship development. 
   Walther (1994) also used the Relationship Communication scale developed 
by Burgoon and Hale (1987) and found higher relationship communication levels for 
CMC groups than FTF groups after only one decision making task.  These intact 
groups then completed two additional decision making tasks using the same channel 
of communication.  Although the initial relational levels were higher than would be 
expected for the CMC groups in comparison to the FTF groups, the relationship 
levels for the two media began to converge over time.   Walther’s (1994) study 
provided support for the need to better understand the development of relationships in 




conclusion was further supported by another study involving relationship 
development in a CMC environment: Liu, Ginther, and Zelhart (2002) reported that 
users that sent more messages and longer messages to manipulate their persona in 
CMC were able to better influence the impression of their behaviors and achieve 
better relations with their partner. 
The cues filtered out theories do not take into account relationships and 
organizational context when recommending a channel for negotiating and they further 
purport that the bandwidth of e-mail is too narrow to support relationship 
development.  From this viewpoint, unless negotiations were viewed as a purely task 
oriented activity with an obvious and universal solution for all parties, e-mail would 
not be a viable channel (McGrath & Hollingshead, 1994; Rice, 1993).  This view of 
negotiation is not supported, however, because considering the effect of relationship 
factors has been shown to be an important part of the negotiation process (Pruitt & 
Carnevale, 1993; Lawler & Yoon, 1995).  Past relational communication experiences 
affect and influence future decisions not only on what is communicated during a 
bargaining session but how the information is communicated.  Considering relational 
factors in the communication process often involves taking a long term view of the 
negotiation relationship.  Much of the past research on media channels (Daft & 
Lengel, 1986) and negotiation (McGrath & Hollingshead, 1994; Rice, 1993; Ulijn & 
Lincke, 2004) has failed to take into account the influence of past communication 
encounters and has relied instead on the prescriptive media richness approach that 




relationships is a weakness in much of the past media selection research and in 
current e-mail negotiation research. 
Naquin and Paulson’s (2003) study comparing the role of trust in e-mail and 
FTF dyads is one example of current research still being structured around the cues 
filtered out approach.  This study involved only one intra-organizational negotiation 
task and the e-mail participants were anonymous (they only had the e-mail address of 
their partner) and had no prior relationship or expectation that a future relationship 
would exist.  Naquin and Paulson (2003) gave the participants three weeks to conduct 
their negotiations and found no differences between FTF and e-mail dyads in terms of 
reaching an impasse, a finding that supports the SIP view that time constraints will 
affect task completion.  However, in comparison to FTF users these researchers found 
that e-mail users had significantly lower levels of trust, lower levels of satisfaction 
with their outcome, and a lower desire to interact with their partner in the future.   
This study ignored the role of previous relationships and created no reason for 
participants to desire future interactions; a negotiation situation that more closely 
mirrored an E-bay transaction than the intra-organizational case used for the 
negotiation task.  The context of this study needs to be considered (i.e., anonymous, 
interpersonal e-mail negotiation) and should not be seen as representative of an intra-
organizational CMC negotiation.  This dissertation addresses the methodological 
weaknesses of Naquin and Paulson (2003) in that the organizational negotiation task 





In a study comparing FTF, telephone, and e-mail negotiations, McGinn and 
Keros (2002) looked at the effect of close social ties on the negotiation process.  They 
transcribed the negotiations from all three conditions and coded them to identify 
negotiation improvisations.  They identified three improvisations: opening up, 
working together, and haggling.  Negotiations with strangers via e-mail involved 
haggling and resulted in attempts to get the best deal whereas negotiations among 
individuals with close social ties involved opening up.  This opening up was 
characterized by mutual trust and a matching of communication behaviors to produce 
coordinated actions.  In the case of e-mail and the telephone, but not FTF, McGinn 
and Keros (2002) reported that social ties resulted in higher levels of trust, enhanced 
cooperation, and increased likelihood of reaching an agreement as compared to 
strangers.  When the negotiation transcripts were analyzed, individuals with social 
ties who negotiated resulted in more matching behaviors and more equal distribution 
of resources.  Their findings indicate that prior relationships affect the outcome of 
negotiations as well as the process and that considering the role of relationships is 
especially important when using e-mail to negotiate. 
Other researchers (Morris et al., 2002; Moore et al., 1999) have looked at the 
effects of shared membership in a group, mutual self disclosure, and the 
establishment of rapport prior to negotiating on the negotiation process.  For several 
years, business school faculty members at Northwestern and Stanford have engaged 
in a series of long distance negotiations with students in their classes using e-mail.  
Moore and colleagues (1999) looked at the effect of in-group and out-group 




more personal by sharing a black and white photo of their partner, providing a short 
biographical sketch, providing a list of 11 “emoticons,” and requiring the exchange of 
a social-related e-mail prior to the start of the business negotiation.   They reported 
that in-group status and the rapport developing exchange resulted in greater reports of 
positive affect and resulted in almost no impasses.  The authors expected that in-
group membership would play a role, but found that this simple instruction to 
establish rapport produced near identical results to being a member of the same 
group.  In a further study, Morris and colleagues (2002) introduced a phone call prior 
to the negotiation between the students at the two schools, a process referred to as 
“schmoozing.”  Individuals who schmoozed prior to negotiating experienced a greater 
sense of trust, a higher degree of rapport, and overall better economic and social 
outcomes than those dyads who did not schmooze prior to negotiating.  This simple 
phone call produced a greater sense of trust among the parties, more positive 
impressions of each other, a greater sense of depth to the relationship, and a 
preference to work with their partner again.  These studies together indicate the power 
of a prior relationship when negotiating via e-mail even when the prior interaction is 
as brief as a short e-mail or five minute phone call.  Further study into the effect of a 
prior FTF relationship on an e-mail negotiation is necessary to determine how an 
actual FTF negotiation may affect the relationship and preference of the parties to 
work together in the future. 
McGinn and Croson (2004) proposed that the ability of a medium to make 
negotiators “socially aware” of each other will lead to shared understandings and 




beyond the media characteristics of synchronicity, co-presence, and richness to 
include cultural differences, affect, depth of prior relationship, and audience effects.  
In their study of social awareness, they found that e-mail negotiators without a prior 
relationship who took part in a single negotiation task were more likely to lie and 
violate normative behavior expectations.  However, they purported that prior 
relationships would most likely provide enough social awareness to mitigate their 
findings (McGinn & Keros, 2002; Moore et al., 1999; Morris et al., 2002, Walther, 
1996).  McGinn and Croson (2004) also provided that in some negotiations, limiting 
social awareness may be useful. For example, when dealing with a dominant or 
aggressive negotiator it may be preferable for the other party to not fully understand 
the aggressive tone of the messages that they are receiving.  If the recipient fully 
understood the dominant relationship tone of the messages, the risk of reaching an 
impasse in the negotiations may increase.  
  A recent study into the development of trust and cooperation among three 
person teams communicating FTF or via synchronous chat provided support for 
Walther’s SIP theory that over time the level of trust in relationships using different 
media will converge (Wilson, Straus, & McEvily, 2006).  In this study, the 
participants were asked to spend three weeks working together on a decision making 
task whereby they met one a week for 60 minutes to discuss their assigned task.  The 
meetings were conducting using either FTF (F) or electronic chat rooms (E).  There 
were four communication groups, FEE, EFF, FEE, and FFF, that indicated the media 
used for each of the three negotiations.  The group that started out meeting FTF and 




began meeting electronically.  In the end, all of the groups ended up converging, so 
that no matter what media was used, no significant differences were found in the 
levels of trust or cooperation between the four groups after three weeks.  This study 
provides support to Walther’s SIP theory for decision making tasks and provides 
some basis for the expectation that trust and affect may decrease when changing from 
FTF to e-mail interactions. 
Media Development 
In addition to considering the role of relationships and time in negotiations, 
the increased diffusion and evolution of new electronic media, such as enhanced e-
mail systems in organizations, requires that the relationship between tasks and media 
choice continue to be revisited.  Poole and associates (1992) recognized the 
importance that new communication media, and e-mail in particular, have for 
negotiation interactions and relationships between people.  McGrath (1984) also 
pointed out in his early work on CMC use that negotiation tasks are more complex 
and difficult than most other organizational communication interactions.  Negotiation 
tasks require the exchange of large amounts of information to identify and resolve 
issues, the handling of conflicting task and social issues, and require thinking through 
one’s own interests and the partner’s interests.  Rice’s (1993) recommendations for 
not using CMC for negotiation were also based on this complexity as well as the 
perceived limited capacity of users to adapt to CMC technology.  However, a failure 
to revisit the use of CMC for negotiation could result in basing practical and 
theoretical decisions about the use of e-mail on studies involving out-dated 




Poole, and DeSanctis’s (1988) early study on decision-making concluded that 
inexperienced CMC users needed more practice and guidance on how to adapt the 
technology to support their communication and decision making skills. 
In many of the early studies described by Poole and associates (1992), in their 
chapter describing research on negotiation and media, the CMC studies used 
anonymous communication interactions, synchronous communication, one stand 
alone interaction, and a focus on outcomes rather than relationship development over 
time.   Studies need to recognize these design limitations and take into consideration 
that most organizational negotiations take place within a long-term relationship 
context where the parties know each other and expect to work together on a series of 
tasks.  Basing theories and practical negotiation decisions on studies where unknown 
people communicate with each other for less than an hour using outdated technology 
lacks the rigor required for a 21st century research design. 
  Another issue is that past research has typically centered on comparing the 
appropriateness of using FTF with another medium (Walther, 2002) without 
considering that geographic and temporal issues may make FTF interactions 
expensive or impractical in many cases (Naquin & Paulson, 2003).  In practice, this 
limitation of FTF is especially true for business negotiations when limited budgets 
and time constraints make this approach to negotiation impractical.  Simply applying 
past media selection theories and research completed in pre-computer dominated 
organizations to present-day organizations would be a mistake (Fulk, 1993).  As the 
technology of e-mail systems has evolved and e-mail use has increased, despite 




negotiations and other social interactions without the development of theoretical 
frameworks. 
Trevino, Webster, and Stein (2000) and Liu (2002) pointed out the lack of 
research that integrates the testing of cues filtered out theories and social influence 
theories to understand and test both.  Trevino and associates (2000) also reported that 
much of the research on e-mail use was developed in the early 1990’s, has not been 
restudied and has considered e-mail’s characteristics as constant for all users.  
Trevino and associates study found significant variance in how individuals used their 
e-mail systems to manage messages and to respond to messages.  E-mails that 
contained social content were typically responded to much more quickly and were 
given considerably more attention as opposed to task oriented messages.  Overall, 
they found that media choice was influenced by situational factors including social 
relationships, technology experience/comfort, organizational climate, distance, the 
individual’s view of the equivocality of the communication situation, and the 
symbolic meaning of using the medium (Trevino, et al., 2000). 
Liu (2002) cited the need for conducting more research that integrates the cues 
filtered out theory and SIP theory.  She also proposed that future study designs 
recognizes the changes in technology, reflect Walther’s and colleagues (Walther, 
1992, 1995, 1996; Walther et al., 1994) findings on the importance of time and the 
expectation of future relationships, consider the user’s CMC comfort level, and 
consider the use of multiple media in the interaction.  McGinn and Croson (2004) 
also have cited the lack of theory development in these areas.  Despite these calls, few 




theories into the design, or examined CMC usage over multiple interactions with an 
expectation of future interactions.  There has been little development of new theories 
related to CMC relational communication in the last 10 years (Dabbish et al., 2005).  
Researchers such as Walther continue to work in the field and refine his SIP model.  
However, Walther’s most recent studies have focused on how communicators 
develop and adapt their CMC messages to achieve their relational goals given the 
constraints to the medium (Walther, Loh, & Granka, 2005).   Recent studies into 
negotiation and CMC (Anderson, 2000; Dorado, Medina, Munduate, Cisneros, & 
Euwema, 2002; Naquin & Paulson, 2003; Ulin & Lincke, 2004) have focused more 
on the outcome and process satisfaction as well as the effect of culture on the 
negotiation but lack the theoretical or methodological components discussed above.  
These studies have involved negotiations of short duration among individuals who 
have little knowledge of the other party or expect to have communication only during 
the course of the study.  
Studies on the use of e-mail for negotiation need to consider the unique 
characteristics of the medium such as rapid transmission of messages and the ability 
to reply without being co-present (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Friedman & Currall, 
2003).  The capability to store and organize messages for future retrieval is another 
advantage (Clark & Brennan, 1991).  E-mail can be stored for re-examination months 
and even years later.  The ability to forward someone’s exact message to others 
without their knowledge is another unique characteristic of this medium.  E-mail 
provides the possibility to communicate a message to a large group of people at one 




their home or office (Kiesler, 1997).  This response can be sent to just the sender or to 
all of the original recipients.  The ease and speed at which these options can be 
exercised has created a hybrid of interpersonal and mass channels (Kiesler, 1997).  E-
mail allows the communicator time to think, reflect, plan, and craft a strategic 
message prior to responding.  The medium also allows for a simple one word 
response: Yes, thanks, no, etc.  The norms of e-mail allow that such one word 
responses are  acceptable and do not violate social norms of appropriate 
communicating (Tapscott & Caston, 1993)  In contrast, in FTF communication, a 
simple one word response to a message may be perceived as abrupt or even rude, 
violating Grice’s (1998) cooperative principle and quantity maxim.   Communicators 
need to make a contribution to a discussion at the appropriate time in the exchange 
and in the right direction while providing a response in keeping with the context 
(Grice, 1998).  FTF discussions typically require a longer response based on the 
context of the discussion, whereas the context of e-mail discussions would allow for 
one word responses without violating Grice’s cooperative principle or quantity 
maxim.  
Clark and Brennan (1991) have developed a concept called grounding 
whereby communicators come to a common understanding of their interaction. They 
propose that grounding is affected by two aspects of the interaction: the purpose (e.g., 
negotiate, make a decision) and the medium (e.g., e-mail, FTF).  Integral to 
grounding is the principle of least collaborative effort whereby communicators try to 
minimize the amount of communication and combined effort necessary to come to a 




ability to comply with the principle of least collaborative effort.  Clark and Brennan 
(1991) provide a list of eight potential constraints by which all media should be 
assessed (p. 141): 
1. Copresence: A and B share the same physical environment. 
2. Visibility: A and B are visible to each other. 
3. Audibility:  A and B communicate by speaking. 
4. Cotemporality: B receives at roughly the same time as A produces. 
5. Simultaneity: A and B can send and receive at once and simultaneously. 
6. Sequentiality: A’s and B’s turns cannot get out of sequence. 
7. Reviewability: B can review A’s messages. 
8. Revisability: A can revise messages for B. 
Of these eight, e-mail only allows for the reviewability of messages and the 
revisability of messages.  E-mail messages can be stored for long periods of time and 
can even be shared with third parties.  E-mail messages are also revisable in that 
individuals can edit and rewrite them before sending.  Clark and Brennan (1991) 
purport that when a media lacks one of the eight characteristics it forces people to 
find alternative ways to ground communication.  Because e-mail does not allow for 
copresence, visibility, audibility, cotemporality, simultaneity, and sequentiality, users 
must find alternative ways to arrive at a common understanding. 
Some ways to make up for the deficiencies of e-mail are to spend increased 
time formulating the message, sending longer e-mail messages to make oneself clear, 
reading longer messages to understand the other party, working harder to get 




an e-mail message is received, paying particular attention to when it is one’s turn to 
send a message, repairing misunderstandings quickly, and taking the time to be sure 
that facts are right in a message.  Clark and Brennan’s (1991) work conveys the need 
to consider the media’s characteristics within the cultural and relationship background 
when making the media selection decision.  Skilled and comfortable e-mail users may 
find that they can still achieve common ground with minimal collaborative effort 
especially in cases of high trust, low dominance, and a strong task orientation.  These 
three relationship dimensions could create an environment whereby collaboration 
could be achieved at a low cost.   
In computer mediated communication, users have been found to express 
greater levels of conflict and raise issues that may not be dealt with in more rich 
forms (Siegel et al., 1986, Turoff & Hiltz, 1982).  For example, the extended time 
provided for people to think and analyze an issue may result in their studying an issue 
in greater detail.  The studying could turn into stewing over the issue and result in an 
angry response whereas in a FTF discussion the flow of the conversation is more 
likely to preclude obsessing over messages.  Studying the message may also give the 
person time to raise new issues and interests that may be lost in the quick flow of FTF 
discussions.  In addition, CMC may create a sense of not dealing with a real person 
who has feelings with whom one has a relationship. 
This surfacing of conflict may cause negotiations to progress more slowly or 
contentiously, in the long run better results may be achieved by addressing these 
underlying issues (Fisher et al., 1991).  The surfacing of underlying issues and 




placed on the bargaining table.  Negotiators can take advantage of the opportunity to 
consider their interests and the interests of the other parties without getting caught up 
in the quick flow of FTF discussion or in emotional responses that are based on affect 
rather than the task at hand.  The success of the negotiator in using e-mail to achieve 
these goals depends on practice and training in using the medium effectively (Zigars 
et al., 1988; Nadler, Thompson, & Boven, 2003). 
  Despite these added possibilities, Rice’s (1993) report on the media 
appropriateness of various mediums found e-mail to be the last choice for negotiating 
and bargaining activities.  Rice collected data on ten communication tasks and asked 
respondents whether a communication medium was appropriate or not appropriate for 
each task.  These responses were coded as a 0 or 1, creating no variability.  The 
questions were not placed in a personal or organization context, but were simple one 
question measurements.  Many of the participants in the study were new e-mail users 
of less than eight months, and some participants were dropped because their secretary 
read their e-mails for them.  This group of respondents would be difficult to replicate 
in today’s working world and subsequent research into CMC uses indicates the need 
to consider media use decisions within either a personal or organizational context 
(Trevino et al., 2000) as describes in the SI and SIP theories.  Rice’s early study in to 
the medium preferences for various tasks does not reflect the current realities of e-
mail use in organizations or the influence of situational and culture issues on the 
media selection process. 
E-mail may allow negotiators to concentrate more on interests of a negotiation 




affective personal issues (Jarvenpaa, Rao, & Huber, 1988; Sheffield, 1995).  The 
textual basis of an e-mail message can also allow negotiators to focus more attention 
on the negotiation process itself to be certain that all issues are raised and discussed 
(Morley & Stephenson, 1979).  Sheffield (1995) conducted a single negotiation task 
study with dyads assigned to four conditions:  phone, FTF, synchronous computer 
conference, and synchronous computer conference with the partners sitting next to 
each other but not speaking.  Sheffield (1995) found that the competitive 
individualistic negotiators achieved joint outcomes similar to cooperative negotiators 
when the partners could not see each other.  Sheffield argued that the lack of visual 
cues resulted in more task focused messages that could not convey the individualistic 
orientation.  Because the dyads were limited to one 35 minute session, the time limit 
could have resulted in the greater task focus.  Moore, Nadler, Kurtzberg, and 
Thompson’s (2000) negotiation study found that under time limits the FTF 
participants exchanged three times the amount of information that CMC participants 
did.  When under time pressure, CMC negotiations appear to exchange less 
information and become more task focus.   
  Some support has been found that CMC negotiations can help to even the 
playing field by mediating attempts to control or influence the negotiation since the 
nonverbal cues used by some negotiators to dominate a discussion are missing such 
as tone of voice, physical size, and dominating the flow of the conversation 
(Dubrovsky et al., 1991; Siegel et al., 1986).  Later research has called this 
equalization phenomena into question based on the expectation that as users become 




behaviors in CMC (Friedman & Currall, 2003).  Finally, e-mail can also provide time 
to study the communication before responding (Hiltz & Turoff, 1978) and can 
provide a cooling off period between receipt of a conflict ladden message and the 
response to this message (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). 
In the case of paper based text negotiations, Morley and Stephenson (1977) 
reported that the negotiations typically rely more on the merits of the case whereas 
FTF negotiations were found to be influenced by personality and persuasive 
arguments and to result in greater opinion changes (Dubrovsky et al., 1991).  Valley, 
Moag, and Bazerman (1998) conducted two negotiation studies using dyads, one 
study compared text messages on paper and FTF and the other study used three 
mediums: paper text messages, FTF, and the phone.  These researchers reported that 
written negotiations resulted in lower seller trust in the buyer when compared to FTF, 
but no differences were found between with the phone negotiations and text 
negotiations.  The telephone offers the ability to convey more nonverbal cues than a 
paper communication making it appear that there is something about co-physical 
presence that may aid in the development of trust.  They also reported that buyers 
were more likely to take the time to search out information and make better informed 
bids in the written condition as opposed to the FTF and phone conditions.  These 
results lend support to written negotiations making negotiators focus on the merits of 
the negotiations and to reflect more on their interests before acting (Dubrovsky et al., 
1991; Valley et al., 1996), but that less trust is developed in text-based negotiations. 
Some of Walther’s (1996) research into socio-emotional content in e-mail 




other words, without nonverbal cues present individuals read more into the text 
messages and take them much more personally, which can affect relationship 
development..  Friedman and Currall (2003) proposed in their article on conflict 
escalation in e-mail, that these hyperpersonal communications could result in the 
intensification of conflict.  Walther (1996) did not study this aspect of hyperpersonal 
communication, therefore Freidman and Currall’s (2003) assertion may be valid.  In 
the present research, increases in levels of dominance are expected more in e-mail 
negotiations than in FTF negotiations.  Further studies of the role and effect of 
conflict in e-mail negotiations are needed that involve experienced users that have a 
long term investment in the development of organizational relationships. 
Decision making research with CMC groups has found that these groups make 
more specific proposals and that members participated more equally in the discussion 
than in FTF groups (Dubrovsky et al., 1991; Kiesler et al., 1984; Siegel et al., 1986).  
These studies found that the percentage of communication messages between CMC 
members was more equally distributed between negotiators than in FTF groups.  The 
CMC users also made more specific proposals because they could take the time to 
write out and revise their message before sending to the other party.  These findings 
support the expectation that e-mail negotiations are likely to be more task oriented 
and formal than FTF negotiations. 
  Research on the ability to detect lies in dyadic communication (Woodworth, 
Hancock, & Goorha, 2005) has found that liars are more successful at avoiding 
detection in CMC.  The lack of nonverbal cues can result in partner’s taking longer to 




develop a plausible untrue position statement, craft artful responses (Hancock & 
Dunham, 2001), and manage one’s persona (Walther, 1996).  The extra time provided 
by CMC to respond and develop messages can provide for an increased capability for 
deception among skilled and experienced e-mail users.  This ability of e-mail to 
transmit messages with low nonverbal content may inhibit the normal truth detecting 
techniques used by negotiators (Woodworth et al., 2005).  More recent research, such 
as that discussed above, seems to indicate that as CMC communicators become more 
experienced and skilled at the channel, they find ways to replicate their 
communication behaviors.  Just as Walther (1992; 1995) found that relationships take 
longer to develop in CMC, people develop and hone their CMC communication 
skills. 
 In a negotiation task, e-mail should provide negotiators with the ability to 
generate specific proposals and ensure that all view points are expressed.   E-mail can 
offer increased satisfaction with the negotiation process by creating clear, egalitarian 
communications (Sheffield, 1995).  E-mail can offer an important advantage over 
FTF in that it provides a written record of each proposal and is more suited to 
tracking complex agreements than FTF (Poole et al., 1992).  This ability should be an 
advantage when using e-mail for individuals when faced with a complex task.  
However, many questions are still unclear: Does e-mail contribute to the reduction or 
escalation of conflict in negotiations? Does longer response time result in more 
carefully crafted messages focused on integrated interests or provide additional time 




process?  More and updated research leading to theories is needed into the effect of e-
mail on negotiation. 
Power in Negotiation  
Social norms can determine the actions that will take place during the 
negotiation process by helping to prevent conflict altogether, by regulating the way 
conflict is conducted and providing a solution once conflict arises (Pruitt & 
Carnevale, 1993).  Power has been described as the essence of bargaining and the 
relative amount of power between negotiators can play a major role in a negotiation 
outcome (Polzer, Mannix, & Neale, 1995).  As one party gains more power or control 
over another, the negotiators can gain the ability to control the exchange of 
information and are more likely have a better BATNA, Best Alternative to a 
Negotiated Agreement (Patton et al., 1991).  This better BATNA provides negotiators 
the option to walk away without engaging in the negotiation or grants them the ability 
to provide an alternative that is just slightly better than their partner’s BATNA. 
  Power in the negotiation relationship has been conceptualized in a number of 
different ways.  One classic approach comes from the work of Emerson (1962).  
Emerson conceptualized power within the context of the social relationship between 
parties in that each party is in some way in a position to grant or deny, hinder or 
facilitate the other’s gratification.  “Power resides implicitly in the other’s 
dependency” (Emerson, 1962, p. 32).  In other words, “Individual A is dependent on 
individual B to the extent that (a) Individual B can influence the goals of Individual 
A, and (b) Individual A has few alternatives available for achieving those goals” (Cai, 




have an advantage over sellers in that buyers have more options available to purchase 
their products whereas sellers need every buyer that they can get. 
In the case of an intra-organizational transfer negotiation, however, this power 
relationship may be violated (Lawler & Yoon, 1995).  An intra-organizational 
transfer is a situation in which a member representing one division of an organization 
sells a product to another division of the same organization.  In these cases, the 
organization has a strategic interest and profit-driven interest in ensuring that the 
overall organization achieves a better outcome by doing business with itself as 
opposed to going to another organization.  In this special situation, parties may share 
a close relationship and may be more likely to have interdependent goals, which in 
general may result in more positive emotions and higher commitment behavior 
(Lawler & Yoon, 1995).  Lawler and Yoon’s (1995) theory of relational commitment 
purports that as members of the same organization negotiate with each other they 
become more aware of their interdependent relationship with each other, and each 
time they reach an agreement it produces an emotional buzz.  This emotional buzz can 
create and deepen the sense of attachment among the organizational members and is 
referred to as the theory of affective attachment (Lawler & Yoon, 1995).  This 
interdependent relationship and shared goals result in a greater commitment to the 
organization, according to Lawler and Yoon (1995).  In turn, this greater commitment 
may result in a greater concern for meeting the organizations larger goals as opposed 
an individual member’s goals. 
In examining situations of power, Lawler and Yoon (1995) reported that when 




future negotiations, and more positive emotions were exhibited when compared with 
unequal power situations.  They also reported that mutual dependence produced 
closer relationships, as reported in the post-experimental questionnaire.  The mutual 
dependencies that exist in intra-organizational negotiation situations can increase the 
likelihood of reaching agreement.  These shared goals should also lead to a win/win 
bargaining approach which has been linked to increased satisfaction with the outcome 
and the process (Fisher et al.,1991). 
Other studies looking at the role of equal and unequal power report that in 
cases of unequal power the affect of the more powerful party influenced the overall 
tone of the negotiation as either positive, integrative, and trusting, or competing and 
suspicious (Anderson & Thompson, 2004).  The affect of the less powerful member 
did not influence the tone of the negotiation.  Anderson and Thompson reported that 
they can not provide a definitive explanation for this finding but argued that the 
positive affect of the more powerful member may make the power difference not 
seem as large and may make the lower power member more open to integrative 
bargaining.  Lawler and Yoon (1993) reported a similar effect in their study in that 
when intra-organizational members negotiated repeatedly together over time it 
produced a closer relationship and greater commitment to each other and in turn 
resulted in more integrative agreements.  However, Lawler and Yoon also found that 
in the early stages of negotiation lower power members tend to resist agreements that 
reflect the power differences.  Not only does time appear to be an important factor in  
the development of relationships in CMC but it also seems to have an important role 




In a CMC setting, Adkins and Brasher (1995) conducted a study in which they 
examined the use of powerful and powerless language in small computer mediated 
groups.  The researchers assigned one individual to work with two confederates and 
participate via computer in a decision-making exercise.  In one condition both 
confederates used powerful language, in the second condition the confederates used 
powerless language, and in the third condition one confederate used powerful 
language and the other used powerless language.  The use of powerful language 
resulted in a more credible, attractive, and persuasive perception of the confederates 
than the use of powerless language.  The powerful language users were perceived to 
be more task-attractive, more competent, more composed, and more persuasive than 
group members using powerless language. 
Although the perception of being powerful was found using the limited 
bandwidth of CMC in Adkins and Brasher’s study (1995), earlier studies reported no 
differences in influence for group members in CMC media (Kerr & Hiltz, 1982; 
Kiesler et al., 1984; Siegel et al., 1986).  These early studies were conducted with 
anonymous group members who had little experience with using the technology, 
making these studies somewhat suspect for today’s better trained users.  Based on 
these early works, CMC has been purported to be a power equalizer, reducing the 
perceptions of power in relationships.  Adkins and Brasher’s (1995) study was 
formulated to specifically look at the manipulation of power in a decision making 
context.  Although their work is the first to demonstrate the effect of power 




Further research is needed in CMC regarding the different relational power 
structures.  Deutsch (2002) has argued that despite over 70 years of research into 
conflict, “the progress does not yet begin to match the social needs for understanding 
conflict” (p. 318).  He further argued that “one of the recent questions that has just 
begun to be explored by the field is how to overcome oppression: (p. 315).  One 
aspect of this question includes looking at strategies and tactics that individuals with 
relatively low power could use to develop more equal power sharing.  This 
dissertation contributes to this effort by looking at the effect that negotiating via e-
mail may have on the development of the relationships between members within the 
same organization and how low power members could affect their relationship 
development by using e-mail. 
 The development of relationships is a key part of how future negotiations and 
work in the organization will occur (Lawler & Yoon, 1995).  Positive social 
relationships are more likely to lead to a cooperative orientation whereby members of 
the same group feel a duty to meet the needs of the entire organization and not just 
their own personal or small group’s needs (Deutsch, 2002; Lawler & Yoon, 1995).  In 
discussing his fifty years of research on the effect of a cooperative orientation on 
negotiations, Deutsch summarized his findings by comparing the effects of positive, 
cooperative orientations with competitive ones: 
1. Effective communication is exhibited.  More ideas are expressed, 
greater attention is paid to the ideas of others, there is greater 




there is improved communication and greater understanding of 
other perspectives. 
2. Friendliness, helpfulness, and less obstructiveness is found in the 
conflict.  People report a higher sense of satisfaction with the 
outcomes, a sense of greater obligation to the other party, and a 
higher sense of trust of one another. 
3. Coordination of effort, divisions of labor, orientation to task 
achievement, orderliness of discussion, and high productivity are 
manifest. 
4. Feelings of agreement with the ideas of others and a sense of 
shared values and beliefs of others along with stronger confidence 
in one’s own ideas and the value that others place in them. 
5. Willingness to enhance the other party’s knowledge, skills, or 
resources with the belief that as the other party gains power he/she 
is of greater value to you and this will lead to a better solution. 
6. Greater recognition of the legitimacy of interests held by other 
parties and the need to respect these interests and mutually work to 
respond to the needs of others (p. 311.) 
The nature of negotiations as competing over goals makes conflict inherent in the 
process, and the handling of this conflict in a positive way is important for all 
organizational members.  Deutsch’s recommendations for improving communication, 
developing a supportive organizational culture, and so on, are all important, yet an 




is unknown.  Overall positive relationships with an organization lead to greater 
productivity, more favorable interpersonal and intergroup communication, better 
psychological health, higher self esteem, and higher quality decisions.  Exploring 
what effects the use of e-mail to negotiate has on the development of relationships 
will contribute to the theoretical body of knowledge by providing a test of the cues 
filtered out and SIP theories under conditions that replicate those of an actual intra-
organizational negotiation: An expectation of a continuing relationship, the ability to 
use multiple channels, and more flexible time limits.  This dissertation also 
contributes to the development of SIP theory by examining the effect of power and 
media on the development of relationships.  Walther and his colleagues (2004) have 
only begun to fully test the SIP theory.  Further tests with new situations like 
negotiation in the context of a long term relationships are needed to continue building 
and developing the theory.   
This research will contribute to practice by providing advice to organization 
members on the risks and benefits of negotiating via e-mail and provide 
recommendations on how and when to use e-mail to negotiate.  Despite the limited 
research and practical training in this area, people are using electronic messaging 
systems to conduct negotiations as a means to solve organizational problems.  This 
dissertation synthesizes the propositions of several theories and tests them in an 
environment that more closely replicates intra-organizational negotiation conditions 
where long term relationship issues are considered.  




Chapter 3: Research Hypotheses  
 
As the use of information technology continues to expand in organizations, 
research is needed to provide information on the effects of technology on 
organizational success and organizational relationships. This dissertation compares 
dyads negotiating three scenarios involving equal or unequal power using two 
different communication media, face-to-face and asynchronous electronic mail.  The 
research examines the effect of the media and power conditions on the interpersonal 
relationship development between the two participants from the first to the third 
negotiation.  The dissertation also examines the effects of the negotiator’s previous 
communication relationship with his or her partner, experiences with using CMC to 
negotiate, and comfort with CMC communication on the selection of the future 
channel for continued negotiations with his or her partner. 
Lawler and Yoon (1995) have developed a model where they posit that 
relationship between partners in dyadic negotiations can override organizational 
commitment issues, such as the need to produce profit for their division, resulting in 
relationship citizenship behavior as opposed to organizational citizenship behavior. 
Their proposed model indicates that the combination of structural power and the 
relationship between parties is a complex dynamic that requires further study.  When 
combined with the characteristics of e-mail, power differences in a negotiation setting 
open the possibility of creating negotiation settlements and interpersonal relationship 
dynamics that would not be expected with strangers.    
Overall, positive relationships within an organization are expected to lead to 




better psychological health, higher self esteem, and higher quality decisions (Blake & 
Mouton, 1964; Huselid, 1995; Likert, 1961, 1967; Miller & Monge, 1986; Wiley & 
Brooks, 2000). 
Exploring what effect using e-mail to negotiate has on the development of 
these relationships contributes not only to the theoretical knowledge about 
relationship development in CMC negotiations but also provides direction that 
organizations can use to improve those relationships in their organization that are 
linked to increased efficiency and profitability.  Despite the lack of research and 
practical training in this area, people use electronic messaging systems to regularly 
conduct negotiations as a means to solve organizational problems.  This dissertation 
provides organizational members with a better understanding of the effects that 
negotiating via e-mail as opposed to face-to-face could have on their relationship with 
co-workers.  The dissertation also provides insight into the effects of power 
differences between negotiators on their relationship development when using e-mail.   
Electronic Mail Characteristics  
Hypotheses 1 through 6 address the effects of the two media channels (i.e., 
FTF and CMC) on the direction of the relationship development on 6 dimensions:  
dominance, depth, affect, trust, formality and task orientation.  E-mail allows 
negotiators to produce more structured messages, more precise messages, and more 
carefully worded messages that provide an archival record.  E-mail also reduces the 
effect of charisma on relationship development and forces communicators to not rely 




  In e-mail negotiations, the limited bandwidth, the lack of co-presence, lack 
of visibility, lack of cotemportality, and the asynchronous nature (Clark & Brennan, 
1991) require negotiators to craft messages that are expected to result in an increase 
in dominance, formality, and task orientation on the part of the sender and an 
increased perception of dominance, formality, and task orientation on the part of the 
receiver as compared to when the medium is FTF.  In the FTF situations, the sender 
will develop messages and receivers will perceive messages that convey increased 
levels of affect, trust, and depth of the relationship as compared to e-mail negotiators. 
 All of the negotiators will conduct a first FTF negotiation with his or her 
partner and then conduct two additional negotiations: half of the dyads will use e-mail 
and half will continue to use FTF for the last two negotiations.  These hypotheses test 
the effects of the unique properties of e-mail to examine whether these properties may 
make e-mail a better choice for negotiation than FTF. 
The hypotheses are designed to test the SIP theory’s expectation that  
relationship development is possible using CMC media but they have been further 
refined based on Clark and Brennan’s common grounding theory and the principle of 
least collaborative effort to test the direction of the relationship change.  The 
relationships are also tested based on the work of Morris and colleagues (2002) on 
rapport building in that each dyad negotiates FTF to establish a baseline relationship.  
The relationship change is studied by examining the changes in dominance, trust, 
affect, depth, formality, and task orientation between the end of the first and end of 
the third negotiation.  This study also examines the effects of switching from FTF to 




examine the effect of starting a relationship with a high bandwidth and strong social 
awareness (McGinn & Croson, 2004) then, in some cases, narrowing the bandwidth 
to examine the effect on social awareness.  
Construct Development and Measures of Post Dependent and Independent Variables 
of Relationship Development 
The relationship development measures for the study were based on a 
modified version of Burgoon and Hale’s (1987) Relational Communication scale.  
Burgoon and Hale examined the verbal and nonverbal themes present in people’s 
communication that defined interpersonal relationships.  Their scale has been used by 
a number of researchers and has been effective for studying relationship development 
in CMC (Anderson, 2000; Liu, Ginther, & Zelhart, 2002; Walther & Burgoon, 1992).  
Burgoon and Hale developed eight communication dimensions: immediacy/affection, 
similarity/depth, receptivity/trust, composure, formality, dominance, equality, and 
task orientation. This scale is primarily used as a self report measure, but it has been 
found to be versatile and adaptable for use in other settings such as being used by a 
third party observer or for coding transcripts or interactions (Rubin, Palmgreen, & 
Sypher, 1994).  It can be used to rate one’s own behavior or rate the behavior of a 
partner or other group members, and it has been used by outside observers to rate 
exhibited behaviors.  Items are responded to on a 7-point Likert scale with items that 
range from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).  The full instrument consists 
of sixty four questions. 
In this study, only six of the eight scales were used to provide a measure of 




was used as a self-report measure to assess one’s own relational communication 
behaviors.  The six dimensions selected for use in this study were based on the nature 
of the expected negotiation relationship and because relationship power was included 
as one of the conditions.  The items that measure equality were included in the 
questionnaire but were not used in the analysis because power was manipulated as a 
independent variable in the study.  This power manipulation would have reduced the 
usefulness of the equality measure for measuring the development of the relationship 
because this power manipulation was introduced at the start of the second negotiation.  
  The validity of this scale’s dimensions has been analyzed several times 
previously, and many criterion-related validity studies have shown the scale to be 
highly valid (Rubin et al., 1994).  Cronbach’s alpha coefficients have been reported 
between .42 and .88 for the dimensions when the scales have been used by Burgoon 
and Hale and others (Rubin et al., 1994).  The reliability is improved because the 
scale is constructed of several questions that measure each dimension rather than 
using a single item (Baily, 1994). The scale was used in this study first to establish a 
baseline relationship after the first negotiation and was then administered again after 
the second and third negotiation to look at the changes in the six relationship 
dimensions.   The change in relationship was examined by looking at the difference in 
the scores on these dimensions between the first and third negotiations. 
H1a: In e-mail negotiations, the perception of one’s dominance will 
increase more than it does in FTF negotiations from after the first 




H1b: In e-mail negotiations, the perception of the partner’s level of 
dominance will increase more than it does in FTF negotiations from after 
the first negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H2a: In FTF negotiations, the perception of the depth of one’s 
relationship will increase more than it does in e-mail negotiations from 
after the first negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H2b: In FTF negotiations, the perception of the partner’s depth of the 
relationship will increase more than it does in e-mail negotiations from 
after the first negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H3a: In FTF negotiations, the perception of one’s affect will increase 
more than it does in e-mail negotiations from after the first negotiation to 
after the third negotiation. 
H3b: In FTF negotiations, the perception of the partner’s level of affect 
will increase more than it does in e-mail negotiations from after the first 
negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H4a: In e-mail negotiations, the perception of one’s formality will 
increase more than it does in FTF negotiations from after the first 
negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H4b: In e-mail negotiations, the perception of the partner’s level of 
formality will increase more than it does in FTF negotiations from after 




H5a: In FTF negotiations, the perception of one’s trust will increase more 
than it does in e-mail negotiations from after the first negotiation to after 
the third negotiation. 
H5b: In FTF negotiations, the perception of the partner’s level of trust 
will increase more than it does in e-mail negotiations from after the first 
negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H6a: In e-mail negotiations, the perception of one’s task orientation will 
increase more than it does in FTF negotiations from after the first 
negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H6b:  In e-mail negotiations, the perception of the partner’s level of task 
orientation will increase more than it does in FTF negotiations from after 
the first negotiation to after the third negotiation.   
Relationships 
A test of the cues filtered out theories (Culnam & Markus, 1987) suggests 
relationships would not change or deepen when using CMC for negotiating.  In 
contrast, the social information processing theory (Walther, 1992) suggests that 
relationships continue to develop when using CMC to negotiate.  A comparison of 
these two theoretical perspectives can be done by examining the change in 
relationship over a series of negotiations conducted using either FTF or e-mail.  
According to Social Information Processing (SIP) theory the development of the 
relationship should continue overtime, whereas in the cues filtered out approach there 




 H7cues is based on the expectation that the richer media of FTF, as compared to lean e-
mail, promotes relationship development, even among people who have a pre-existing 
relationship.  This hypothesis is based on the cues filtered out perspective, which 
proposes that e-mail will result in little change in the relationship. 
 H7SIP is an alternative hypothesis based on the social information processing model.  
This hypothesis proposes that relationships will develop in the same manner as they 
do when communicating FTF when enough time is provided to compensate for the 
limited bandwidth of e-mail and the additional time it takes to send messages.  In this 
study, the negotiations conducted with e-mail should result in a continuing 
development of the pre-existing relationship as sufficient time was allotted to 
overcome the bandwidth and message creation problems.  As a result of negotiating, 
relationships do not always develop in the positive direction and it is possible that 
some relational aspects may become more negative, therefore, the SIP hypothesis 
measures absolute relationship change.    
H7cues: In FTF negotiations, the relationship between the parties will 
show greater change than in e-mail negotiations. 
H7SIP: In e-mail negotiations, the relationship between the parties will 
show greater change than in the FTF condition.  
Role of Power and Negotiation Role 
Power differences in relationships affect negotiation outcomes and the future 
development of these relationships.  Understanding how power is displayed and used 
in CMC negotiations can assist organizational negotiators to achieve better outcomes 




that powerful language can be found in CMC communications and can at times 
amplify the need to use more direct power language to convey dominance and the 
increase the awareness of how language is effecting the relationship (Adkins & 
Brasher, 1995).  This use of direct language (Siegel et al., 1986) may result in 
magnifying power which may result in greater relationship change between the 
parties than in the FTF condition. According to Adkins and Brasher (1995), the lack 
of FTF interaction requires the use of more powerful language when using CMC and 
heightened the impression of the power relationship between the parties when 
compared with FTF.  FTF situations involve nonverbal cues that can substitute for the 
use of powerful words. 
Given the exploratory nature of the study, no hypotheses are proposed here for 
power and media conditions across negotiator roles (i.e., buyer and seller).    
However, these relationships will be analyzed to examine the effects of power on 
negotiations using CMC or FTF interactions.  This examination of the effect of 
introducing a power difference after the establishment of a baseline relationship in the 
first FTF negotiation also provides the opportunity to examine the effect of an 
established intra-organizational rapport on relationship development when power is 
unequal (Lawler & Yoon, 1993, 1995; Moore et al., 1999; Morris et al., 2002).  
For these research questions, power captures the degree of influence or control 
that negotiators posses based on their role and position in the organization.  Whereas 
the dimension of dominance that is part of Burgoon and Hale’s relationship 
development scale captures the degree of dominance perceived in the individual 




parties has greater influence in the organization due to their personal relationship with 
their supervisor that should provide them an expected situational advantage.  While 
all negotiators choose the degree of dominance they choose to convey in their 
individual FTF or e-mail messages.  The degree of message dominance expressed and 
perceived by the parties is captured by the Burgoon and Hale scale while the relative 
power in the organization serves as a manipulated independent variable in the study.  
RQ1: What effect does the power difference between the negotiators have 
on the change in the six dimensions of relational communication over 
time as reported by the negotiators themselves? 
RQ2: What effect does the power difference between the negotiators have 
on the change in the six dimensions of relational communication over 
time in a negotiation as perceived by negotiators? 
RQ3: What effect does negotiation role (i.e., buyer/seller) have on the 
change in the six dimensions of relational communication in a negotiation 
over time as reported by the negotiators themselves? 
RQ4: What effect does the negotiation role (i.e., buyer/seller) have on the 
change in the six dimensions of relational communication over time in a 
negotiation as perceived by negotiators? 
Future Use 
  Past studies have found some support for the expectation that use of e-mail 
within organizations is associated with experience using electronic media (Fulk et al., 
1995; Schmitz & Fulk, 1991).  Johnanen, Vallee, and Vivian (1979) found that e-mail 




future selection of e-mail for negotiation in ongoing relationships.  Walther’s SIP 
theory (1992, 1994) also purports that future media use will be influenced by previous 
experiences using the media.  Negotiators who have used e-mail to negotiate and have 
developed some skill at this task-media pairing may prefer to use it for future 
negotiations as opposed to those who lack experience using e-mail to negotiate.    
Studies have found some support for using e-mail to communicate as being 
positively associated with prior use of this medium.  Because e-mail use has become 
almost a requirement of modern daily life, simply measuring experience may be too 
simplistic a view about how media are selected.  A broader perspective about media 
selection would be to examine a person’s perception of computer and “e-mail 
friendliness,” or their comfort level using computer-mediated communication 
channels.  A measure of this type should encompass comfort using computers, 
comfort using e-mail in personal and work situations, perceived ease of e-mail use, as 
well as comfort using other new communication technologies.   
  Yellen, Winniford, and Sanford (1995)  found support for the existence of a 
relationship between personality type and a person’s comfort and satisfaction with 
computer mediated communication. In other words, the decision to use electronic 
mail and satisfaction with e-mail may be related not only to the objective 
characteristics of the medium but also to personality types.  For example, computer 
exchanges may be more comfortable for introverts compared to extroverts so that 
introverts may have a more positive appreciation of the computer in general and 
electronic mail in particular for communication tasks.  Further, the computer may 




turn, places greater emphasis on the merits of each side rather than the verbal 
persuasive abilities of individuals (Turoff & Hiltz, 1982; Yellen et al., 1995).  
Individuals who feel greater affinity and comfort with computers should be more 
likely to use e-mail for negotiation tasks.  Further, individuals who perceive their 
partners to be dominant in past interactions may be more likely to use e-mail for 
future interactions. 
 
H8: The preference to use e-mail for future negotiations (i.e., after the 
third negotiation) with their same partner will be greater for individuals 
with higher levels of computer mediated communication comfort. 
H9: The preference to use e-mail for future negotiations (i.e., after the 
third negotiation) with their same partner will be greater for individuals 
who used e-mail to negotiate with their partner in the past. 
Several factors associated with relational communication (Burgoon & Hale, 
1987) are expected to predict whether e-mail will be used in the future.   The first 
factor is the individual’s perception of how dominant his or her partner has been in 
past negotiations.  Dominance is associated with attempts to control, command, and 
persuade others.   Perceiving one’s partner as being low in dominance is expected to 
increase the preference for e-mail use.  Negotiators who perceive their partners to be 
as low dominants may think that e-mail provides sufficient bandwidth and task focus 
to achieve high relationship and economic outcomes.  Negotiators with a low 




e-mail making this medium one that requires the least collaborative effort, in keeping 
with Clark and Brennan’s (1991) grounding theory. 
Trust is expected to influence the decision to use e-mail for negotiations.  
When trust exists in a negotiation relationship there is generally greater cooperation 
and a more positive relationship (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).  This positive 
relationship should result in greater concession making and use of a joint problem 
solving approach among the negotiators.  In cases where high trust exists the use of e-
mail should be a more likely selection because the focus of the interaction is on 
information exchange rather than on hostile, complex negotiation. Walther (1995) and 
Walther and Burgoon (1992) found that the level of trust individuals experienced 
when communicating via computer or FTF did not significantly differ once a 
relationship was established.  These findings imply that trust is possible to develop 
through the use of e-mail and that once individuals have developed trust they will 
continue to choose to use e-mail.  Negotiators may continue to use e-mail given the 
advantages of asynchronous communication and greater time efficiency.  However in 
situations where trust remains low individuals are expected to be more likely to 
choose FTF because they will need the larger bandwidth to detect deceptions.  In 
addition to needing an increased bandwidth, low levels of trust will require more 
collaborative effort and a media with co-presence, visibility, and audibility as 
consistent with Clark and Brennan’s (1991) grounding theory.  
H10: The preference to use e-mail for future negotiations with their 
partner (i.e., after the third negotiation) will be greater for individuals 




H11: The preference to use e-mail for future negotiations with their 
partner (i.e., after the third negotiation) will be greater for individuals 
with perceive lower levels of dominance in their relationship. 
Individuals who find that their past negotiation experiences have been more 
task oriented as opposed to social oriented are expected to prefer the use of e-mail.  
Task oriented individuals tend to report themselves to be more work-oriented and 
focused on completing their assignments as compared to social oriented individuals 
(Burgoon & Hale, 1987).  Because fewer nonverbal cues are provided via e-mail, 
individuals whose past experiences have exhibited a higher social orientation may 
prefer the use of FTF communication because it may be perceived as better for 
enhancing their social relationship.  The findings regarding this comparison will be 
especially interesting because Walther (1995) and Walther and Burgoon (1992) found 
e-mail exchanges between group members to be more socially oriented than FTF 
exchanges.  In both studies on decision making tasks, individuals using e-mail 
engaged in more socially oriented exchanges than the FTF group.  Walther (1995) 
reasoned that because individuals are social beings they attempt to establish 
relationships and connect with their communication partners.  When using e-mail to 
establish a relationship for the first time, the participants exchanged more social 
messages with e-mail than with FTF in an attempt to get to know their partner.  The 
same social exchanges were not necessary in the FTF condition because they had 
more nonverbal cues to form an impression of their partner.  Some evidence also 




watercooler” (Mantovani, 1994), such that e-mail is used to communicate social 
information without openly violating the assumptions that one should be “working.” 
Negotiators with a high task focus may be also drawn to the reviewability 
feature of e-mail (Clark & Brennan, 1991) that allows for reviewing their partner’s 
offerings, interests, and positions.  E-mail also provides high task oriented individuals 
an opportunity to fine tune and revise their offerings with the least collaborative effort 
(Clark & Brennan, 1991). 
H12: The preference to use e-mail for future negotiations with one’s 
partner (i.e., after the third negotiation) will be greater for individuals 








Chapter 4: Methods 
This chapter describes the research design, sample, procedures, negotiation 
scenarios used, questionnaires, data collection process, and creation of constructs 
(e.g., dominance, trust, depth, affect, task orientation, formality), and a description of 
the dyadic analysis technique used.  The first section describes the influences on the 
study design.  The second section presents the experimental design.  The third section 
describes the participants, task, and experimental procedures.  The fourth section 
discusses the development of the questionnaires including the development of 
composite constructs and their reliabilities.  The final section presents a description of 
the Actor-Partner Interaction Model used to conduct the analyses. 
Influence for Experimental Design 
Walther and Burgoon (1992) have suggested that the study of the 
manipulation of relational cues may yield useful results regarding how people adapt 
themselves to achieve interpersonal goals within the restriction of a particular media.  
Thus, this study examines the effect of a series of three negotiation tasks on the 
development of social relationships.  The participants are randomly assigned partners 
that they keep throughout the experiment.  The first negotiation task is conducted 
using FTF by all parties and for the purpose of establishing a baseline relationship.  
The final two negotiations occur using either FTF or e-mail based on random 
assignment.  This prior relationship was initiated in keeping with Walther’s (1992, 
1994) advice that relationships develop over time and that ones conducted using 




negotiate first using FTF also helped to develop a rapport between the parties.  Moore 
and colleagues (1999; Morris et al., 2002) reported that “schmoozing” or developing 
rapport prior to the start of a negotiation resulted in reports of better working 
relationships and higher levels of satisfaction.  McGinn and Keros (2002) reported 
that when friends negotiated using e-mail they behaved more cooperatively and 
achieve more integrated outcomes than strangers.  McGrath (1984) further advised 
that participants should have an expectation of a future dependency when 
communicating so that they invest in the relationship formation process as would be 
found in an actual organizational setting.  Building an expectation of a future 
negotiation relationship into the design of the study was done to improve the external 
validity of the study. 
This research was conducted using a buyer-seller intra-organizational 
purchasing simulation.  Walther (1992; 1994) has recommended that either time 
pressures or limiting the amount of time for CMC participants to reach an agreement 
can result in artificially inhibiting relationship development in CMC interactions and 
that additional time should be provided for the CMC condition.  This 
recommendation has been included in the task design by providing three weeks to 
conduct the final two negotiations.  
Experimental Design 
This study is an experiment with a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design.  Three 
independent variables were manipulated in the negotiation tasks: the medium of 
communication (face-to-face vs. asynchronous electronic mail), level of power (equal 




statistical power and to allow for the potential loss of dyads, fifteen pairs were sought 
for each cell.    The medium and power were the main focus of the study, but this 
design allowed for the testing of whether the assigned role of buyer or seller affected 
results.  The dependent variables studied were the change in various aspects of 
relational communication and the preference to use e-mail as a communication 
medium for subsequent negotiations.  In addition, several additional variables were 
measured such as comfort with computer mediated communication channels, 
computer use comfort, perceived levels of self and partner power, and participant 
demographics. 
 
Table 1: Research Design 
     Mode of Communication 
 
    E-mail    Face-to-Face 
 
  Equal  1. Equal   2. Equal 
      E-mail     Face-to-Face 
Power    (20 dyads)   (19 dyads) 
 
 
  Unequal 3. Unequal   4. Unequal 
       E-mail      Face-to-Face 
    (19 dyads)   (16 dyads) 
Participants were randomly assigned the role of either buyer or seller, and 
were randomly assigned to one of the four negotiation conditions found in Table 1: 
Condition 1.  Equal Buyer and Seller Power participants conducted their second and 
third negotiations task using the asynchronous medium of e-mail.  The dyads were 




negotiations and achieve either agreements or decide they has arrived at an impasse.   
All pairs in this condition reached agreements for their second and third negotiations. 
Condition 2.  Equal Buyer and Seller Power participants conducted their second and 
third negotiation tasks using the synchronous medium of face-to-face communication.  
The dyads were given two weeks for the second task and one week for the third task 
to conduct the negotiations and achieve either agreements or decide they has arrived 
at an impasse.   All pairs in this condition reached agreements for their second and 
third negotiations. 
Condition 3.  Unequal Buyer and Seller Power participants conducted their second 
and third negotiation tasks using the asynchronous medium of e-mail.  The dyads 
were given two weeks for the second task and one week for the third task to conduct 
the negotiations and achieve either agreements or decide they has arrived at an 
impasse.   All pairs in this condition reached agreements for their second and third 
negotiations. 
Condition 4.  Unequal Buyer and Seller Power participants conducted their second 
and third negotiation tasks using the synchronous medium of face-to-face 
communication.  The dyads were given two weeks for the second task and one week 
for the third task to conduct the negotiations and achieve either agreements or decide 
they has arrived at an impasse.   All pairs in this condition reached agreements for 
their second and third negotiations.   
  The amount of time provided to participants to conduct the negotiations in the 
e-mail and face-to-face conditions was the same.  Participants in the face-to-face 




multiple times over the course of the time allotted.  E-mail participants could 
exchange as many or as few e-mails as they wanted to achieve their goals.  This 
decision of how the negotiation would be conducted was designed to mirror the 
conditions under which most intra-organizational negotiations would take place.  
Members of the same organization would not necessarily feel pressure to quickly 
come quickly to an agreement in one setting; instead, they often are invested in a long 
term relationship with each other such that they will have to work together in the 
future.  Not providing an artificial time barrier is consistent with the recommendation 
of Walther (1992; 1994) when conducting long-term studies of CMC. 
The dyads were formed by randomly assigning partners to conditions and to 
the role of buyer or seller.  The same partners were maintained for the series of three 
negotiations.  As mentioned above, more than fifteen complete dyads were included 
in each condition to insure a sufficient amount of data was available for analyses and 
the necessarily statistical power, even though previous CMC studies have been  
conducted with ten dyads per condition.  This study of ten dyads in each condition 
was considered to provide sufficient power to complete the analyses (Anderson, 
2000). 
Participants 
Participants were undergraduate students enrolled in an upper-level 
undergraduate organizational communication course at a large east coast university.  
The data were collected over the course of three semesters (Spring 2003, Fall 2003, 
and Spring 2004).  Overall, 168 juniors and seniors participated in the negotiations, 




all three negotiation tasks and questionnaires.  All 168 students completed all three 
the negotiation tasks as part of the assigned course work. 
Each pair participated in three negotiation exercises.  For the first exercise, all 
dyads negotiated face-to-face using the same case study (Knight Engineering).  This 
negotiation took place during class.  This negotiation was used to form the baseline 
for the dyad’s relationship development.  The pair was informed that they would be 
conducting two additional negotiations (Universal Computer I and Universal 
Computer II) with their partner as part of the course module on negotiation.  In 
addition, students interested in earning extra credit could volunteer as participants for 
the research study by completing an informed consent form, a questionnaire prior to 
the first negotiation, and another questionnaire after each of the three negotiations.  
Any student who did not want to participant in the research study did not suffer any 
penalty and was provided with an alternative method for earning extra credit in the 
course.  Of the 168 students recruited some of them completed the first in class 
negotiation, the informed consent form, and related questionnaires, but chose not to 
complete the subsequent questionnaires.    Dyads that did not have complete 
questionnaires from both parties were dropped from the analysis leaving 74 complete 
dyads (see Table 1). 
For the second and third negotiations, participants were instructed to use their 
assigned medium and not to discuss the negotiations with others in the class and not 
to discuss the negotiations with their partner through any other medium.  To motivate 
the students, they were told that their performance on the negotiations would affect 




working on future projects with their assigned partner to create the expectation that 
they would have a future working relationship with their partner.  Many of the 
students did work with their partners in the future as part of work in the course, but no 
formal pairs were arranged.  All students that completed the assignment were given 
full credit and their performance in the negotiations did not affect their grade.  These 
minor deceptions regarding the impact on their course grades and future working 
relationships were necessary to insure high involvement in the study and create an 
expectation of a future working relationship as recommended by Liu (2002).  The 
expectation that their performance would affect their grade on the assignment and that 
they would work together on a future class assignment was consistent with the course 
grading policy and the course practice of assigning students to groups to work on 
exercises, case studies, and other course assignments.  This design was used to 
increase student involvement in the project and reduce communication through other 
mediums that may have compromised the study.  All of the participants had access to 
free e-mail accounts provided by the university and access to multiple computer labs 
on campus as well as dial-in access from remote locations to the university mail 
system.   An informal question in each class prior to the start of the assignment 
indicated that all students had at least one e-mail account and most had at least two e-
mail accounts that they used on a regular basis.  A copy of the written materials 
provided to the participants is included in Appendix A. 
Task 
As described above, all of the participants conducted their first negotiation in 




each dyad.  The participants were randomly assigned partners in class, but if the pair 
reported that they knew each other outside of class they were placed back into the 
assignment pool and they were matched with another random partner.  The situational 
task for the first negotiation was a dyadic negotiation, Knight Engines/Excalibur  
Engine Parts, (Lewicki, Litterer, Saunders, & Minton, 1999) that did not involve any 
power manipulations.  The case involved one member playing the role of Knight 
Engineering (buyer) and the other playing the role of Excalibur Engine Parts (seller).  
The instructions said the Knight representative contacts the Excalibur representative 
about purchasing some of its pistons and the negotiation follows a fairly typical 
buyer-seller negotiation.  The dyad was asked to reach a decision on the number of 
pistons sold, the price of the pistons, the quality control arrangements, and was free to 
include other items in the settlement.  A copy of the case exercise and accompanying 
instructions can be found in Appendix A.  This first negotiation was conducted a third 
of the way through the course and students were provided three additional weeks for 
the next two negotiations. 
  The second and third negotiations were based on modified versions of the 
Universal Computer Company Case I and the Universal Computer Case II (Lewicki 
et al., 1999).  The second negotiation involved a case in which two division managers 
are involved in an intra-organizational transfer pricing task that involves integrative 
potential for task, relationship, and face goals (Wilson & Putnam, 1990).  Each 
participant was asked to take on the role of one of the plant managers at Universal 
Computer.  The Crawley plant manager (seller) was expected to sell modules to the 




The plant managers both report to the same vice president for manufacturing who 
they are told is anxious to resolve this disagreement.  Half of the participants were 
told that the vice president for manufacturing typically favors and backs the Crawley 
Plant Manager in all disputes, whereas the other half were not provided with this 
information.  The cases in which the vice president of manufacturing backed Crawley 
provided a power imbalance between the two partners in which the seller is given 
greater power than the buyer.  The Crawley plant manager was informed that he or 
she had the backing of the vice president of manufacturing which gave the negotiator 
the ability to pressure the Phillips plant manager or evade discussing the problems.  
The Phillips plant manager also had this information and had to take this information 
into consideration when negotiating.  This power manipulation required the parties to 
consider relationship goals and affect issues in addition to the actual issue of the 
defective modules.  Half of the participants in the Equal Power and half in the 
Unequal Power conditions used e-mail and the other half conducted their negotiations 
face-to-face. 
The third negotiation was a continuation of the Universal Computer Company 
case (Lewicki et al., 1999), which was modified to include some of the relational 
components from the second negotiation such as the power of the vice president of 
manufacturing for those participants in the unequal power condition.  This third case 
involved an intra-organizational purchasing agreement in which Phillips was seeking 
to place a large order for a new chip with Crawley and needed to negotiate a price and 
quantity.  In the equal power condition, Phillips could purchase the parts from 




were informed that the Universal Computer Company preferred that its divisions 
purchase its chips in-house.  Phillips was therefore, not forced to buy from Crawley, 
but the Phillips representative was informed that the vice president of manufacturing 
would ask very difficult questions if Phillips did not purchase from Crawley.  
However, the Crawley representative was informed that if he or she decided not to 
sell to Phillips that the vice president of manufacturing would back Crawley.  The 
power differences were manipulated so that the unequal and equal power differences 
established in negotiation number two were continued as were the media used in the 
second negotiation.  Copies of the instructions and roles for the negotiations are 
contained in Appendix A.  
Participants worked with their same partner over the course of the three 
negotiations based on Walther’s recommendation (1992) that relationships take time 
to develop.  All participants took part in the same face-to-face negotiation simulation 
for the first encounter to allow for relationship development prior to the main 
treatments. 
 Requiring that the second and third negotiations took place via e-mail for one 
half of the dyads and FTF for the other half of the dyads made it possible to examine 
the effect of the media on the relationship development over the course of the three 
negotiations.  An added dimension in the second and third interaction was the 
introduction of a power difference in half of the relationships.  The term unequal 
power is used rather than absolute power because the negotiations were housed in an 
intra-organizational setting in which relational goals related to future working 




considered by the participants (Wilson & Putnam, 1990).  Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) 
proposed that absolute power is “the extent to which parties have power over each 
other” (p. 131) and relative power is “the extent to which one party is more powerful 
than the other” ( p. 131).  In this study, the roles were designed so that within the 
equal power condition neither party would appear to have greater control over the 
outcome; in the unequal power condition, the participants did not have direct control 
over the other party’s actions but one party had a stronger bargaining position based 
on the favorable treatment by the vice president of manufacturing.  
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to pairs for this negotiation and these 
pairs remained unchanged throughout the three negotiations.  Tasks were provided in 
class with written and verbal instructions that the participants were not to share their 
role information with their partner nor discuss their negotiation with anyone else in 
the class.  Half of the dyads were randomly assigned to use e-mail and the half to use 
face-to-face communication for the second and third tasks.  The first negotiation task 
was done in class over a period of 60 minutes with all dyads reaching a settlement 
and finishing the negotiation before the end of the class.  The second negotiation task 
was completed over a two week time frame for all dyads.  The third negotiation task 
was conducted over a one week time frame for all dyads.  These time periods allowed 
participants ample opportunity to make contact with their partner multiple times if 
necessary.  The time frames also more closely matched the way negotiations are 
conducted in actual organizations as compared to the numerous single task 




minutes to complete a FTF and e-mail negotiation.  The FTF participants could 
conduct their negotiation in one session or hold multiple FTF sessions as long as they 
were completed in the allowed time frame.   For the third negotiation task, the FTF 
negotiators reported that they met an average of 1.75 times with a standard deviation 
of .677 while the e-mail negotiators reported that they sent their partners an average 
of 3.04 messages with a standard deviation of 1.56.  
Prior to the first negotiation task, participants completed a base level 
questionnaire containing demographic information, questions regarding CMC 
comfort, and questions about the richness of various media.  After the first task, the 
participants completed an instrument that measured aspects of their relationship with 
their partner, a rating of their behaviors with respect to their partner, a measure of the 
power balance between the two parties, outcome satisfaction levels for the negotiation 
that just occurred, and satisfaction ratings regarding the process for the previous 
negotiation.  After the second negotiation session, the participants completed a 
questionnaire identical to the one completed after the first negotiation. 
Upon completion of the third task, participants again completed a 
questionnaire that included items measuring the perceived relationship with their 
partners, a rating of the participant’s own behaviors with respect to their partners, a 
measure of the perceived power balance between the two parties, outcome 
satisfaction levels for the previous negotiation, process satisfaction ratings for the 
previous negotiation, as well as questions about CMC comfort levels, the future 
likelihood of using e-mail for future negotiations with their partners and details about 




to provide copies of their e-mail exchanges for the second and third negotiations as a 
check to insure that the negotiations were completed.  Examples of the questionnaires 
are provided in Appendix B. 
Pre-Negotiation Demographics 
The pre-negotiation questionnaire consisted of questions requesting 
demographic information such as gender, age, major, class standing, full-time work 
experience and part-time work experience.  These questions made it possible to check 
for potential systematic differences between the various conditions and to insure that 
dyads were comparable in experience.   As Table 2 below indicates, the participants 
were significantly more female than male although there were no significant 
imbalances of gender make across conditions.  A review of the means for the 
dependent variables used in the analysis did not indicate any significant differences 
between the male and female responses.  None of the hypotheses were expected to 





Table 2: Demographic Variables for Study Participants on the Pre-Negotiation 
Questionnaire 
    Equal Power Unequal Power 
        
   Count Percent Count Percent 
E-mail  Females* 22 14.9% 23 15.5% 
  Males* 18 12.2% 15 10.1% 
         
    Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
  Age 20.1 years 1.10 21.4 years 2.05 
  
Months of    
Full-Time 
Work 





Experience 26.03 19.38 48.69 133.53 
         
    Count Percent Count Percent 
FTF Females* 29 19.6% 25 16.9% 
  Males* 9 6.1% 7 4.7% 
         
    Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
  Age 21.6 years 1.65 21.1 years 0.87 
  
Months of    
Full-Time 
Work 





Experience 6.73 8.58 33.7 31.05 







The Six Dimensions 
 
The relationship development measures for the study were based on a 
modified version of Burgoon and Hale’s (1987) Relational Communication scale.  In 
this study, only six of the eight scales were used to provide a measure of perceptions 
about the other party’s relational communication behaviors, and the scale was used as 
a self-report measure to assess one’s own relational communication behaviors.  The 
six dimensions selected for use in this study were based on the nature of the expected 
negotiation relationship and because relationship power was included as one of the 
conditions.  The items that measure equality were included in the questionnaire but 
were not used in the analysis because power was manipulated as a independent 
variable in the study.  This power manipulation would have reduced the usefulness of 
the equality measure for measuring the development of the relationship because this 
power manipulation was introduced at the start of the second negotiation.  
  The validity of this scale’s dimensions has been analyzed several times 
previously, and many criterion-related validity studies have shown the scale to be 
highly valid (Rubin et al., 1994).  Cronbach’s alpha coefficients have been reported 
between .42 and .88 for the dimensions when the scales have been used by Burgoon 
and Hale and others (Rubin et al.,1994).  The reliability is improved because the scale 
is constructed of several questions that measure each dimension (Baily, 1994). The 
scale was used in this study first to establish a baseline relationship after the first 
negotiation and was then administered again after the second and third negotiation to 
look at the changes in the six relationship dimensions.   A complete list of the items 




Appendix B.   The Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .62 to .82 on the dimensions for 
the perceptions on one’s partner’s relational communication behaviors and from .69 
to .84 for the self report measures.   Table 3 provides the Chronbrach alphas for each 
of the composites after the negotiations. 
For analyses regarding relationships, the study uses the difference between the 
relationship scores after the Knight Negotiation (Post 1) and Universal Computer II 
(Post 3).  This difference score (Post 3 – Post 1) provides the change measure for the 
dimensions of the relationship as well as the direction of the change.  As discussed in 
the hypotheses section, some of these relationship dimensions are expected to become 
stronger and others are not.    
For each of the six dimensions of relational communication, one subscale was 
used to measure the respondent’s attempt to convey this relationship dimension to his 
or her partner and another subscale to measure the negotiator’s perception that his or 
her partner conveyed these relational behaviors in the negotiations. 
Dominance: This scale consists of five items to assess both one’s own and the 
partner’s dominance behaviors.  Dominance is a measure of how much control each 
of the parties attempted to exert over the other in the negotiation.  A high score for 
one’s partner would indicate a strong degree of dominance was perceived in the 
negotiation whereas a low level would indicate a more submissiveness was perceived.  
A high score for one’s self would be a sign of a concerted attempt to control the 
negotiation and establish distance between one’s self and one’s partner.  A low score 
would indicate perceived submission to the other party’s desires and the perception 




dominance is made up of items measuring competitiveness, aggressiveness, and 
treating one’s partner as inferior, along with perceived attempts to control the 
negotiation.   When individuals attempt to dominate the negotiation they attempt to 
set themselves apart from their partner. 
Affection and immediacy: Five items are included in the affection/immediacy 
scale, which measures the respondent’s and partner’s attempts at establishing a sense 
of affection and closeness with the other party.  The scale measures the extent to 
which there is a perception of being involved in the interaction with the other person, 
finding the exchanges stimulating, showing interest in communicating with each 
other, and not being bored with one’s partner.  Affection/immediacy is an indication 
that one is perceived as trying to establish a sense of closeness with one’s partner.  In 
the context of negotiation, portraying a sense of affection and immediacy would be an 
attempt to seem close to one’s partner and to understand his or her goals.  Negotiators 
who perceive affection and immediacy from their partner should feel closer to their 
partner and are more likely to be concerned about helping their partners achieve their 
goals (Fisher et al., 1991).  
Depth: Five items included in the depth measure.  This scale consists of items 
about the respondent’s efforts to deepen the relationship and the extent to which the 
respondent perceives his or her partner wants a deeper relationship.  A deeper 
relationship is consistent with attempts to make one’s partner feel similar to oneself, 
to move the interaction to a deeper level, to act like the partners are good friends, to 
indicate a desire to communicate further, and to appear to care if one is liked by his or 




wanting to develop an ongoing relationship beyond the immediate interaction.  
Establishing a sense of depth by looking for similarities between oneself and one’s 
partner in a negotiation can result in more successful appeals to get one’s partner to 
understand one’s goals.  
Formality: Three items are included in the formality construct.  This scale 
measures respondents attempts to make the communications formal and their 
perceptions of their partners’ efforts to increase formality in the negotiations.  
Formality is characterized by making interactions formal, being less casual in 
communication messages, and avoiding informality in communications.  Formal 
negotiations contribute to a more businesslike setting and a greater reliance on rules 
and procedures.  Negotiations that are more formal are more likely to move through 
stages in an orderly and precise manner.  Formal negotiations are more likely to be 
driven by issues than by personal characteristics of the negotiators. 
Trust:  Five items are included in the trust measure.  This scale includes 
measures that assess the respondents attempt to create a sense of trust with their  
partners and perceptions that their partners wanting a trusting relationship.  Trust is 
characterized by efforts to demonstrate sincerity in messages, listen to one’s partner, 
be open to the ideas of others, demonstrate honesty in communication, and display an 
interest in working with one’s partner.  Trust contributes to a greater sense of 
receptivity to one’s partner’s ideas and the needs.  Negotiators who demonstrate a 
high level of trust may be more likely to use an integrative approach and to share 




Task Orientation:  Four items comprise the task orientation measure.  This 
scale includes measures that assess the respondents attempts to minimize the social 
communications with one’s partner and perceptions that their partners focused their 
messages on completing the negotiation task.  A task orientation is characterized by 
sticking to the main purpose of the interaction, being more interested in the task than 
socializing with one’s partner, being very work oriented in one’s demeanor, and not 
engaging on social conversation.   A high task orientation in a negotiation will 
generally result in keeping messages focused on the topic and reaching a resolution 
more quickly than with low task orientation.  Exchanges of a personal nature tend to 
be limited and little attempt is made to deepen the personal relationship. 
These six dimensions provide a measure of the communication relationship 
between the two negotiators at the conclusion of each negotiation.  A difference of 
the relationship level at the conclusion of the third negotiation with the level after the 
first negotiation provides a measure of the relationships’ change on each of the six 
dimensions.  This change score provides an effective way to test the relationship 





Table 3: Reliabilities for Social Relational Communication Subscales for Partner 
Relational Behaviors and Negotiator Self Report Relational Behaviors 
 
Reliabilities for Social Relational Communication Subscales 
for Partner Relational Behaviors *     
  
Number 
of Items Post 1 Post 2 Post 3 
  
            
Dominance 5 .81 .77 .77   
Depth 5 .76 .74 .77   
Affection 5 .74 .81 .75   
Formality 3 .66 .74 .81   
Trust 6 .81 .75 .84   
Task Orient 4 .63 .62 .75   
       
Reliabilities for Social Relational Communication Subscales 
for Self Relational Behaviors *     
  
Number 
of Items Post 1 Post 2 Post 3 
  
            
Dominance 5 .69 .70 .74   
Depth 5 .75 .80 .79   
Affection 5 .73 .81 .81   
Formality 3 .78 .83 .84   
Trust 6 .81 .80 .84   
Task Orient 4 .76 .77 .79   




Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) differentiate between relative power, or the extent 
to which one party is more powerful than the other, and absolute/total power, or the 
extent to which one party has power over the other.  In this study, power refers to the 
extent to which one party is dependent on the other, or the ability of one party to 
grant, deny, hinder, or facilitate the other’s gratification (Emerson, 1962).  In this case 
the power of Crawley the producer/seller of the chips is manipulated such that in the 




manufacturing.  Because both parties in the role play work for the vice president, 
Crawley is considered to have the greater power than Phillips because the vice 
president typically favors Crawley when there are disputes.  This conceptualization of 
power being equal or unequal is in keeping with Pruitt and Carnevale’s (1993) 
definition of relative power and Emerson’s (1962) view that power is the ability to 
influence the gratification of the other.  In the unequal power situation of this study, 
the task was designed so that one party has a greater ability to influence the outcome 
of the negotiation.  Both parties work for the same organization and have an 
expectation that they will be dependent on one another and their boss, the vice 
president of manufacturing, in the future.  Crawley has relatively more power than 
Phillips because if a dispute arises between the two parties the vice president of 
manufacturing typically sides with Crawley.  This dynamic provides Crawley with 
relatively more power than Phillips, but not absolute power; the vice president has 
absolute power over both parties. 
Prior to administering the experiment, the case studies were provided to 
students enrolled in an upper level organizational communication course.  These 
students read the case studies and provided feedback on the relative power of Phillips 
and Crawley based on their objective reading of the cases.   These students reported 
that Crawley was in a more powerful position because Phillips and Crawley’s mutual 
boss sided with Crawley in past conflicts between the two plant managers. This 
review technique has been used by other researchers when the possibility exists that 
the less powerful negotiator may not want to admit his or her weaker relative power 




In addition to this objective review, a manipulation check of power was 
conducted by asking the parties to allocate one hundred total power points to illustrate 
the level of power each party has in the negotiation.  Power also was measured by 
asking about the level of control one’s partner had over the final negotiation 
settlement as well as the level of control the negotiator felt over the outcome.  Table 4 
presents the results of the distribution of 100 points of power between the two parties, 
first for the overall study and then for the different power conditions broken down by 
the buyer and seller roles.  This measure did not produce significant differences 
between the two conditions.  In other words, despite this manipulation, this measure 
did not show a perceived difference in power between the parties. 
A second measure of power, the level of control experienced by the two 
parties, was more useful.  Table 5 provides the results of the differences in the 
perceived level of control over the settlement from after the Knight negotiation (P1) 
to after Universal Computer II (P3).  Control was measured by using two seven-point 
Likert item.  Crawley, the seller, responded to an item assessing his or her control 
over the final settlement and Phillips, the buyer, responded to an item assessing 
Crawley’s control over the settlement.  The changes in these two items were 
computed by taking the difference between the reported levels after the first and third 
negotiations.  In the case of Crawley (the seller), an ANOVA analysis, F[2, 71] = 
5.54, p < .03, indicated a significant increase in perceived control developed from the 
first to the third negotiation in Crawley’s perception of having power.  For the 
unequal power condition, Crawley perceived an average increase of power by .63 as 




the case of Phillips (the buyer), an ANOVA analysis, F[1, 72] = .379, n.s., did not 
indicate an increase in the perception of Crawley’s power over the negotiation.  
Instead, Phillips negotiators reported that Crawley’s power had decreased more in the 
unequal power condition (-.54) than in the equal power condition (-.24).  The finding 
contradicts the power manipulation, but is not completely unexpected based on 
findings from other studies (Anderson &Thompson, 2004).  This lack of measurable 
difference on the part of Phillips perception of power is partly explained by the results 
in Table 4: All the participants in the study perceived a greater sense of their power 
relative to that of their partner in the third negotiation as compared to after the first 
negotiation.  In addition, the buyer (Phillips) may have felt a greater sense of power 
because he or she had the option of going to another supplier and the effect of the 
vice president of manufacturing’s unhappiness was not a great enough force to alter 
Phillips perception of Crawley’s power given the ongoing dependencies expected in 
an intra-organizational negotiation (Lawler & Yoon, 1995).  Another possible reason 
that Phillips negotiators did not recognize a significant increase in their partner’s 
power is the unwillingness of parties to admit a weakness of one’s interests in a 
negotiation.  Crawley’s greater sense of power despite Phillips’ lack of reporting a 
change in the power balance is enough to allow the analysis of the power difference 
to proceed with close scrutiny.  The continuing of this analysis is based on Anderson 
and Thompson’s (2004) work in a previous study where they used the pre-study 
review by individuals similar to the participants and also reported a reluctance on the 




Table 4: Power Balance Statistics for Phillips (Buyer) and Crawley (Seller) 
 Descriptive Statistics for Phillips (Buyer) Perceptions of Power Balance After Negotiations 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Post Knight: Partner 
Power 74 10 65 48.57 8.935 
Post Knight: My 
Power 74 35 90 51.43 8.935 
Post Neg 2: Partner 
Power 74 10 65 46.53 9.984 
Post Neg 2: My 
Power 74 35 90 53.47 9.984 
Post Neg 3: Partner 
Power 74 25 80 47.82 8.197 
Post Neg 3: My 
Power 74 20 75 52.18 8.197 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Phillips (Buyer) Perceptions of Power Balance After Negotiations for Equal Power 
Condition 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Post Knight: Partner 
Power 39 10 60 48.13 8.458 
Post Knight: My 
Power 39 40 90 51.87 8.458 
Post Neg 2: Partner 
Power 39 10 65 46.59 9.583 
Post Neg 2: My 
Power 39 35 90 53.41 9.583 
Post Neg 3: Partner 
Power 39 30 80 48.69 7.760 
Post Neg 3: My 
Power 39 20 70 51.31 7.760 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Phillips (Buyer) Perceptions of Power Balance After Negotiations for Unequal 
Power Condition 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Post Knight: Partner 
Power 35 10 65 49.06 9.539 
Post Knight: My 
Power 35 35 90 50.94 9.539 
Post Neg 2: Partner 
Power 35 10 60 46.46 10.553 
Post Neg 2: My 
Power 35 40 90 53.54 10.553 
Post Neg 3: Partner 
Power 35 25 70 46.86 8.668 
Post Neg 3: My 
Power 35 30 75 53.14 8.668 




Table 4 con’t: Power Balance Statistics for Phillips (Buyer) and Crawley (Seller) 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Crawley (Seller) Perceptions of Power Balance After Negotiations 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Post Knight: Partner 
Power 74 25 75 49.28 8.405 
Post Knight: My 
Power 74 25 75 50.72 8.405 
Post Neg 2: Partner 
Power 74 10 70 47.85 8.634 
Post Neg 2: My 
Power 74 30 90 52.15 8.634 
Post Neg 3: Partner 
Power 73 20 60 47.42 6.610 
Post Neg 3: My 
Power 73 40 80 52.58 6.610 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Crawley (Seller) Perceptions of Power Balance After Negotiations for Equal Power 
Condition 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Post Knight: Partner 
Power 39 35 70 50.05 7.312 
Post Knight: My 
Power 39 30 65 49.95 7.312 
Post Neg 2: Partner 
Power 39 25 65 48.03 7.565 
Post Neg 2: My 
Power 39 35 75 51.97 7.565 
Post Neg 3: Partner 
Power 38 30 60 48.47 5.793 
Post Neg 3: My 
Power 38 40 70 51.53 5.793 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Crawley (Seller) Perceptions of Power Balance After Negotiations for Unequal 
Power Condition 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Post Knight: Partner 
Power 35 25 75 48.43 9.512 
Post Knight: My 
Power 35 25 75 51.57 9.512 
Post Neg 2: Partner 
Power 35 10 70 47.66 9.798 
Post Neg 2: My 
Power 35 30 90 52.34 9.798 
Post Neg 3: Partner 
Power 35 20 55 46.29 7.311 
Post Neg 3: My 
Power 35 45 80 53.71 7.311 






Table 5: Crawley (Seller) Perception of Self Control Over the Settlement 
Change in Own Control over Settlement Perception by Power Condition from Post Negotiation 1 to Post 
Negotiation 3 
  N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum 
              
Equal 
Power 38 -.24 1.69951 .27570 -4.00 4.00 
Unequal 
Power 35 .63 1.41600 .23935 -2.00 4.00 
Total 73 .18 1.61883 .18947 -4.00 4.00 
* Statistically significant at p = .02 level.  Crawley, perceived a greater sense of self power after the third 




Table 6: Phillips (Buyer) Perceptions of Crawley’s Control Over the Settlement 
Change in Partner Control over Settlement Perception by Power Condition from Post Negotiation 1 to Post 
Negotiation 3 
  N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum 
              
Equal 
Power 39 -.28 1.80567 .28914 -5.00 4.00 
Unequal 
Power 35 -.54 1.83660 .31044 -6.00 4.00 
Total 74 -.4054 1.81258 .21071 -6.00 4.00 
** No significant difference exists between the buyer’s, Phillip’s, perception of the seller’s power, Crawley, 
between the first and third negotiation. 
 
Comfort Level with Computer Mediated Communication  
Computer Mediated Communication comfort was measured based on a scale 
of five questions using a seven-point Likert-type scale.  The items asked about the 
respondent’s comfort communicating via e-mail, comfort using a computer, comfort 
with using e-mail in personal and work situations, ease of e-mail use, as well as 
comfort using other new communication technologies such as instant messenger. The 
measure of computer mediated communication comfort is based on social influence 




medium the more likely the medium is to be used.  The use of multiple items to 
measure comfort level increased its reliability and similar measures have been used 
by Fulk and associates in the past.  Cronbach’s alpha for the five-item measure was 
.84, making this measure appropriate for assessing computer mediated 
communication comfort. 
Table 7: Computer Mediated Communication Comfort Statistics 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
P3 Comfort Using a 
Computer 6.19 1.190 147
P3 Comfort Using E-mail 
to Communicate 6.22 1.274 147
P3 Using E-mail to Stay in 
Touch W/Friends 6.05 1.254 147
P3 Using E-mail to Get 
Work Done 5.73 1.358 147
P3 Using Computer for 
Instant Comm 6.41 1.193 147




Future Use of Media for Negotiations 
A measure was administered at the conclusion of all three negotiations to 
identify the preference for using various media for future negotiations with the 
negotiator’s partner.  Lower numbers represent greater likelihood to use the media in 
the future, with “1” representing most likely to use.  Participants were asked to rank 
e-mail, the telephone, FTF, instant messenger, fax, and letter.  All of the participants, 
ranked FTF as their first choice and the phone as their second choice for future 
negotiations.  The differences are present among the third and fourth ranking by 
condition, with e-mail negotiators ranking e-mail third and instant messenger fourth 
and FTF users ranking instant messenger third and e-mail fourth.  Table 8 presents 




Table 8: Ranks of Future Use of Media for Negotiations with Partner  
Descriptive Statistics for All Participants 
 Media N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
FTF 69 1 6 1.94 1.327 
Telephone  68 1 5 2.57 .951 
Instant Messenger 68 1 6 2.84 1.288 
E-mail 68 1 6 2.99 1.240 
Fax 68 3 6 5.26 .725 
Letter 68 2 6 5.38 .773 
      
 
 
Descriptive Statistics for E-mail Participants 
 Media N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
FTF 72 1 6 2.10 1.493 
Telephone 71 1 5 2.69 .855 
E-mail 71 1 6 2.83 1.331 
Instant Messenger 71 1 6 2.87 1.414 
Fax 71 3 6 5.06 .674 
Letter 71 2 6 5.44 .906 
      
 
 
Descriptive Statistics for FTF Participants 
 Media N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
FTF 64 1 4 1.78 1.133 
Telephone 63 1 5 2.37 .921 
Instant Messenger 62 1 6 2.66 1.070 
E-mail 63 1 4 3.22 .991 
Fax  62 4 6 5.42 .560 
Letter 62 4 6 5.48 .565 
      
 
Pre-Study Cognitive Interviewing 
Cognitive interviewing is a process whereby a participant is asked to explain 
the thought processes he or she had as they read each part of the questionnaire.  The 
interviews were conducted with undergraduate students in an organizational 




eventually drawn).  Interviewees were provided with copies of the questionnaires to 
review and were asked to comment on the ease of use and the clarity of the questions.  
The interviewees also reviewed the negotiation cases and scenarios and provided 
comments on their clarity as well as the relative power of Crawley and Phillips for the 
unequal power condition.  This feedback was used to improve the clarity of the case, 
improve the phrasing of the questions, and the organization of the instruments.  The 
reviewers found little confusion regarding the questionnaires.  The interviewees were 
able to detect the power difference between Phillips and Crawley in the unequal and 
equal power conditions as discussed above providing support for the continued use of 
the power difference as a variable in the analysis.  This interviewing technique to 
detect power differences in case studies has been used by Anderson and Thompson 
(2004) in their studies of power relationships and has produced acceptable results for 
their studies.      
Analyses 
Analyses of data involving dyads present some unique statistical challenges 
that must be taken into consideration.  At the basis of many commonly used statistical 
analyses (e.g., ANOVA, regression) is the assumption of independent observations of 
the dependant variables (Cook & Kenny, 2005).   Violating this assumption can 
produce inaccurate results, misleading degrees of freedom, and biased statistical 
significance (Cook & Kenny, 2005; Kenny, Kashy, & Cook 2006).  One way of 
managing such analyses has been to treat the dyad as the unit of measurement and 
ignore the individual perceptions of the relationship.  However, in negotiation, in 




levels of relationship power in two of the four conditions, using the dyad as the unit 
of analysis would result in overlooking the perceptions and behaviors affected by 
those roles.  In contrast, assuming the dependent relationship measures and future 
desire to use e-mail were independent for the buyers and sellers may produce results 
that miss the interdependence of the buyers and sellers within each dyad. 
As recommended by Kenny and his associates (2006), for studies involving 
fewer than 35 dyads, the dyads should be assumed to be nonindependent, and in 
studies involving more than 35 dyads and where the members are distinguishable the 
Pearson product-moment correlation should be studied for each of the variables.  
Cook and Kenny (2005) have recommended using the more liberal test of p < .20 for 
the two-tailed correlation test when examining nonindependence.   Using the .20 level 
with this technique minimizes the mistake of assuming the dyads are independent 
when they are not.  Assuming independence could produce Type I and Type II errors.  
Using this criterion, a review of the intra class correlations between the partners for 
the 12 relationship dimensions and the future use of e-mail rank variable resulted in 7 
of the 13 correlations being significant at the p < .20 level.  The results for the 
correlations are provided in Appendix C.  These results indicate that it would be an 
error to treat individual participants as independent by performing standard 
ANOVAs.  Instead participants must be treated based on their interdependent roles of 
buyers and sellers or the dyad must be used as the unit of analysis.  A recommended 
approach is to continue to use the individual scores but to consider each buyer and 
seller to be nested within the dyad.  This technique is referred to as the Actor-Partner 




APIM has been used in this study as a specialized type of multilevel modeling 
as proposed by Kenny and colleagues (Cook & Kenny, 2005; Kenny et al., 2006).  
The model is designed to account for and consider the effect each partner has on the 
other.  APIM allows for the separation of each actor’s relational communication 
behaviors from those of his or her partner.  This approach, therefore, can take into 
consideration that the Crawley negotiator’s report of his or her relationship behavior 
(an actor effect) was influenced by the Phillips negotiator’s report of his or her 
relationship behavior on the same relationship communication behavior (partner 
effect).   For example, if the Crawley negotiator established a very task oriented 
approach to the negotiation, the Phillips negotiator was likely to have responded in a 
similar way by matching the Crawley negotiator’s behavior or at least modified his or 
her approach to some extent.  APIM was especially useful for this analysis because it 
allowed for the study of mixed independent variable where variability was both 
between dyads and within dyads (Kenny et al., 2006). 
All of the hypotheses and four research questions were tested using APIM.  
The differences between the first and third negotiation for the six self and six partner 
relationship communication behaviors (dependent variables) were analyzed in a 2 
(FTF & e-mail) X 2 (equal power & unequal power) X 2 (seller/Crawley & 
buyer/Phillips) design.  Mixed Linear Model was performed to examine the effects of 
the media, the power relationship, the bargaining role, as well as interactions between 
these independent variables.   The model was run with the assumption of 
heterogeneous compound symmetry, which allows the error variances of the partners 




colleagues APIM model (2006) because the members of the dyad are distinguishable 
from one another.  In other words, there was a buyer and a seller in the dyad that each 
had different roles to play, and it would be inaccurate to assume that the buyer and 
seller were interchangeable in their attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors. 
The data file was organized so the each dyad was assigned a unique ID and 
each person within the dyad was assigned a person role of 1 or 2.  The file consisted 
of one line of data for each dyad with each variable associated either with person role 
1 or person role 2 (Cook & Kenny, 2005).  For example, the difference between the 
dominance dimension score after the first negotiation and the third negotiation was 
designated Domin_P1P3.1.00 for the first member of the dyad and Domin_P1P3.2.00 
for the second member of the dyad.  The independent variables of bargaining power, 
bargaining role, and media used to negotiate were organized so that each 
dichotomous condition was assigned a value of +1 or -1.  This dichotomous coding is 
advisable because each independent variable in an APIM model must have a 
meaningful zero or be grand mean centered.  This file structure resulted in 148 
records because each dyad was entered twice, first as person “1” in the dyad where 
they were the primary participant in the negotiation and then again at person “2” as 
part of a second dyad where he or she was a secondary member of the dyad.   
  This procedure uses “Satterthwaithe degrees of freedom that represent a 
complicated weighted average of the between and within degrees of freedom” (Kenny 
et al., p. 161).  This degree of freedom computation is produced by most multilevel 
modeling computer programs by using the standard errors associated with the within 




variables.  The number of degrees of freedom is some number between the number of 
dyads less one and the number of individuals in the study minus 2.  The degrees of 
freedom produced are often fractional and should be interpreted when using a t-table 
by rounding downward (Kenny et al., 2006). 
APIM is similar to a regression model in that the independent variable (i.e., 
the change in the relationship dimension between the first and third negotiation) is 
entered into the model along with dependent variables of media, power, and 
bargaining role along with the interactions between each of these dependent variables.  
The model produces unstandardized coefficients (b) that are interpreted like 
regression coefficients.  The significance of the b value is determined by using a t-test 
with the Satterthwaithe degrees of freedom.  The coding the dependent variables as -1 
or 1 provides an accessible interpretation of the effect on the independent variable by 
using the b value and changing the sign of the coefficient based on the dependent 
variable.  The APIM procedure is different from a standard regression in that it takes 
into account the variance both within and between the dyad members as a correlation 
variable in the model, whereas regression would treat it as an independent variance.   
Significant differences at the p < .05 level were required before b coefficients 
for main effects or interactions were considered statistically significant.  Interactions 
between the power variable, the communication medium, and the role were analyzed 
for all hypotheses and research questions.  APIM allows for the inclusion of these 
interactions without the need to create new variables.  However, APIM requires that 




When interactions were detected, a filter was used and the APIM analyses were run 
for one of the two interaction conditions to determine the effects of the interaction.   
The set of hypotheses related to future e-mail use for negotiation, were also 
tested by using APIM.  The level of significance was also set at the p < .05 level.   
For this analysis the dependent variable was the rank assigned to e-mail by each 
respondent for desire to use for future negotiations with their partner.  The 
independent variables were either dichotomous resulting in a meaningful zero or the 
variables that were transformed by centering them around the grand mean (Cook & 
Kenny, 2005; Kenny et al., 2006).  The results are interpreted in a similar manner as 
that used for the previous relationship dimension results. 
    The use of the APIM model allows for the study of the dyad members as 
individuals while adjusting and correcting for the effect of the partner on the actor.  
This approach creates a powerful tool for the study of relationships and the 
development of relationships such as those found in this study and in negotiation 
studies in general.  Additional explanation of this technique can be found in Kenny 





Chapter 5:  Results 
 
 This chapter presents the results of the tested hypotheses and the four research 
questions.  These results look at the effect of the media, the bargaining power, and the 
bargaining role on the six aspects of interpersonal communication relationship 
development.  They also explore the effect of various factors on the selection to use 
electronic mail for future negotiations with a negotiator’s partner. 
Relationship Dimensions  
Means and standard deviations for the perception of the negotiator’s partner’s 
behavior for the six dimensions of dominance, depth of relationship, 
affect/immediacy, formality, trust, and task orientation are provided in Table 9.  
Means and standard deviations for the negotiator’s own behaviors for the six 
dimensions are provided in Table 10.  The changes in perception of the partner’s 
behaviors are found in Table 11.  The changes in perceptions for the one’s own 











Table 9: Sample Size, Means, and Standard Deviations of Negotiator's Perceptions of Partner’s Behaviors for the Six 
Relationship Dimensions for E-mail and FTF Negotiations after the Three Negotiations. 
  
 
  E-mail 
 Equal Power Unequal Power 




Deviation N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Dominance Post 1 20 2.99 0.983 20 2.82 0.863 19 3.07 1.279 19 2.69 0.793 
Dominance Post 2 20 2.97 0.637 20 2.61 0.916 19 3.34 0.887 19 2.86 1.041 
Dominance Post 3 20 3.03 0.987 20 2.74 1.098 19 2.95 1.056 19 3.12 0.703 
Depth Post 1 20 3.96 0.736 20 4.36 1.263 19 3.54 0.792 19 4.44 0.732 
Depth Post 2 20 3.58 0.982 20 3.73 0.886 19 3.88 1.134 19 4.02 0.745 
Depth Post 3 20 3.70 0.874 20 3.87 1.088 19 3.86 0.998 19 3.93 0.931 
Affection Post 1 20 4.91 0.749 20 5.16 0.961 19 4.93 1.017 19 5.13 0.714 
Affection Post 2 20 4.49 1.040 20 4.76 0.912 19 4.68 1.139 19 4.58 0.834 
Affection Post 3 20 4.45 0.837 20 4.74 1.220 19 5.00 1.093 19 4.67 0.795 
Formality Post 1 20 2.92 0.948 20 2.83 1.057 19 2.63 0.881 19 3.26 1.040 
Formality Post 2 20 3.27 1.111 20 3.25 1.031 19 3.67 1.622 19 3.63 1.196 
Formality Post 3 20 3.50 1.226 20 2.78 0.938 19 3.30 1.252 19 3.49 0.834 
Trust Post 1 20 5.25 0.502 20 5.77 0.785 19 5.42 0.705 19 5.51 0.514 
Trust Post 2 20 5.31 0.505 20 5.65 0.665 19 5.35 0.635 19 5.12 0.857 
Trust Post 3 20 5.19 0.647 20 5.62 0.731 19 5.51 0.731 19 5.17 0.804 
Task Orientation Post 1 20 4.98 0.555 20 5.23 1.085 19 5.45 0.715 19 4.93 0.666 
Task Orientation Post 2 20 5.29 0.871 20 5.54 0.608 19 5.71 0.689 19 4.79 0.620 














Dominance Post 1 19 2.28 0.684 19 2.77 1.071 16 3.20 0.829 16 3.26 1.037
Dominance Post 2 19 2.64 0.898 19 2.41 0.918 16 2.86 0.812 16 2.98 1.025
Dominance Post 3 18 2.37 0.780 19 2.53 1.009 16 2.90 0.961 16 2.48 0.826
Depth Post 1 19 4.27 0.769 19 4.34 1.126 16 3.90 0.589 16 3.75 0.899
Depth Post 2 19 4.32 1.104 19 4.55 1.172 16 4.29 0.645 16 3.86 0.809
Depth Post 3 18 4.29 1.109 19 4.35 1.280 16 4.14 0.792 16 4.03 0.921
Affection Post 1 19 5.22 0.565 19 5.08 0.862 16 4.75 0.695 16 4.88 0.801
Affection Post 2 19 5.20 0.919 19 5.21 0.751 16 4.88 0.606 16 4.89 0.935
Affection Post 3 18 5.29 1.016 19 5.21 0.976 16 4.94 0.887 16 4.89 1.133
Formality Post 1 19 2.61 0.818 19 3.25 1.356 16 3.65 0.898 16 3.50 0.919
Formality Post 2 19 2.42 0.888 19 2.91 1.059 16 2.88 0.902 16 2.63 0.902
Formality Post 3 18 2.20 0.923 19 2.96 1.374 16 2.90 1.094 16 2.15 0.750
Trust Post 1 19 5.83 0.647 19 5.55 0.610 16 4.83 0.786 16 5.08 0.963
Trust Post 2 19 5.73 0.619 19 5.75 0.507 16 5.30 0.551 16 5.33 0.915
Trust Post 3 18 5.93 0.669 19 5.78 0.600 16 5.48 0.593 16 5.65 0.771
Task Orientation Post 1 19 5.37 0.887 19 5.36 0.830 16 5.22 0.730 16 5.34 0.926
Task Orientation Post 2 19 5.07 0.824 19 5.01 1.091 16 4.88 0.645 16 5.31 0.981
Task Orientation Post 3 18 4.92 0.879 19 5.30 1.114 16 5.03 0.718 16 5.47 0.826
Phillips (Buyer)
Face-To-Face
Equal Power UnEqual Power










Table 10: Sample Size, Means, and Standard Deviations of Negotiator's Behaviors for the Six Relationship Dimensions for E-










Self Dominance Post 1 20 3.39 0.912 20 3.14 1.024 19 3.36 0.944 19 3.08 0.746
Self Dominance Post 2 20 3.45 0.792 20 3.20 1.122 19 3.62 1.071 19 3.31 0.900
Self Dominance Post 3 20 3.62 1.161 20 3.33 1.192 19 3.38 0.822 19 3.25 0.945
Self Depth Post 1 20 4.18 0.945 20 4.12 1.330 19 4.12 0.694 19 4.38 0.686
Self Depth Post 2 20 3.55 0.885 20 3.68 0.798 19 3.88 1.080 19 4.22 0.961
Self Depth Post 3 20 3.84 0.852 20 3.94 1.137 19 3.91 1.171 19 3.99 1.047
Self Affection Post 1 20 5.28 0.823 20 5.26 0.905 19 5.28 0.768 19 5.36 0.723
Self Affection Post 2 20 4.45 0.880 20 4.74 1.034 19 5.07 0.992 19 4.89 0.822
Self Affection Post 3 20 4.78 1.000 20 4.89 1.114 19 5.08 1.103 19 4.83 0.692
Self Formality Post 1 20 2.98 1.286 20 2.70 1.293 19 2.40 0.774 19 3.21 1.238
Self Formality Post 2 20 3.30 1.251 20 3.15 1.226 19 3.30 1.636 19 3.44 1.315
Self Formality Post 3 20 3.47 1.313 20 2.85 1.273 19 3.04 1.523 19 3.53 1.085
Self Trust Post 1 20 5.48 0.684 20 5.75 0.769 19 5.47 0.583 19 5.54 0.616
Self Trust Post 2 20 5.37 0.664 20 5.58 0.734 19 5.48 0.762 19 5.45 0.601
Self Trust Post 3 20 5.28 0.678 20 5.63 0.793 19 5.61 0.596 19 5.30 0.666
Self Task Orientation 
Post 1 20 4.80 1.025 20 5.50 0.973 19 5.51 0.819 19 4.89 0.647
Self Task Orientation 
Post 2 20 5.39 1.050 20 5.70 0.868 19 5.76 0.685 19 5.29 0.619
Self Task Orientation 
Post 3 20 5.29 1.080 20 5.40 1.027 19 5.57 0.939 19 5.29 0.567
Email
Equal Power UnEqual Power















Self Dominance Post 1 19 2.61 0.767 19 2.89 1.027 16 3.43 0.489 16 3.46 0.765
Self Dominance Post 2 19 2.57 0.690 19 2.88 0.960 16 3.09 0.921 16 3.10 0.766
Self Dominance Post 3 18 2.70 0.801 19 2.73 0.880 16 3.36 0.865 16 2.86 0.779
Self Depth Post 1 19 4.09 0.795 19 4.16 1.292 16 4.09 0.566 16 3.69 1.048
Self Depth Post 2 19 4.49 1.061 19 4.19 1.339 16 4.26 0.722 16 3.66 1.065
Self Depth Post 3 18 4.29 1.150 19 4.33 1.386 16 4.35 0.757 16 3.90 0.952
Self Affection Post 1 19 5.24 0.779 19 5.16 1.158 16 5.05 0.647 16 4.80 0.963
Self Affection Post 2 19 5.22 0.946 19 5.38 0.883 16 4.95 0.621 16 4.75 0.966
Self Affection Post 3 18 5.21 0.810 19 5.29 0.929 16 5.09 0.618 16 4.81 1.250
Self Formality Post 1 19 2.33 0.943 19 3.09 1.241 16 3.23 1.114 16 2.98 0.821
Self Formality Post 2 19 2.07 0.836 19 2.81 1.193 16 2.85 0.966 16 2.38 1.039
Self Formality Post 3 18 2.02 0.932 19 2.89 1.419 16 2.90 1.059 16 2.25 0.931
Self Trust Post 1 19 5.95 0.462 19 5.75 0.771 16 5.35 0.666 16 5.63 0.582
Self Trust Post 2 19 6.03 0.604 19 5.94 0.553 16 5.52 0.486 16 5.66 0.595
Self Trust Post 3 18 6.02 0.671 19 5.90 0.519 16 5.60 0.586 16 5.63 0.676
Self Task Orientation 
Post 1 19 5.34 0.891 19 5.42 1.044 16 5.45 0.818 16 5.44 0.722
Self Task Orientation 
Post 2 19 5.29 0.765 19 5.36 1.137 16 5.13 0.683 16 5.52 0.868
Self Task Orientation 
Post 3 18 5.13 1.007 19 5.29 1.125 16 5.06 0.766 16 5.56 0.629
Face-To-Face
Equal Power UnEqual Power










Table 11: Sample Sizes, Means, and Standard Deviations for Changes in Perceptions from Post Negotiation 1 (P1) to Post 











Domin P1 to P3 Change 20 0.04 1.452 20 -0.08 1.092 19 -0.13 0.955 19 0.42 0.914
Depth P1 to P3 Change 20 -0.26 1.055 20 -0.49 1.156 19 0.33 1.077 19 -0.52 0.860
Affect P1 to P3 Change 20 -0.46 1.011 20 -0.43 0.824 19 0.07 1.210 19 -0.46 1.140
Form P1 to P3 Change 20 0.58 1.237 20 -0.05 1.234 19 0.67 1.077 19 0.23 1.049
Trust P1 to P3 Change 20 -0.06 0.763 20 -0.15 0.776 19 0.08 0.713 19 -0.34 1.022










Domin P1 to P3 Change 18 0.07 0.788 19 -0.24 1.030 16 -0.30 1.220 16 -0.79 1.021
Depth P1 to P3 Change 18 -0.01 0.919 19 0.01 0.839 16 0.24 0.967 16 0.28 0.776
Affect P1 to P3 Change 18 0.06 0.926 19 0.13 0.733 16 0.19 0.942 16 0.02 0.964
Form P1 to P3 Change 18 -0.35 0.973 19 -0.28 1.596 16 -0.75 1.072 16 -1.35 1.043
Trust P1 to P3 Change 18 0.16 0.656 19 0.23 0.770 16 0.65 0.919 16 0.58 0.952




Equal Power UnEqual Power
Phillips (Buyer)
Crawley (Seller) Crawley (Seller)
Crawley (Seller) Crawley (Seller)








Table 12: Sample Sizes, Means, and Standard Deviations for Changes in Perceptions from Post Negotiation 1 (P1) to Post 
Negotiation 3 (P3) for Negotiators Self Reported Relational Behaviors for E-mail and FTF across Power Conditions. 
 
E-mail 
Equal Power Unequal Power 






Deviation N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Self Domin P1 to P3 Change 20 0.23 1.460 20 0.19 0.998 19 0.021 0.832 19 0.17 0.828 
Self Depth P1 to P3 Change 20 -0.34 0.803 20 -0.18 1.229 19 -0.211 1.210 19 -0.39 0.821 
Self Affect P1 to P3 Change 20 -0.50 1.173 20 -0.38 0.681 19 -0.197 0.945 19 -0.53 0.878 
Self Form P1 to P3 Change 20 0.48 1.263 20 0.15 1.211 19 0.632 1.351 19 0.32 1.194 
Self Trust P1 to P3 Change 20 -0.20 0.880 20 -0.13 0.549 19 0.140 0.428 19 -0.25 0.537 
Self Task P1 to P3 Change 20 0.49 1.281 20 -0.10 0.676 19 0.053 0.720 19 0.40 0.694 
                          
Face-To-Face 
Equal Power Unequal Power 
Crawley Phillips Crawley Phillips   
  
  N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Self Domin P1 to P3 Change 18 0.12 0.938 19 -0.17 0.734 16 -0.06 0.934 16 -0.60 0.611 
Self Depth P1 to P3 Change 18 0.14 0.972 19 0.17 1.046 16 0.26 0.819 16 0.21 0.778 
Self Affect P1 to P3 Change 18 0.01 0.929 19 0.13 0.860 16 0.05 0.720 16 0.02 0.602 
Self Form P1 to P3 Change 18 -0.33 1.242 19 -0.19 1.146 16 -0.33 0.860 16 -0.73 1.124 
Self Trust P1 to P3 Change 18 0.07 0.543 19 0.16 0.769 16 0.25 0.755 16 0.00 0.524 






H1a: In e-mail negotiations, the perception of one’s dominance will 
increase more than it does in FTF negotiations from after the first 
negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H1b: In e-mail negotiations, the perception of the partner’s level of 
dominance will increase more than it does in FTF negotiations from after 
the first negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
 
H1a was tested by examining the change in the negotiator’s self reported 
change in dominant communication behaviors between the first negotiation (Knight) 
and the third negotiation (Universal Computer II).  Media was included in the APIM 
model as an independent variable along with bargaining power, bargaining role, and 
interaction effects between the variables.  Change in the reported level of dominance 
was the dependent variable.  The level of dominance was significantly higher for the 
e-mail condition, providing supporting for H1a.  Table 13 presents the findings that 
the parameter estimate for media was b = .166 with t(69.729) = 2.292,  p < .03.  No 
other significant main effects or interactions were found regarding changes in 




Table 13: Estimates of Fixed Effects for Partner’s Own Dominance Change from 
Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3)a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept -.0133 .072 69.729 -.185 .854 
Bargaining Role .089 .086 70.129 1.037 .303 
Media Condition .166 .072 69.729 2.292 .025 
Bargaining Power -.105 .072 69.729 -1.451 .151 
Barrole * Media -.116 .086 70.129 -1.349 .182 
Barrole * Barpower .008 .086 70.129 .097 .923 
Media * Barpower .047 .072 69.729 .654 .515 
Barrole * Media * 
Barpower -.055 .086 70.129 -.642 .523 
a.  Dependent variable: Domin Self P1 to P3 Change.  Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1; Bargaining Power: 




H1b was tested with a model that examined the change in the perception of 
dominance regarding one’s negotiation partner from after the first negotiation to the 
third negotiation.  Media was included in the model as an independent variable along 
with bargaining role, bargaining power, and interactions effects between the 
variables.  The perceived change in partner’s level of dominance was significantly 
higher for the e-mail condition than the FTF condition; see Table 14 for results.  
Hypothesis H1b was supported, with b = .190, t(70.251) = 2.066, p < .05.  No other 






Table 14: Estimates of Fixed Effects for Negotiator’s Perceptions of Partner’s 
Dominance Change from Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3)a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept -.126 .092 70.371 -1.372 .174 
Bargaining Role .046 .087 70.251 .531 .597 
Media Condition .190 .092 70.371 2.066 .043 
Bargaining Power -.072 .092 70.371 -.785 .435 
Barrole * Media -.153 .087 70.251 -1.762 .082 
Barrole * Barpower -.061 .087 70.251 -.703 .484 
Media * Barpower .156 .092 70.371 1.695 .094 
Barrole * Media * 
Barpower -.106 .087 70.251 -1.220 .227 
a  Dependent variable: Domin P1 to P3 Change.  Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1; Bargaining Power: Equal = -




H2a: In FTF negotiations, the perception of the depth of one’s 
relationship increase more than it does in e-mail negotiations from after 
the first negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H2b: In FTF negotiations, the perception of the partner’s depth of the 
relationship will increase more than it does in e-mail negotiations from 
after the first negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H2a was tested by examining the change in the negotiator’s self reported 
change in depth of one’s communication behaviors between the first negotiation 
(Knight) and the third negotiation (Universal Computer II).  Media was included in 
the APIM model as an independent variable along with bargaining power, bargaining 
role, and interaction effects between the variables.  Change in the reported level of 




higher for the FTF condition than the e-mail condition, providing supporting for H2a.  
Table 15 presents the findings that the parameter estimate for media was b = -.238, 
t(68.740) = -2.807,  p < .01.  No other significant main effects or interactions 
were found regarding changes in negotiator’s own depth. 
 
Table 15: Estimates of Fixed Effects for Partner’s Own Depth Change from 
Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3) a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept -.042 .085 68.741 -.501 .618 
Bargaining Role .005 .078 68.720 .061 .952 
Media Condition -.238 .085 68.741 -2.807 .007 
Bargaining Power .011 .085 68.741 .132 .896 
Barrole * Media .000 .078 68.720 .000 1.000 
Barrole * Barpower .052 .078 68.720 .674 .503 
Media * Barpower -.031 .085 68.741 -.368 .714 
Barrole * Media * 
Barpower .032 .078 68.720 .414 .680 
a  Dependent variable: Depth Self P1 to P3 Change.  Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1; Bargaining Power: Equal 




H2b was tested with a model that examined the change in the perception of 
the depth of the relationship regarding one’s negotiation partner from after the first 
negotiation to the third negotiation.  Media was included in the model as an 
independent variable along with bargaining role, bargaining power, and interactions 
effects between the variables.  The perceived change in partner’s depth level was 
significantly higher for the FTF condition than the e-mail condition; See Table 16 for 
results.  Hypothesis H2b was supported with b = -.182, t(70.001)= -2.297, p < .05.  






Table 16: Estimates of Fixed Effects for Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s 
Depth Change from Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept -.053 .079 70.001 -.674 .502 
Bargaining Role .127 .082 70.052 1.553 .125 
Media Condition -.182 .079 70.001 -2.297 .025 
Bargaining Power .134 .079 70.001 1.696 .094 
Barrole * Media .141 .082 70.052 1.731 .088 
Barrole * Barpower .074 .082 70.052 .911 .365 
Media * Barpower .006 .079 70.001 .077 .939 
Barrole * Media * 
Barpower .079 .082 70.052 .964 .339 
a  Dependent variable: Depth P1 to P3 Change.  Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1; Bargaining 
Power: Equal = -1 & Unequal=1; and Bargaining Role: Phillips/Buyer= -1 & Crawley/Seller = 1. 
 
Affect 
H3a: In FTF negotiations, the perception of one’s affect/immediacy will 
increase more than it does in e-mail negotiations from after the first 
negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H3b: In FTF negotiations, the perception of the partner’s level of 
affect/immediacy will increase more than it does in e-mail negotiations 
from after the first negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
   
H3a was tested by examining the change in the negotiator’s self report of 
affect/immediate communication behaviors between the first negotiation (Knight) and 
the third negotiation (Universal Computer II).  Media was included in the APIM 
model as an independent variable along with bargaining power, bargaining role, and 
interaction effects between the variables.  Change in the reported level of 
affect/immediacy was the dependent variable.  The level of affect/immediacy was 




providing support for H3a.  Table 17 presents the findings that the parameter estimate 
for media was b = -.224, t(68.590) = -2.888,  p < .01.  No other significant main 
effects or interactions were found regarding changes in negotiator’s own 
affect/immediacy. 
 
Table 17: Estimates of Fixed Effects for Negotiator’s Affect/Immediacy Change 
from Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3) a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept -.175 .078 68.590 -2.258 .027 
Bargaining Role .013 .067 68.627 .197 .844 
Media Condition -.224 .078 68.590 -2.888 .005 
Bargaining Power .010 .078 68.590 .130 .897 
Barrole * Media .038 .067 68.627 .567 .573 
Barrole * Barpower .077 .067 68.627 1.152 .253 
Media * Barpower .028 .078 68.590 .357 .722 
Barrole * Media * 
Barpower .037 .067 68.627 .548 .585 
a.  Dependent variable: Affect Self P1 to P3 Change.  .  Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1; Bargaining Power: 




H3b was tested with a model that examined the change in the perception of 
the affect/immediacy of the relationship regarding one’s negotiation partner from 
after the first negotiation to the third negotiation.  Media was included in the model as 
an independent variable along with bargaining role, bargaining power, and 
interactions effects between the variables.  The perceived change in partner’s 
affect/immediacy level was significantly higher for the FTF condition than the e-mail 
condition; see Table 18 for results.  Hypothesis H3b was supported, with b = .284, 





Table 18: Estimates of Fixed Effects for Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s 
Affect/Immediacy Change from Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3) a 
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept -.112 .084 68.723 -1.331 .188 
Bargaining Role .072 .078 68.721 .928 .357 
Media Condition -.208 .084 68.723 -2.465 .016 
Bargaining Power .064 .084 68.723 .763 .448 
Barrole * Media .050 .078 68.721 .643 .522 
Barrole * Barpower .102 .078 68.721 1.316 .193 
Media * Barpower .059 .084 68.723 .695 .489 
Barrole * Media * 
Barpower .039 .078 68.721 .496 .621 
a.  Dependent variable: Affect P1 to P3 Change. Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1; Bargaining Power: Equal = -1 
& Unequal=1; and Bargaining Role: Phillips/Buyer= -1 & Crawley/Seller = 1. 
 
Formality 
H4a: In e-mail negotiations, the perception of one’s formality will 
increase more than it does in FTF negotiations from after the first 
negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H4b: In e-mail negotiations, the perception of the partner’s level of 
formality will increase more than it does in FTF negotiations from after 
the first negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H4a was tested by examining the change in the negotiator’s self report of 
formality between the first negotiation (Knight) and the third negotiation (Universal 
Computer II).  Media was included in the APIM model as an independent variable 
along with bargaining power, bargaining role, and interaction effects between the 
variables.  Change in the reported level of formality was the dependent variable.  The 
level of formality increased from the first to the third negotiation for the e-mail 
condition and decreased for the FTF negotiation. Table 19 presents the findings, 




formality over the three negotiations more than in the FTF negotiations, b = .396, 
t(70.293) = 4.090,  p < .001.  No other significant main effects or interactions were 
significant.   
 
Table 19: Estimates of Fixed Effects for Negotiator’s Formality Change from 
Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3) a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept -.001 .097 70.293 -.010 .992 
Bargaining Role .113 .100 70.347 1.131 .262 
Media Condition .396 .097 70.293 4.090 .000 
Bargaining Power -.028 .097 70.293 -.287 .775 
Barrole * Media .049 .100 70.347 .491 .625 
Barrole * Barpower .065 .100 70.347 .648 .519 
Media * Barpower .106 .097 70.293 1.098 .276 
Barrole * Media * 
Barpower -.069 .100 70.347 -.691 .492 
a  Dependent Variable: Form Self P1 to P3 Change.  Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1; Bargaining Power: Equal 
= -1 & Unequal=1; and Bargaining Role: Phillips/Buyer= -1 & Crawley/Seller = 1. 
 
 
H4b was tested with a model that examined the change in the perception of 
the formality of the relationship with one’s negotiation partner from after the first 
negotiation to the third negotiation.  Media was included in the model as an 
independent variable along with bargaining role, bargaining power, and interactions 
effects between the variables.  The level of formality was significantly higher when e-
mail was used than when FTF was used.  As Table 20 illustrates, the partner was 
perceived as displaying a higher level of formality in the third as opposed to the first 
negotiation in the e-mail condition than in the FTF condition, with b = .520, 
t(70.196)=  5.810, p < .001.  Hypotheses H4b was supported.  In addition, a 
significant interaction was found between media type and bargaining power that is 





Table 20: Estimates of Fixed Effects for Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s 
Formality Change from Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation (P3) a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept -.163 .090 70.196 -1.823 .073 
Bargaining Role .201 .105 70.342 1.909 .060 
Media Condition .520 .090 70.196 5.810 .000 
Bargaining Power -.139 .090 70.196 -1.554 .125 
Barrole * Media .067 .105 70.342 .636 .527 
Barrole * Barpower .060 .105 70.342 .567 .573 
Media * Barpower .230 .090 70.196 2.563 .013 
Barrole * Media * 
Barpower -.108 .105 70.342 -1.029 .307 
a  Dependent variable: Form P1 to P3 Change.  Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1; Bargaining Power: Equal = -1 




H5a: In FTF negotiations, the perception of one’s trust will increase more 
than it does in e-mail negotiations from after the first negotiation to after 
the third negotiation. 
H5b: In FTF negotiations, the perception of the partner’s level of trust 
will increase more than it does in e-mail negotiations from after the first 
negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H5a was tested by examining the change in the negotiator’s self reported of 
trust between the first negotiation (Knight) and the third negotiation (Universal 
Computer II).  Media was included in the APIM model as an independent variable 
along with bargaining power, bargaining role, and interaction effects between the 
variables.  Change in the reported level of trust was the dependent variable.  The level 
of trust increased from the first to the third negotiation for the FTF condition, but was 
not significantly different from the e-mail condition.  Table 21 presents the findings 




interaction between role and power that is explored further in the power section 
below. 
 
Table 21: Estimates of Fixed Effects for Negotiator’s Trust Change from 
Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3)  a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept .004 .060 67.568 .064 .949 
Bargaining Role .057 .045 67.961 1.269 .209 
Media Condition -.111 .060 67.568 -1.848 .069 
Bargaining Power .032 .060 67.568 .536 .594 
Barrole * Media .020 .045 67.961 .461 .646 
Barrole * Barpower .102 .045 67.961 2.269 .026 
Media * Barpower .023 .060 67.568 .375 .709 
Barrole * Media * 
Barpower .013 .045 67.961 .296 .768 
a.  Dependent variable: Trust Self P1 to P3 Change. Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1; Bargaining Power: Equal 
= -1 & Unequal=1; and Bargaining Role: Phillips/Buyer= -1 & Crawley/Seller = 1. 
 
 
H5b was tested with a model that examined the change in the perception of 
the trust in the relationship with one’s negotiation partner from after the first 
negotiation to the third negotiation.  Media was included in the model as an 
independent variable along with bargaining role, bargaining power, and interactions 
effects between the variables.  The level of trust was significantly higher when FTF 
was used than when e-mail was used.  As Table 22 illustrates, the partner was 
perceived as displaying a higher level of trust in the third as opposed to the first 
negotiation for the FTF condition when compared to the e-mail condition, indicating 
a more trusting relationship developing over time, with b = -2.58, t(68.322)=  -3.549, 






Table 22: Estimates of Fixed Effects of Negotiator’s Perceptions of Partner’s 
Trust Change from Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3) a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept .142 .073 68.322 1.958 .054 
Bargaining Role .062 .063 68.269 .983 .329 
Media Condition -.258 .073 68.322 -3.549 .001 
Bargaining Power .101 .073 68.322 1.386 .170 
Barrole * Media .065 .063 68.269 1.029 .307 
Barrole * Barpower .062 .063 68.269 .970 .335 
Media * Barpower -.111 .073 68.322 -1.532 .130 
Barrole * Media * 
Barpower .021 .063 68.269 .333 .740 
a  Dependent variable: Trust P1 to P3 Change.  Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1; Bargaining Power: Equal = -1 
& Unequal=1; and Bargaining Role: Phillips/Buyer= -1 & Crawley/Seller = 1. 
Task Orientation 
H6a: In e-mail negotiations, the perception of one’s task orientation will 
increase more than it does in FTF negotiations from after the first 
negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H6b:  In e-mail negotiations, the perception of the partner’s level of task 
orientation will increase more than it does in FTF negotiations from after 
the first negotiation to after the third negotiation. 
H6a was tested by examining the change in the negotiator’s self report of task 
orientation between the first negotiation (Knight) and the third negotiation (Universal 
Computer II).  Media was included in the APIM model as an independent variable 
along with bargaining power, bargaining role, and interaction effects between the 
variables.  Change in the reported level of task orientation was the dependent 
variable.  Table 23 presents the findings for this hypothesis.  E-mail negotiations 




p < .04.  In addition, an interaction was found between bargaining role and power that 
is explored below in the research questions.   
Table 23: Estimates of Fixed Effects for Negotiator’s Task Orientation Change 
from Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3) a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept .036 .079 70.433 .456 .650 
Bargaining Role -.036 .061 69.702 -.589 .558 
Media Condition .173 .079 70.433 2.184 .032 
Bargaining Power .009 .079 70.433 .119 .906 
Barrole * Media .097 .061 69.702 1.594 .116 
Barrole * Barpower -.178 .061 69.702 -2.921 .005 
Media * Barpower .006 .079 70.433 .071 .944 
Barrole * Media * 
Barpower -.054 .061 69.702 -.883 .380 
a  Dependent variable: Task Self P1 to P3 Change.  Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1; Bargaining Power: Equal 
= -1 & Unequal=1; and Bargaining Role: Phillips/Buyer= -1 & Crawley/Seller = 1. 
 
 
H6b was tested with a model that examined the change in the perception of 
the task orientation in the relationship with one’s negotiation partner from after the 
first negotiation to the third negotiation.  Media was included in the model as an 
independent variable along with bargaining role, bargaining power, and interactions 
effects between the variables.  The level of task orientation was significantly higher 
when the negotiation took place via e-mail.  As Table 24 illustrates, in the e-mail  
condition more than the FTF condition, the partner was perceived as displaying a 
higher level of task orientation in the third as opposed to the first negotiation 
indicating a more task orientated relationship developing over time, b = .193, 
t(70.258)=  2.445, p < .02.  No other main effects or significant interactions were 





Table 24: Estimates of Fixed Effects of Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s 
Task Orientation Change from Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3)a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept .063 .079 70.258 .803 .425 
Bargaining Role -.082 .084 70.350 -.981 .330 
Media Condition .193 .079 70.258 2.445 .017 
Bargaining Power .036 .079 70.258 .461 .646 
Barrole * Media .083 .084 70.350 .987 .327 
Barrole * Barpower .014 .084 70.350 .169 .866 
Media * Barpower -.062 .079 70.258 -.785 .435 
Barrole * Media * 
Barpower .005 .084 70.350 .060 .953 
a  Dependent variable: Task P1 to P3 Change. Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1; Bargaining Power: Equal = -1 
& Unequal=1; and Bargaining Role: Phillips/Buyer= -1 & Crawley/Seller = 1. 
 
Cues Filtered Out and Social Information Processing 
H7cues: In FTF negotiations, the relationship between the parties will show a 
greater change than in e-mail negotiations. 
H7SIP: In e-mail negotiations, the relationship between the parties will show a 
greater change than in the FTF condition.  
 Hypotheses 7cues and 7SIP predict changes in the perceptions that a negotiator 
has regarding the relationship with his or her partner between the first and third 
negotiation.  Means and standard deviations for the perception of the partner’s 
behavior for the six dimensions of dominance, depth of relationship, 
affect/immediacy, formality, trust, and task orientation are provided in Table 9.  
Means and standard deviations for the negotiator’s own behaviors for the six 
dimensions are provided in Table 10.  The changes in perception of the partner’s 
behaviors are found in Table 11.  The changes in perceptions for the one’s own 




If H7cues hypothesis was supported, no changes would have been found in the 
e-mail condition between the first and third negotiations because it predicts that 
relationships do not develop over a narrow, lean media such as e-mail negotiations.  If 
H7SIP hypothesis was supported then relationships should have shown development in 
both the FTF and e-mail conditions.   
The APIM analysis (Cook & Kenny, 2005; Kenny et al., 2006) was used to 
test the effect of media, bargaining role, bargaining power, and their interactions on 
the perception of partner’s change in communication on the six dimensions over the 
three negotiations. These analyses control for bargaining role and relative power. 
For all six dimensions, significant differences in the perception of the 
partner’s behaviors depended on the media used.  For e-mail, the degree of 
dominance perceived, the degree of formality, and the degree of task orientation all 
increased significantly more than in the FTF condition.  For FTF, the degree of 
partner’s affect, the depth of the relationship, and the level of trust all increased 
significantly more than in the e-mail condition.  The individual test statistics are 
reported above in Tables 13-24 where each relational dimension was discussed. 
The APIM also tested the effect of media, bargaining role, bargaining power, 
and the interactions on the negotiator’s own report of change in relational 
communication behaviors.  For five of the six aspects, significant differences were 
found between the two media.  For e-mail, the degree of dominant behavior, the 
formality, and task orientation communication behaviors all increased, whereas 
individuals who used FTF increased in their affect and the depth of their 




found when controlling for bargaining power and bargaining role.  These findings are 
reported in the odd numbered tables 13-23 above.  In five of the six relationship 
variables the individual’s behaviors and their partner’s tracked each other.  The lone 
exception was self demonstration of trust which only changed for the partner over 
time. 
H7SIP hypothesis was supported because media had a significant effect on all 
the aspects of relational communication tested with the lone exception of self reported 
trust behaviors.  The H7cues hypothesis was not supported because the six measures of 
relational communication for one’s partner changed and five of the six self-reported 
measures changed with the use of e-mail.  The relationships were not unchanged, 
contrary to what the cues filtered out theories predict.  Although the relational 
behaviors that may appear to be more affected by nonverbal cues like dominance, 
task orientation, and formality increased more in the e-mail condition than the FTF 
condition, these differences still do not lend support to the cues filtered out 
perspective.  This approach suggests that e-mail should be too narrow to detect 
changes in the level of dominance, task orientation, and formality.  From the cues 
filtered out perspective, one’s partner would not detect any relationship changes from 
the first negotiation (Knight) that was conducted using FTF.  Individuals would also 
not attempt to alter their own relationship behaviors because they would perceive the 




 Effect of Power on Relational Communication  
RQ1: What effect does the power difference between the negotiators have 
on the change in the six dimensions of relational communication over 
time as reported by the negotiators themselves? 
Research Question 1 asks what effect the different power conditions had on 
the change in the six dimensions of relational communication.  To examine this 
research question, previous analyses were reviewed for the effect of power on the six 
relational dimensions.  No main effects were found for any of the six dimensions 
related to the power condition, however, two interactions were found that are worth 
noting. 
Table 21, which provides the results of examining the perceived change in 
trust as reported by the negotiators, showed an interaction for the perceived level of 
trust behaviors exhibited by the negotiator between bargaining role and bargaining 
power.  In the unequal power condition, the level of trust displayed by the negotiator 
was affected by role such that the buyer was perceived to decrease trusting 
communication behaviors over time, whereas the seller increased trusting 
communication behaviors.  No significant effect for the change in the level of trust 
behaviors was found for the equal power condition.   Table 25 presents the means and 
standard deviations for the negotiator’s perceived change in trusting communication 
behaviors, and Table 26 reports the APIM estimates for the unequal power condition 




Table 25: Means and Standard Deviations for Negotiators Reported Trust 
Change from Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3) 
  Phillips (Buyer) Crawley (Seller) 
 Equal Unequal Equal Unequal 
Mean 0.01 -0.13 -0.07 0.19 
Std. 
Deviation 0.671 0.537 0.743 0.593 
 
 
Table 26: Estimates of Fixed Effects of Own Trust Communication Changes 
from Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3) for the Unequal Power Condition a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept .036 .079 33.000 .456 .651 
Media Condition -.088 .079 33.000 -1.120 .271 
Bargaining Role .158 .054 33.000 2.936 .006 
Media * Barrole .033 .054 33.000 .628 .535 
a  Dependent variable: Trust Self P1 to P3 Change. Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1 and Bargaining Role: 
Phillips/Buyer= -1 & Crawley/Seller = 1. 
 
 
Another interaction that was observed was for the effects of bargaining role 
and bargaining power on the change in the perceived level of task orientation 
exhibited by the negotiator. Table 23 presents the results of the previous analysis 
related to the negotiators’ self report task orientation behaviors.  In the unequal power 
condition, the level of task oriented behaviors increased from the first negotiation to 
the third negotiation for the buyer, Phillips, and decreased for the seller, Crawley.  
The means and standard deviations for the bargaining roles in each of the power 
conditions is reported in Table 27 and the level of change in task oriented behaviors 
was significant as indicated in Table 28, b = -.214, t(33) = -2.308, p < .03.  No 
significant effect was found for role or change in the perceived level of task 




Table 27: Means and Standard Deviations for Negotiator’s Reported Task 
Orientation Behaviors from Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3) for 
Bargaining Roles within Power Conditions 
 Phillips (Buyer) Crawley (Seller) 
 Equal Unequal Equal Unequal 
Mean -0.12 0.27 0.18 -0.15 
Std. 
Deviation 0.664 0.723 1.132 0.862 
 
 
Table 28 Estimates of Fixed Effects of Own Task Orientation Change from 
Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3) for the Unequal Power Condition a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept .045 .095 33.000 .475 .638 
Media Condition .178 .095 33.000 1.865 .071 
Bargaining Role -.214 .092 33.000 -2.308 .027 
Media * Barrole .043 .092 33.000 .467 .644 
a  Dependent variable: Task Self P1 to P3 Change.  Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1.  Bargaining Role: 




RQ2: What effect does the power difference between the negotiators have 
on the change in the six dimensions of relational communication over 
time in a negotiation as perceived by negotiators? 
Research Question 2 asks what effect the different power conditions had on 
the change in the negotiator’s perception of his or her partner’s six dimensions of 
relational communication.  To examine this research question, previous analyses were 
specifically reviewed for the effect of power on the perceived changes in the partner’s 
six relational dimensions over the three negotiations.   
No main effect was found for the different power conditions on any of the six 
dimensions, although some interactions were found that are worthy of further 
examination.  As indicated in Table 20, which reports the results of the previous 




formality, an interaction was found between media and power condition.  In the FTF 
condition, the change in partner’s formality was affected by power such that it 
decreased over time whereas in the e-mail condition the power difference had no 
significant effect.  In the FTF condition, both the equal and unequal power conditions 
decreased in the perceived level of formality exhibited by their partner over time, but 
in the unequal power condition, the level of formality decline was significantly 
greater.  Table 29 reports the means and standard deviations for perceived changes in 
partner formality by media used and power condition.  Table 30 provides the APIM 
analysis indicating that perceptions of partner’s formality increased significantly 
more in the unequal power condition than in the equal power condition for FTF 
negotiators, b = -.368, t(33.238) = -2.533, p < .02.     
Table 29: Means and Standard Deviations for Negotiators Perception of 
Partner’s Change in Formality from Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3) for 
Media within Power Conditions 
 FTF E-mail 
 Equal Unequal Equal Unequal 
Mean -0.32 -1.05 0.27 0.45 
Std. 
Deviation 1.312 1.085 1.261 1.072 
 
 
Table 30: Estimates of Fixed Effects for Negotiators Perception of Partner’s 
Change in Formality from Negotiation 1 (P1) to Negotiation 3 (P3) in the FTF 
Condition a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept -.684 .145 33.238 -4.711 .000 
Bargaining Role .133 .146 33.241 .911 .369 
Bargaining Power -.367 .145 33.238 -2.533 .016 
Barrole * Barpower .168 .146 33.241 1.154 .257 
a Dependent variable: Form P1 to P3 Change.  Bargaining Power: Equal = -1 & Unequal=1; and Bargaining 





Effect of Role on Relational Communication  
RQ3: What effect does negotiation role (i.e., buyer/seller) have on the 
change in the six dimensions of relational communication in a negotiation 
over time as reported by the negotiators themselves? 
Research Question 3 asks what effect the negotiation role (i.e, buyer or seller) 
had on the change in the negotiator’s six dimensions of relational communication.  To 
examine this research question, previous analyses were reviewed for the effect of 
bargaining role on the negotiator’s reported changes in their relational dimensions 
over the three negotiations.   
No main effect was found for negotiation role on any of the six dimensions, 
although two interactions between role and bargaining power were examined more 
closely as part of Research Question 1 and 2 above. 
As indicated in Table 21, which presents the results for the change in the 
negotiator’s perceived level of trust, an interaction was found between bargaining role 
and bargaining power.  In the unequal power condition, the perceived level of trust 
displayed by the negotiator was affected by their role:  Phillips, the buyer, was 
perceived to decrease the use of trusting communication behaviors whereas Crawley, 
the seller, was perceived to increase use of trusting communication behaviors.  There 
was no effect on the perceived level of trust behaviors for either role in the equal 
power condition.   Table 25 reports the means and standard deviations, and Table 26 
presents the APIM results for the unequal power condition that were discussed as part 




The change in the level of negotiator reported task orientation behaviors was 
also affected by an interaction between bargaining role and bargaining power as 
indicated by Table 23, which presents the results for testing Hypothesis H6a.  This 
interaction was examined as part of Research Question 1 above.  In the unequal 
power condition, the perceived level of task oriented behaviors reported by the 
negotiators increased from the first negotiation to the third negotiation for the buyers 
and decreased for the sellers.  This interaction was significant, as indicated in Table 
28 and Table 27 provides the means and standard deviations for negotiator change in 
task oriented behaviors from the first to the third negotiaiton.   In the equal power 
condition, no effect was found for bargaining role on negotiator reported change in 
task orientation. 
 
RQ4: What effect does the negotiation role (i.e., buyer/seller) have on the 
change in the six dimensions of relational communication over time in a 
negotiation as perceived by negotiators? 
No main effects or interactions were found for bargaining role on any of the 
negotiator’s perceptions of his or her partner’s change in behavior on the six 
dimensions of relational communication. 
Effects on Future E-mail Use  
H8: The preference to use e-mail for future negotiations (i.e., after the 
third negotiation) with their same partner will be greater for individuals 




H9: The preference to use e-mail for future negotiations (i.e., after the 
third negotiation) with their same partner will be greater for individuals 
who used e-mail to negotiate with their partner in the past. 
H10: The preference to use e-mail for future negotiations with their 
partner (i.e., after the third negotiation) will be greater for individuals 
that perceive higher levels of trust in their relationship. 
H11: The preference to use e-mail for future negotiations with their 
partner (i.e., after the third negotiation) will be greater for individuals 
with perceive lower levels of dominance in their relationship. 
H12: The preference to use e-mail for future negotiations with one’s 
partner (i.e., after the third negotiation) will be greater for individuals 
that perceive their partner to have a higher task focus in their previous 
negotiations. 
 
H8 through H12 were tested using an APIM procedure that tested the 
negotiators’ preference for using e-mail for future negotiations with their partners.  
As described in Chapter 4, participants were asked to rank order their preferences for 
future media use when negotiating with their partner.  Participants were provided the 
following options to rank order: e-mail, telephone, FTF, instant messenger, fax, and 
letter.   Table 31 provides the means and standard deviations for the rank ordering of 
each media displayed by media condition and bargaining power.  The APIM model 
included independent variables of media used, bargaining power, dominance 




negotiation, level of task orientation exhibited by partner in the third negotiation, and 
the level of computer mediated communication comfort after the conclusion of the 
third negotiation.  Interactions for the relationship variables with media and 
bargaining power were also explored in the model.  The score for e-mail was the 
dependent variable.  The lower the rank assigned to e-mail, the greater the preference 




Table 31: Rank Ordering of Media for Future Use to Negotiate with Partner, by 
Media and Power Conditions a 
E-mail FTF 
Equal Unequal Equal Unequal 









E-mail Rank 37 2.51 1.216 34 3.18 1.381 33 3.15 .972 30 3.30 1.022
Telephone Rank 37 2.81 .877 34 2.56 .824 33 2.42 1.091 30 2.30 .702




37 2.73 1.503 34 3.03 1.314 32 2.47 1.077 30 2.87 1.042
Fax Rank 37 5.05 .705 34 5.06 .649 32 5.50 .568 30 5.33 .547
Letter Rank 37 5.46 .900 34 5.41 .925 32 5.38 .609 30 5.60 .498
a The lower the mean the more likely to use that media for future negotiations with one’s partner. 
 
For H8, comfort using computer mediated communication was significantly 
related to a greater preference to use e-mail for future negotiations, b = -.432, 




greater level of comfort with computer mediated communication the more likely the 
participant was to report a preference to use e-mail in the future. 
For H9, the media that was used for the second and third negotiations 
significantly affected the preference to use e-mail for future negotiations, b = -.302, 
t(56.664)=  -2.640,  p <  .05 (Table 32 provides the results for the APIM procedure.   
Individuals who used e-mail for the second and third negotiations were more likely to 
prefer to use e-mail for future negotiations than negotiators who interacted FTF.  
Therefore, H9 was supported. 
The test of H10, which predicted that the perceived level of their partner’s 
level of dominance in the previous negotiation would effect their preference for using 
e-mail for future negotiations with their partners, resulted in no main effects.  Table 
32 provides the results for the analysis, b = .035, t(91.702) =  .264,  n.s.  However an 
interaction was found between partner’s dominance level in the last negotiation and 
the media used that is worth noted and explored below. 
H11 examined the effect of the negotiator’s perceived level of trust in the final 
negotiation their partners demonstrated on preference for future using e-mail to 
negotiate in the future.  H11 was not supported, as indicated by the results in Table 
32, b = -.107, t(106.356) =  -.603, n.s.   
H12 examined the negotiators’ perception of their partner’s task orientation in 
the final negotiation and its effect on the preference for using e-mail for future 
negotiations.  No main effect was found for perception of task orientation in the last 
negotiation, b = -.0511, t(110.124)=  -.413,  n.s. as reported in Table 32.  An 




negotiation that was significant, as can be seen in Table 32.  This interaction is 
explored below. 
Table 32: Estimates of Fixed Effects for Preference to Use E-mail in the Future 
to Negotiate with Partner a 
 Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept 2.991 .114 55.986 26.037 .000 
Media Condition -.296 .114 55.986 -2.580 .013 
Bargaining Power .147 .114 55.986 1.282 .205 
Partner Dominance Post 
Neg 3 .034 .131 91.702 .264 .792 
Partner Trust Post Neg 3 -.107 .177 106.356 -.603 .548 
Partner Task Oriented Post 
Neg 3 -.051 .123 110.124 -.413 .680 
CMC Comfort -.423 .110 112.108 -3.822 .000 
Media * Barpower .112 .114 55.986 .977 .333 
Media * Part Domin 3 .462 .131 91.702 3.502 .001 
Media * Part Trust 3 .139 .177 106.356 .785 .434 
Media * Part Task 3 -.154 .123 110.124 -1.247 .215 
Media * CMC Comfort -.024 .110 112.108 -.225 .822 
Barpower * Part Domin 3 
.134 .131 91.702 1.020 .310 
Barpower * Part Trust 3 
.004 .177 106.356 .027 .978 
Barpower * Part Task 3 
-.260 .123 110.124 -2.106 .037 
Barpower * CMC Comfort 
.051 .110 112.108 .466 .642 
Media * Barpower * Part 
Domin 3 -.105 .131 91.702 -.796 .428 
Media * Barpower * Part 
Trust 3 -.171 .177 106.356 -.967 .336 
Media * Barpower * Part 
Task 3 -.105 .123 110.124 -.853 .395 
Media * Barpower * CMC 
Comfort -.108 .110 112.108 -.982 .328 
a Dependent ariable: E-mail Rank.  Media: FTF= -1 & E-mail= 1; Bargaining Power: Equal = -1 & 
Unequal=1. Partner Dominance Post Neg 3, Partner Trust Post Neg 3, Partner Task Orientation Post Neg 3, 
and CMC Comfort are all grand mean centered.  The grand means were 2.77, 5.53, 5.30, and 6.12, 
respectively. 
 
 The media and partner’s perceived dominance in the third negotiation 
interaction was significant, b = -.470, t(91.535) = 3.564, p < .001.  This finding 
indicates that the preference to use e-mail for future negotiations was influenced by a 




behavior during the third negotiation.  This interaction was explored by dividing the 
data into e-mail condition only and FTF condition only, then repeating the APIM 
analysis without the media variable. 
In the e-mail only analysis, the results indicated that the less dominant the 
partner was perceived to be in the third negotiation the greater the likelihood that a 
negotiator preferred to use e-mail in the future, b = -.471, t(50.056)= 2.040, p < .05, 
as shown in Table 33.  Hypothesis H11 was supported for the e-mail condition.    
In the FTF only analysis, the results indicated that a perception of working 
with a lower dominant partner in the third negotiation resulted in lower likelihood to 
prefer to use e-mail in the future.  This finding is the opposite of the e-mail condition, 
so H11 was not supported for the FTF condition, b = -.392, t(31.000) = -3.096, p < 
.01, as shown in Table 34. 
Table 33: Estimates of Fixed Effects for Future E-mail Use to Negotiate with 
Partner for E-mail Only Group a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept 2.709 .1701 26.582 15.862 .000 
Bargaining Power .263 .171 26.582 1.538 .136 
Partner Dominance 
Post Neg 3 .471 .231 50.056 2.040 .047 
Partner Trust Post 
Neg 3 .031 .303 54.191 .101 .920 
Partner Task 
Oriented Post Neg 3 -.240 .202 57.943 -1.188 .240 
CMC Comfort -.419 .124 37.351 -3.392 .002 
Barpower * Part 
Domin 3 .100 .231 50.056 .434 .666 
Barpower * Part 
Trust 3 -.078 .303 54.191 -.258 .798 
Barpower * Part 
Task 3 -.351 .202 57.943 -1.742 .087 
Barpower * CMC 
Comfort -.076 .124 37.351 -.619 .540 
a Dependent variable: E-mail Rank.  Bargaining Power: Equal = -1 & Unequal=1. Partner Dominance Post 
Neg 3, Partner Trust Post Neg 3, Partner Task Orientation Post Neg 3, and CMC Comfort are all grand mean 




Table 34: Estimates of Fixed Effects for Future E-mail Use to Negotiate with 
Partner for FTF Only Group a 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
            
Intercept 3.311 .145 29.186 22.912 .000 
Bargaining Power .032 .145 29.186 .219 .828 
Partner Dominance 
Post Neg 3 -.392 .126 31.000 -3.096 .004 
Partner Trust Post 
Neg 3 -.225 .190 49.691 -1.184 .242 
Partner Task 
Oriented Post Neg 3 .137 .141 49.501 .972 .336 
CMC Comfort -.406 .154 46.185 -2.628 .012 
Barpower * Part 
Domin 3 .287 .126 31.000 2.266 .031 
Barpower * Part 
Trust 3 .210 .190 49.691 1.102 .276 
Barpower * Part 
Task 3 -.138 .141 49.501 -.981 .331 
Barpower * CMC 
Comfort .204 .154 46.185 1.323 .192 
a Dependent Variable: ae-mailr.1.00: Final E-mail Rank. Bargaining Power: Equal = -1 & Unequal=1. 
Partner Dominance Post Neg 3, Partner Trust Post Neg 3, Partner Task Orientation Post Neg 3, and CMC 
Comfort are all grand mean centered.  The grand means were 2.77, 5.53, 5.30, and 6.12, respectively. 
 
 
 The further exploration of the bargaining power and partner’s task orientation 
interaction was accomplished by splitting the data set into the unequal and equal 
power groups and running the APIM model without bargaining power as an 
independent variable.  Although the interaction was significant previously, the 
analyses separating equal and unequal power did not produce significant findings for 
task orientation in the third negotiation.  The results were not significant for task 
orientation in the equal power condition were:  b = .220, t(57.571) = 1.564, n.s. or in  
the unequal power condition, b = -.303, t(51.817) = -1.461, n.s.   Therefore, H12 was 




Summary of Results 
In summary, all of the relational communication behavior hypotheses were 
affected by the media used with the lone exception of negotiator self-reported trusting 
behaviors.  In total, these findings provide support for the SIP theory and did not 
support the cues filtered out approach, as discussed in greater detail in H8.  However, 
these findings also indicate that the channel seems to have an effect on relationship 
development when negotiating because the FTF and e-mail conditions did not 
converge to the same relationship levels for the six dimensions.  These findings and 
implications for future studies are discussed in the next chapter. 
The test of the preference for using e-mail in the future use for negotiating 
supported the effect of CMC comfort and prior e-mail negotiating experience on  
future preference for using e-mail.  E-mail negotiators who perceived their partner as 
highly dominant were significantly more likely to express a preference for not using 
e-mail to negotiate in the future, whereas FTF negotiators who perceived their partner 
as being more dominant were more likely to prefer using e-mail for future 
negotiations.  Perceptions of task orientation and trusting behaviors did not appear to 
significantly effect preference for e-mail use when negotiating in the future.  These 








Chapter 6:  Discussion 
 
 
This chapter presents a summary of the study, discusses the results and their 
implications, and identifies limitations of the research.  In addition, contributions to 
theory and organizational application are presented along with directions for future 
research. 
Summary of the Study 
The dissertation examined the cues filtered out and Social Information 
Processing (SIP) approaches to relationship development in an intra-organizational 
dyadic negotiation by comparing the use of face-to-face (FTF) and e-mail channels.  
The study further examined the effect of power differences on relationship 
development.  Individuals in organizations use technology based tools such as e-mail 
to perform a variety of communication tasks.  The results of this research point to the 
importance of understanding the effect of communication experiences under a variety 
of settings on the development of relationships in organizations.  An organization’s 
profitability, efficiency, and reputation are all affected by the internal relationships of 
their employees.  
In summary, this study produced results in three areas related to negotiation 
and computer mediated communication:  (1) interpersonal relationships develop over 
lean media like e-mail; (2) the characteristics of e-mail affect relationship 
development when compared to FTF; and (3) the preference to use e-mail for future 
negotiations is affected by prior e-mail negotiation experience with one’s partner, 




exhibits in e-mail negotiations.  With regard to interpersonal relationships and 
negotiation, the study suggests that individuals learn how to manage their 
interpersonal relationships via e-mail because it can be a useful tool for managing 
one’s persona.  The finding in this study that e-mail users who perceive their partner 
as dominant were more likely to want to use FTF with their partner in future 
negotiations was a significant finding.  Traditional CMC thinking has considered e-
mail to be a great relationship equalizer and a means for power differences to 
minimized, but this study did not support this view of CMC.  This study also found 
that greater organizational bargaining power and bargaining role were only of limited 
influence on the development of interpersonal relationships. 
Cues Filtered Out and Social Information Processing  
Competing Hypotheses, H7cues and H7SIP, addressed the differences between 
the cues filtered out approach and SIP approach to relationship development in 
computer mediated communication.  The cues filtered out perspective holds that e-
mail is too narrow a channel for the development of relationships to occur when 
conducting a communication task like a negotiation.  SIP posits that individuals are 
driven to establish connections with others and that despite the limited bandwidth of 
e-mail people adapt their communications to manage their interpersonal relationships.  
SIP asserts that given enough time, regardless of the channel used to negotiate, 
relationship development will eventually reach the same levels.  This dissertation 




affect, formality, dominance, and task orientation – they all changed from after the 
first negotiation (Knight) to after the third negotiation (Universal Computer II). 
For some of the dimensions, such as perceived trust, depth, and affect, the 
FTF condition produced significantly higher increases when compared to e-mail, 
whereas for the dimensions of perceived dominance, task orientation, and formality, 
the increases were greater for the e-mail condition.  This study found that 
relationships do develop when a lean channel such as e-mail is used to negotiate, 
therefore H7cues was not supported.  The cues filtered out theories support the idea 
that e-mail is too narrow a channel to allow individuals to detect changes in 
relationship aspects such as dominance, task orientation, and formality.  If this view 
had been supported, then the relationship dimensions should have remained at the 
same level after the third negotiation as measured after the first negotiation, which 
was conducted FTF (Knight). 
The H7SIP hypothesis was supported because the negotiators used e-mail to 
manage their personas and develop their relationships.  The relationship dimensions 
did not converge as Walther’s (1992, 1994) SIP theory would have expected, but the 
relationships did change and evolve.  There are several possible reasons for this 
result.  First, there may not have been enough time for the relationships to achieve 
equal levels between the first and third negotiations because the e-mail group only 
conducted two negotiations via e-mail.  Beginning the negotiation relationship with 
the FTF channel and then only providing two negotiation interactions with e-mail 
may not have allowed negotiators to adapt their communication messages to this new 




successfully negotiation may require more time to equalize.  In other words, the 
communication and message creation skills necessary for a negotiation interaction 
may take longer to develop and master than those required for a decision making task 
or simple brainstorming exercise.  Third, negotiators may have learned to use the 
unique characteristics of e-mail to manage their relationships to produce more 
dominant, task-oriented, and formal negotiations because these relationship 
characteristics were perceived as useful to achieving their task and relationship goals.  
Many of the participants were not experienced negotiators and may have focused on 
using distributive bargaining techniques.  If the participants adopted this approach, 
they may have used the limited bandwidth of e-mail to become more dominant, task-
oriented, and formal in the belief that this is how a good manager negotiates.  In other 
words, they used the characteristics of e-mail to manage their persona in a way they 
perceived as necessary.  
 The research adds to the body of knowledge on e-mail negotiations because 
almost all theoretical-based studies have been based on single negotiations tasks 
conducted using either FTF or e-mail.  In situations where longer term or multiple 
interactions were studied (Hollingshead & McGrath, 1995; Poole, et al., 1992; 
Tidwell & Walther, 2002; Walter, 1994), mixed channel designs were not used or the 
researchers did not explore the effect of creating a baseline relationship development 
measure after an initial FTF negotiation. 
The establishment of a prior FTF relationship and subsequent study of the 
relationship development not only mirrors what is likely to occur in many intra-




relationship before engaging in a CMC negotiation.  Moore and his associates’ (1999) 
research into the effect of intra-organizational membership provided support for the 
idea that shared membership in the same organization along with some personal 
information about the other party positively affected the outcome of an e-mail 
negotiation.  Morris and colleagues (2002) did additional work in this area by 
exploring the effect of a simple five minute phone conversation between strangers 
prior to a negotiation.  However, these two studies did not look at the long term 
effects of relationship development by having the parties engage in subsequent 
negotiations to see if this initial rapport had long term effects.  The current study 
found high levels of rapport between the negotiators and positive negotiation 
relationships for the e-mail negotiators, as evidence the perceived levels of trust and 
affect reported by the negotiators regarding their own behaviors and their partners.  
The levels of trust and affect perceived by e-mail negotiators were all above the 
middle of the scale indicating that most negotiators characterized their relationship as 
trusting and positive.  This study’s design of having the participants conduct a 
negotiation FTF to establish a prior relationship as a baseline is a unique approach.  
The study provides further supportive evidence that relationships can develop over e-
mail and that people use the characteristics of the medium to manage their persona. 
 Walter’s SIP theory (Walther, 1992, 1994, 1995; Walther & Burgoon, 1992), 
suggests that CMC relationships will develop to the same degree as FTF relationship 
but that they will take longer when using CMC because individuals need longer to 
decode the textual clues to form impressions.  Walther has also stated that in CMC 




presentation and take small textual clues from partners and magnify them to create 
full impression (Walther, 1997).  Although this study used a series of three 
negotiations, the first one was conducted via FTF, which helped to develop an initial 
impression, which is unique among previous tests of SIP. 
In this study, individuals detected greater increases over time in their partner’s 
behavior in three of the six dimensions studied when e-mail was used: dominance, 
task orientation, and formality whereas in the FTF condition individuals perceived 
significantly greater changes in the affect, depth, and trust communication behavior 
of their partners.  These negotiations were structured so that the negotiators were 
members of the same organization and had already formed initial impressions of one 
another.  As Walther predicted, over time the relationships continued to evolve.  Even 
though increasing levels of perceived trust, depth, and affect/immediacy were not 
reported for the negotiator’s self presentation or perceived in the partner, the 
relationships continued to develop, as discussed for each of the six areas below.  
What does seem clear is that individuals took the opportunity in their self presentation 
to use the textual, asynchronous aspects of e-mail to manage both their impressions 
and the negotiation.  The e-mail negotiators reported being more focused on the task, 
more formal, and more dominant in their communications, while decreasing their 
levels of trust, depth, and immediacy between the first and third negotiations.  
However, individuals who used e-mail did not report a straight decline from the first 
to the third negotiation in their relationships but adapted their behaviors.  This 




relationship dimensions in Tables 9 and10, which report the perceptions from the 
first, second, and third negotiations.   
Dominance 
 Negotiators who used e-mail reported becoming more dominant over the 
course of the negotiations and perceived that their partner’s level of dominance also 
increased. This finding supported Hypotheses 1a and 1b.  Individuals who negotiated 
FTF with a dominant partner reported being more willing to use e-mail in the future, 
whereas individuals who negotiated with a dominant partner via e-mail were less 
likely to use it in the future.  Individuals without prior e-mail negotiation experience 
(the FTF condition), perceived e-mail as an effective way to counter act a dominant 
partner, whereas experienced e-mail negotiators in this study preferred using e-mail 
with a less dominant partner and FTF with a more dominant partner.  Based on the 
preference expressed by experienced e-mail negotiators, individuals who expect to be 
negotiating with a dominant partner may be better served by scheduling a face-to-face 
meeting.  This difference in understanding the perception of dominant messages 
between FTF and e-mail negotiators highlights a key finding in this dissertation that 
e-mail is not that great power equalizer that it is often considered to be by 
inexperienced e-mail negotiators.  The final decision on media use should be 
determined after weighing one’s own preferred level of dominance and experience 
with using e-mail to manage a dominant negotiation partner.  Being cognizant of the 
capabilities of e-mail for increasingly perceptions of dominance and its ability to help 
manage one’s impression is useful because negotiators are more likely to be 




issues (Pruitt & Carnelvale, 1993; Lawler & Yoon, 1995; Walther, 1996).  These 
findings also relate to the work of Woodworth and associates (2005) who found that 
deceptions are more difficult to detect in CMC communication at least in the case 
when the parties are relatively unknown to each other: e-mail may be better used once 
a relationship has been established with the other party (McGinn & Croson, 2004). 
 This research provides some evidence that e-mail should only be used to 
negotiate when an individual realizes its potential to enhance one’s perceived level of 
dominance, but that e-mail also heightens the perception of the partner’s dominance.  
Organizational members who understand this dynamic increase the likelihood that 
they can use e-mail effectively to interact with others.  The ability to effectively 
navigate power dynamics in an organization is a managerial skill that separates an 
effective manager from an ineffective one.  Media richness theory is based on the 
expectation that effective managers would never use e-mail to negotiate because the 
level of equivocality and uncertainty reduction required for negotiation cannot be met 
(Daft & Lengel, 1986).  This study finds that e-mail can be an effective tool for 
negotiating if an individual understand the dyads’ power dynamic and the media 
characteristics and how to use these features effectively.    
Depth 
 FTF negotiations resulted in a greater perception of growing depth in the 
relationship both by one’s partner and on the part of oneself as compared to e-mail 
negotiations.  This finding supports Hypotheses 2a and 2b.  When dealing with a 
colleague with whom one has a relatively new relationship, using FTF has advantages 




interests.   Helping a partner develop a better understanding of one’s own interests 
can be an advantage when using an integrative bargaining approach.  It can also be an 
advantage when working with a partner who is using a distributive bargaining 
approach that a negotiator wants to convert to an integrative bargaining style.  
Increasing the depth of the relationship can develop a sense of caring about the other 
person and may lead to a more positive negotiation experience whereby one’s partner 
joins in searching for mutually beneficial outcomes.  Negotiators who care about their 
partner’s needs are more likely to find solutions that meet both parties’ needs (Fisher, 
et al., 1991). 
 In contrast, situations in which a negotiator expects the partner to use 
emotional appeals or to attempt to persuade the negotiator to decide based on the 
relationship rather than information, e-mail may provide a useful alternative to FTF.  
Negotiating with e-mail can be advantageous in that it can help separate the 
emotional aspects of a situation from the objective aspects (Fisher et al., 1991; Nadler 
& Shestowsky, 2006; Morley & Stephenson, 1979).  In this study, participants in the 
e-mail condition reported a decline in the level of caring they portrayed to their 
partners once they switched to e-mail.  The partners detected this decline indicating 
that the limited of bandwidth of e-mail may not solely account for this perceived 
decline in the depth of the relationship, but rather their partner intended to create 
distance between the parties.  This ability that negotiators showed in detecting this 
decreased depth may indicate that e-mail offers the ability to make a relationship less 
close while still allowing for negotiations to proceed focusing on the issues.  Because 




knowledgeable e-mail negotiators may be able to distance themselves from their 
partners by communicating with e-mail and have their partners attribute this distance 
to the medium rather than an intentional shift by the partner.    
 Although negotiating via e-mail in this study resulted in a decrease in the level 
of closeness between the negotiators, what remains unknown is how the relational 
depth would develop over a longer period of time using a variety of media.  In this 
case, negotiators worked together once FTF and twice via e-mail; the initial 
negotiation may not have been a long enough time period to establish a baseline 
relationship and the subsequent negotiations may have been too limited to determine 
the long term implications of e-mail use.  In studies of intra-organizational 
negotiations, it would not be unexpected that managers with long standing, closer 
relationships may negotiate with each other more frequently.  What is still unknown 
is whether e-mail would result in a decrease in the depth of these long established 
relationships?  A study on the effect of e-mail within long term relationships would 
be beneficially for understanding intra-organizational relationship development as 
would a study that examines the process negotiators use to select the communication 
media mix they will use (e.g., FTF, e-mail, phone call, e-mail, FTF, e-mail). 
Affect 
Perceived changes in the display of affect by both the negotiator and the 
partner decreased in e-mail negotiations when compared to FTF negotiations, 
supporting Hypotheses 3a and 3b.  Higher reported affect would mean that the parties 
perceived greater closeness with each other and, in the case of negotiation, 




with cooperative bargainers, a higher level of affect can lead to greater concern for 
mutual gain and integrative solutions.   As was the case in this study, negotiators with 
a more competitive orientation may have preferred to use e-mail because it can 
decrease the role of emotion in the negotiation and make it easier to ignore the needs 
of the other party. 
Anderson and Thompson (2004) found that among negotiators with unequal 
levels of power, the positive affect of the more powerful negotiator was a better 
predictor of the negotiation outcome than the positive affect of the less powerful 
partner.  In this study, in the unequal power condition, Crawley (the buyer with 
greater power) reported an increase in the level of affect displayed by the partner, 
Phillips.  Although this increase was not statistically significant from the equal power 
condition, further research should examine the effect of affect on the outcome of the 
negotiation and on the satisfaction with the negotiation process at a later date.  The 
difficulty those in the Phillips role had recognizing the greater power role of Crawley 
when directly asked in the questionnaire may have affected the ability of these 
negotiators to be aware of this power difference.  However, some relationship 
changes were statistically effected in the unequal power condition: the seller 
(Phillips) was perceived as less trusting and more task oriented over time whereas the 
buyer (Crawley) was perceived as more trusting and less task oriented.  It would seem 
that Crawley’s role resulted in having the upper hand in the intra-organizational 
negotiation so that Crawley could afford to increase trust and become more 
integrative.  Phillips, on the other hand, seems to have been focusing more on the task 




power differences.  If this is the case, Phillips would be expected to make more 
appeals on the merits of the task rather than on relational aspects.  Future research 
should examine the tactics used in these conditions to examine whether this 
difference is evident.  Nevertheless, using a medium like e-mail may be preferable for 
Phillips because this negotiator may prefer to downplay the power differences.   
Formality 
 Individuals who used e-mail to negotiate increased their perceived level of 
formality significantly from the Knight negotiation, but the mean level was still 
below four on the seven-point Likert scale.  E-mail negotiators also perceived that 
their partners increased their level of formality significantly more when compared to 
the FTF group.  Hypotheses 4a and 4b were supported.  Overall the FTF group 
perceived decreases in formality over time.  One of the advantages that e-mail 
provides for negotiators is a more formal process by forcing negotiators to create text 
messages.  E-mail creates a written record on the various offers, counter offers, 
arguments made, and interests expressed.  The increased formality can be a positive 
tool for both sides by allowing the negotiators to focus on the topic of discussion and 
move through the stages of negotiation.  E-mail imposes a structure to the negotiation 
by its ability to include previous messages in the negotiation communications and 
makes it a virtual necessity that one respond to all of ones partner’s points.  The 
partner can easily review the message history and track whether or not all of their 
concerns and issues have been addressed.  This characteristic of e-mail messages 
should make the process more formal by creating a structure and enforcing a turn-




energy, and money for organizations while still allowing the overall context of the 
long term relationships to be considered.  Individuals in this study appear to have 
used e-mail to focus discussions and thereby establishing a more formal impression of 
themselves than negotiators interacting FTF.  This finding is in keeping with Clark 
and Brennan’s (1991) theory of grounding and keeping the cost of collaboration low.  
Using the characteristics of e-mail to be more formal may have made it possible for 
the parties to focus more on the issues at hand and ground their understanding of the 
issues.  The study seems to indicate that experienced e-mail negotiators are more 
likely to review their partner’s messages and revise their own messages before 
sending thereby creating an advantage for the e-mail negotiator. 
For e-mail negotiators, neither the power difference nor the bargaining role 
affected the change in perceived or self projected formality in the negotiations.  
However, negotiators in the unequal power condition who negotiated FTF perceived 
that their partner was attempting to be more formal over the course of the 
negotiations.  The negotiators themselves did not report significantly higher levels of 
formality over time.  It would appear that the power difference may have resulted in  
a heightened sense of awareness to the use of language to structure the negotiation to 
mitigate the relational power differences given that the partner’s perceived an 
increase by the senders did not report any intentional increase in these levels over 
time.  As Clark and Brennan’s (1991) grounding theory implies, the FTF negotiators 
in the unequal power condition could have perceived the messages as more formal 




E-mail users in the equal power and the unequal power group, both reported 
significant increases in the level of formality in their messages over time as compared 
to the FTF groups.   There is some evidence that e-mail could mitigate the relational 
power differences and create a way to overcome relational power differences.  For 
example, because e-mail produces a written record that can be shared with other 
people it makes the negotiation record a virtual public document rather than a private 
communication.  Attempts by parties to exploit a relational power advantage like the 
one in this case where the vice president for manufacturing likes one party better than 
the other are more difficult to express in an e-mail.  In FTF discussions, negotiators 
can make more casual references to their relationship with their mutual boss or other 
advantages that they possess.  Managers found trying to argue in an e-mail that they 
should get what they want because the boss likes them more may not have a bright 
future in the organization even if the boss does like them.  In this case, a negotiator 
sending an e-mail message saying that the vice president of manufacturing prefers 
your plant and will support that plant manager no matter may not be a wise move: 
This message is reviewable by other members of the organization and may be passed 
on.  There is always a president and other managers who like to know that business 
decisions are based on business not personal feelings or pets.  E-mail negotiators are 
more likely to be forced into sending formal messages and make arguments based on 
manufacturing, technical, and economic issues. 
Trust  
 Trust in a relationship can contribute to an environment in which negotiators 




differences were found in the perceived expressions of trust by the negotiators 
between the FTF and e-mail condition.  Hypothesis 5a was not supported.  However, 
H5b was supported in that e-mail negotiators reported that the perceived level of trust 
displayed by their partner decreased over the course of the negotiations as compared 
to the FTF negotiators. 
 The finding of no differences in self expressions of trust between the two 
channels is consistent with recent studies (McGinn & Keros, 2004; Morris et al., 
2002; Wilson et al., 2006), which have indicated that the establishment of rapport or a 
feeling of friendliness prior to negotiating with e-mail resulted in higher levels of 
trust as opposed to e-mail negotiators who did not establish rapport.   In this study, 
the e-mail participants had established a rapport during the first FTF negotiation and 
this rapport appears to have carried through in that the e-mail negotiators reported no 
difference in their level of trust behaviors exhibited between the first FTF negotiation 
and the third e-mail negotiation.  The switch to e-mail with its limited bandwidth did 
not impact the level of trust communicated by the negotiators.  On the other hand, the 
e-mail negotiators perceived that their partners showed less trust in them over time.   
Wilson and colleagues (2006) reported lower levels of perceived trust among their 
three person groups engaged in a decision making task when they moved from a FTF 
channel to a synchronous chat channel.  This perceived lower level of trust could 
have been associated with the higher cost of collaborating and maintaining common 
grounding associated with e-mail communication (Clark & Brennan, 1991).  In order 
to continue the common grounding established in the FTF negotiation, e-mail 




all of the nonverbal cues of the FTF channel available to exhibit feelings of trust.  
This greater focus on the text caused by the shift in the media may heighten the 
negotiators awareness to their usual reliance on nonverbal cues for establishing a 
trusting relationship (Woodworth et al., 2005).   When faced with the limited 
bandwidth of e-mail after having used FTF, it is possible that it will take longer than 
two e-mail negotiations for the negotiators to perceive the same level of trust from 
their partner that they perceived in the FTF negotiation.   
Task Orientation 
 Negotiators in the e-mail condition reported that they increased their task 
orientation from the first FTF negotiation to the third negotiation and that they 
perceived that the partner also became more task oriented over time.  Hypotheses 6a 
and 6b were both supported.  This increased task orientation was expected based on 
e-mail’s ability to focus on the task aspects of the negotiation scenario as opposed to 
the social aspects such as the vice president of manufacturing supporting the Crawley 
manager.  Once rapport was established in the first FTF negotiation, e-mail 
negotiators exploited the limited bandwidth of e-mail to focus their discussions on the 
task aspect of the negotiation and did not have to spend a lot of time deepening the 
social relationship.   Whereas, in the FTF negotiation, the increased bandwidth and 
co-presence make the exchange for social information and the perception that one is 
more social likely (Clark & Brennan, 1991).  This ability that e-mail offers to focus 
on the task once a social relationship has been established could create significant 
time and financial savings for organizations and their managers who learn to 




out of the office spent negotiating FTF could be saved if managers understand how to 
use CMC channels to convey their interests, make proposals, respond to proposals, 
and pay enough attention to the relationship issues to maintain the rapport.   
Bargaining Role and Bargaining Power 
Relative power between parties has been shown to significantly affect the 
negotiation process in previous research (Cai et al., 2000; Lawler & Yoon, 1993; 
Mannix & Neale, 1993).  Research questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 examined the effects of 
bargaining power and bargaining role on the development of relationships.  No main 
effects were found for bargaining power or bargaining role on relationship 
development.  However, there were a few significant interactions that are discussed 
below. 
The first relationship variable that was effected by bargaining power and the 
role (buyer or seller) was trust.  In the unequal power condition, Crawley, the seller, 
reported increased use of trusting behaviors whereas Phillips reported decreased use 
of trusting behaviors over time.  One possible explanation for this finding is that 
Crawley, the party with the higher power, was in a position of control and could 
afford to display higher levels of trust in this intra-organizational setting.  The parties 
were all part of the same organizational and other researchers (Anderson & 
Thompson, 2004) have indicated that in these situations the higher power figure may 
display greater concern for the other party.  They found that in cases of unequal 
power the more powerful party has a greater effect on the overall tone of the 




the lower power member, may have decreased the level of trust and felt a loss of 
control over the negotiation.  Phillips negotiators may have held back in sharing their 
interests because they perceived this approach as a way to regain some level of 
power.  This pattern was apparent in both the FTF and e-mail groups. 
In the unequal power condition, the change in the level of task orientation 
exhibited by Phillips, the buyer, increased, whereas for Crawley, the seller, it 
decreased.  Much like with trust, Crawley’s position of higher power may have made 
it possible for this negotiator to be less task focused.  This finding is consistent with 
Anderson and Thompson’s (2004) research in that the member of the party with 
higher power in an intra-organizational negotiation may feel a need to make the lower 
power member feel at ease.  The increase in the task orientation on the part of Phillips 
can be viewed as an attempt to maintain some level of control over the negotiation by 
making interests known and crafting arguments that are based on the merits of the 
negotiation rather than on Crawley’s special relationship with the vice president of 
manufacturing. 
 A third interaction occurred with formality in the FTF condition in that the 
equal power group experienced a significantly greater decrease in formality when 
compared with the unequal power group.  The equal power group had been together 
for three negotiation tasks with no change in the channel or in their power 
relationship.  This level of stability in the relationship may account for the perceived 
decrease in formality.  SIP theory would predict that given increased time the e-mail 
users in the equal power condition would experience a similar decrease, but the 




the discussion may have kept the formality high.  This higher formality may be a 
benefit to the organization because the negotiators may be more efficient in their 
message exchanges and not waste time or organizational resources.   
 Overall, the effects of power on the development of relationships were 
minimal.   This study was the first to look at the long term effects of power 
differences on e-mail negotiations.  The results provide support for the SIP 
perspective: The channel does not appear to significantly effect the ability to detect or 
use power.  If anything, e-mail’s ability to support a formal, task oriented negotiation 
could create an advantage when negotiating with someone who has more power in the 
organization.  Learning to use e-mail to maintain one’s persona and manage the 
relationship could produce a better outcome for the lower power member, but if a 
negotiator is not aware of the special skills necessary to effectively negotiate via e-
mail these power differences may be magnified to create a worse outcome. 
Future Use of E-mail 
 The preference of negotiators to use e-mail for future negotiations with their 
partner was significantly affected by CMC comfort  (H8) and whether the negotiator 
had previously negotiated with one’s partner using e-mail (H9).  As was predicted, 
previous experience using e-mail to negotiate and CMC comfort increased the 
likelihood that a negotiator would choose to use e-mail to negotiate in the future.  As 
users experience the unique qualities of the media, gain experience in grounding and 
collaboration (Clark & Brennan, 1991), and have time to master the relationship 
communication skills required of e-mail (Tidwell & Walther, 2002; Walther, 1992, 




medium for negotiating.  These findings directly challenge the tenets of the cues 
filtered out approach which concludes rational communicators should not use e-mail 
to negotiate. 
 An examination of the effects of trust, dominance, and task orientation after 
the third negotiation indicated no direct effect on preference for e-mail use.  
However, there was a significant interaction between dominance and media that was 
explored. 
For e-mail users, H11 was supported in that e-mail users who perceived that 
they were negotiating with a less dominant partner during their third negotiation 
reported an increased preference for using e-mail for future negotiations as compared 
to e-mail users who perceived their partner to be more dominant.  The study seems to 
suggest that negotiating with a dominant partner may make one less likely to use e-
mail in the future because once the partner has established his or her ability to 
dominant in e-mail the user may want to increase the nonverbal cues in the channel to 
mitigate the dominance.  When negotiating with someone perceived to be low in 
dominance, e-mail becomes viable because it can contribute to more integrative 
negotiations because it focuses the interaction on the merits of the task.  Negotiators 
can interact and continue to develop their relationship when parties are not trying to 
dominant each other but are working together. 
For FTF users, the more dominant the partner was perceived to be the greater 
the preference to use e-mail to negotiate in the future.  This result supports previous 
research in negotiation and CMC that e-mail’s lack of nonverbal cues makes it more 




and FTF users highlights the difference in perceptions about using e-mail and the 
effect of experience in using e-mail to negotiate has on making a realistic assessment 
of its abilities to maintain and develop relationships.  Experienced e-mail users may 
be more realistic about the ability to use e-mail to develop relationships than 
inexperienced users. 
Contributions to Theoretical Constructs 
 This dissertation makes several significant contributions in the theoretical 
arena by testing current theories, extending them into new areas, and providing the 
basis for the development of future theories that considers the unique characteristics 
of media on relationship development in an intra-organizational setting when 
negotiating.  This dissertation provides a direct test of the cues filtered out theories 
with regard to whether e-mail is too lean of a channel to use for negotiation and the 
development of relationships.  The study provides results that contradict the cues 
filtered out theory and instead support the alternative SIP theory.  The continued 
development of relationships and the ability of users to manage and create personas 
detected via e-mail supports the SIP assertion that communicators are driven to 
establish relationships regardless of the media and find ways to include relational 
communication messages in all media exchanges.  Although the relationship 
measures provided by Burgoon and Hale (1987) did not converge for e-mail and FTF 
as SIP theory purports, they did continue to change and develop throughout the 
negotiation. 
Overall, the relationships developed in the direction and manner predicted by 




least effort when collaborating, and the unique characteristics of e-mail that allow for 
revisability and reviewability.  Clark and Brennan’s work posited that when e-mail 
was used that individuals would become task orientation and formal due to the 
limited bandwidth and the extra effort required to achieve common ground.  When 
establishing common ground, individuals try to expend the least effort therefore e-
mail users would be expected to reduce their relational messages thereby decreasing 
perceptions of trust, depth, and affect and increasing perceptions of dominance.  
Clark and Brennan’s work would have expected e-mail to be a viable negotiation 
medium for individuals experienced with using e-mail to achieve common ground 
with minimal effort and for individuals who understand the benefits of the revisability 
and reviewability properties of e-mail for negotiators. 
Implications for Negotiators 
 Over half of a manager’s time is involved in dyadic communication using a 
variety of media (Panko, 1992).  Given this inevitable requirement, gaining a greater 
understanding of how communication medium affect the development of 
interpersonal relationships in a work place is extremely valuable.  Of equal 
importance is providing research-based advice to managers on using e-mail to 
conduct negotiations.  This dissertation provides advice to organizational members 
regarding the effects of using e-mail to negotiate with co-workers and the effect on 
the future relationship. 
 A key finding of this dissertation is the importance of negotiators 
understanding the unique characteristics of e-mail and using it to actively manage 




her own persona.  Developing a comfort level in using CMC and having prior 
experience with using e-mail to negotiate will make one more successful in future 
interactions and negotiations that use e-mail.  Using e-mail for negotiations is a skill 
that needs to be developed along with paying attention to relational cues when using 
CMC. 
In this study, negotiating with e-mail after having established a FTF 
relationship led to perceptions of being more dominant, more task oriented, and more 
formal by the individual and the same perceptions about one’s partner.  It also 
resulted in a perception of less trust in communications from one’s partner, decreased 
affect in the relationship, and a less depth in the relationship.  The study also 
indicated that the negotiators themselves attempted to create a less deep relationship, 
decrease the affect of the relationship, but not alter the level of trust they exhibited 
when using e-mail as opposed to using FTF to negotiate.  These all have implications 
for negotiators as discussed below. 
Negotiators can use e-mail to create distance between themselves by using e-
mail, can focus the discussion on the facts of the topic by using e-mail to make the 
negotiation more formal and task oriented, they can use the reviewability function of 
e-mail to look at past messages and analyze them for cues to interests and positions, 
they can use the revisability function of e-mail to carefully craft strategic messages 
that attend to the task aspects of the negotiation and the social aspects, and they can 
actively include relationship and social information in the messages to maintain 
rapport and trust.  When dealing with a dominant intra-organizational negotiator, the 




more integrative style or may consider creating messages that do not respond with 
increased dominance but respond with a factual, formal, task oriented messages that 
move the negotiation to be more integrative.  The ability to review messages could 
lead a negotiator to focus or obsess over a negative or hurtful comment, but skilled 
and practiced e-mail users should know that unskilled users include such messages 
out of ignorance and time should be used to process the message and craft a message 
that responds to the task but not the affective part of the message.  
 Negotiators can use e-mail effectively to manage their relationships, but they 
need to be aware of the messages they are sending and receiving.  They also need to 
know that relationships need to be attended to even when using e-mail.  Finally, 
effective e-mail users know that sometimes a personal visit or phone call is needed 
when trust, affect, or the depth of the relationship seems to be suffering. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 There are several limitations to this study, the greatest of which is the use of 
undergraduate students to play the role of intra-organizational members.  These 
students may not have taken on all of the characteristics described in the role play and 
are thus limited in their ability to interact as organizational members who are 
negotiating good and services.  Attempts were made to mitigate for this short coming 
by having the students negotiate for three negotiations and by creating an expectation 
that a future relationship would exist between the partners.  Despite these attempts, 
three interactions may not have been enough. 
Another concern is that although the sample size was large enough to detect main 




not be tested due to the small samples in individual cells.   The large percentage of 
women in the sample may have also had some unknown effect on the analyses since 
men and women sometimes approach conflict in different ways.  Differences in 
approaches to conflict were not assessed in the study and thus are not controlled for in 
this study.  On the positive side, the use of the APIM model corrected for the effect of 
a partner’s response on a negotiator’s own response and strengthened the analysis by 
reducing the probability of statistical error.  The use of the APIM technique with 
CMC dyadic communication is a significant improvement over the previous tests that 
were used in that buyer and seller interactions could be studied. 
Another limitation is the perceived power difference between the Crawley, the 
seller, and Phillips, the buyer, for half of the negotiators.  Those in the role of 
Crawley were the only ones to recognize their greater power in the scenario.  Phillips 
negotiators reported no lower level in their power despite the clear instructions in the 
role play.  Subsequent review of other studies indicate: that lower power individuals 
often times do not recognize this lower power position especially in intra-
organizational settings.   The power difference also was produced out of a 
relationship with the vice president of manufacturing rather than an economic role 
that may have been more tangible.  The relational power difference based on the vice 
president’s preference may have been something difficult to articulate in e-mail 
because it would leave a written record of an advantage that is considered somewhat 
suspect. 
Another limitation of the study could be the use of difference scores between the 




scores do not capture the development of the relationships between the first and 
second negotiations or the relationship changes between the second and third 
negotiations.  It is possible that there is an immediate effect on the relationship after 
the second negotiation that is not captured in the study.  Future studies could increase 
reliability by treating the measures as longitudinal and using additional APIM 
analysis techniques to include relationship variables for all three negotiations. 
 Finally, the study did not include a review of the actual messages and 
behaviors exhibited by the parties by reviewing video tapes of the FTF negotiators or 
studying the e-mail transcripts.  This review would have moved the study beyond self 
report measures and perceptions to include a neutral party assessment of the 
relationship behaviors observed.  An additional behavior that may have affected the 
parties’ relationship development may have been the breaks between the negotiation 
sessions for FTF participants.  These breaks may have allowed a cooling off period or 
an opportunity for negotiators to reflect on their own interests and the interests of 
their partner.  Further research should examine the messages and behaviors by the 
negotiators to relate these behaviors to changes in relationships over time. 
 In terms of future directions, expanding this project to include a review of 
video recordings of the FTF negotiations and e-mail transcripts would provide insight 
into the process of negotiating associated with these channels.  A consideration of the 
media’s effect on the negotiation’s economic outcome, negotiator satisfaction with 
the outcome, and negotiator satisfaction with the process would also add to the body 
of negotiation knowledge.  Additional measures to collect and detect difference in 




negotiation theory based on SIP, media characteristics, personality, and situation 
constraints. 
 Expanding this study to look not just at e-mail, but also at instant messenger 
and chat would provide a service to negotiators because instant messenger is 
becoming more prevalent for negotiations.  It is a CMC media, that is synchronous in 
nature which makes it function in vastly different ways and removes many of the 
advantages for negotiation that e-mail provides such as revisability and reviewability.  
As negotiators continue to expand their use of these media, relying only on e-mail 
negotiation studies will be ill-advised in the same way that relying on studies with 
novice e-mail users from the early 1990s would be a mistake when making judgments 
about e-mail use today. 
Conclusion   
This dissertation answers the call Walther (2004) made in his introduction to a 
special issue of The Journal of Language and Social Psychology where he called for 
more research that moved beyond media selection to take into account mixed channel 
usage and channel switching.  This dissertation does respond to this call in that all the 
negotiators conducted their first negotiation FTF and baseline relationship measures 
were established.  The participants were then randomly assigned to conduct their next 
two negotiations either FTF or via e-mail.  The dissertation addresses how the 
relationships develop over time, but also provides information on preferred channel 
use for future negotiations.  Although some studies have been conducted research 
regarding CMC and negotiation, none of them have specifically looked at the 




experiences on future media use with a continuing partner.  Finally, this work 
provides a further test of Walther’s (1996) study that found support for the idea that 
CMC relationship development in organizational settings is affected by prior 
technology experience and prior relationships. 
This study explored the social awareness of the negotiators by not only asking 
about their own communication behaviors but by collecting perceptions of their 
partner’s behaviors.  These measures explored different dimensions of relationship 
development such as dominance, trust, affect, depth, formality, and task/social 
orientation (Burgoon & Hale, 1987).  This dissertation also examined some of the 
newest and most recent trends in relationship development and media usage in CMC 
negotiation while at the same testing long standing theories, like the cues filtered out 
ones.  The dissertation provides a further test and expansion of Walther’s work (1992, 
1994) on the effects of time on relationship development by testing his theory within 
a highly social process like organizational negotiation where there is mixed channel 
use.  Finally this dissertation has provided a test of e-mail’s unique characteristics and 










Knight Engines/Excalibur Engine 
Parts 




The process of negotiation combines economic transactions with verbal persuasion. 
A great deal of what transpires during a negotiation is the verbal persuasion -- people 
arguing for and supporting their own preferred position, and resisting similar arguments 
from the other party. At the same time, underlying this layer of persuasive messages is a 
set of economic transactions -- bids and counter bids -- that are at the economic core of 
the negotiation process. 
The purpose of this exercise is to provide some experience with combining the 




If assigned by the instructor, read the role-play briefing information (provided by the 




If your instructor has not already done so, you will be assigned the role of Knight 
Engines or Excalibur Engine Parts for this exercise. You will be told how to locate the 
appropriate information for your side. Read this information. You will also be assigned a 
partner (other party) for this exercise. 
Step 2 
 
Meet with the opposite side to negotiate a settlement to the issues in this scenario.  Your 
objective is to negotiate a deal that is most advantageous to you and your company. 
During this negotiation, you may observe the following guidelines: 
1. Use any plan or strategy that will help you achieve your objectives. 
2. Call a break at any time to evaluate your strategy or the other party’s strategy. 
3. Reach an agreement by the end of the specified time period, or conclude that you are 









 Be prepared to discuss your settlement with the other party, and with other groups in the 
large-group setting.  If you are participating in the research project, complete the post 
Knight Negotiation Questionnaire and return it at the next class to your instructor along 




ROLE INFORMATION FOR EXCALIBUR ENGINE PARTS 
EXERCISE 4: KNIGHT ENGINES - EXCALIBUR ENGINE PARTS    
The Excalibur Engine Parts Company has been involved in the production of 
advanced engine parts for little over a year. It seems that the demand for their 
specialized pistons has not been as great as anticipated, and some shareholders are 
beginning to become concerned about the company's disappointing revenues. It 
appeared that the situation was about to improve six months ago, when the 
government of Switzerland placed an order for 20,000 of their Series 2.1 Intensaflux 
(Class "A") pistons. This contract with Switzerland was considered a real coup, 
because there are several other more established companies that produce the same 
type of piston. Unfortunately, the contract in question was not approved by the Swiss 
legislature and was therefore considered to be null and void under Swiss law. By the 
time that Excalibur learned of the contract's imperfections, 10,000 pistons had already 
been produced and packaged. Since Excalibur had no legal way to enforce the 
contract, it was stuck with an extra 10,000 pistons in a market that already had a very 
dissatisfying demand. Financial analysts were predicting that this latest setback would 
lead to a major loss in this quarter unless Excalibur's management acted quickly. 
As fate would have it, a representative from Knight Engines Inc., contacted 
Excalibur recently and asked whether it would be possible for them to process a rush 
order for 8,000 of their Series 2.1 Intensaflux (Class "A") pistons within two weeks. 
Representatives of Excalibur stated that this might be possible, but that certain 
conditions would have to be attached to such a rush order. First, in order to get some 
free advertising, Knight would have to agree to indicate on the chassis that their 
engines were fitted with Excalibur pistons. Second, a rush fee of at least 5% over the 
selling price would be charged for the extra costs involved for the processing of such 
an order. 
Excalibur's random testing program ensures the maintenance of the high 
quality of their products. However, even with their strict standards, tests have 
revealed that 4 to 5% of pistons manufactured contain some sort of defect. Excalibur 
does offer an excellent quality-control insurance program that guarantees that all 
pistons delivered will be free from defects.  Under the conditions of this guarantee, all 
pistons are individually tested before delivery. Due to the extra costs involved, 
Excalibur charges an extra 10% over the selling price for this service.  If this 
particular guarantee is not purchased, defects in the products delivered are the 
responsibility of the purchaser. As well, prospective customers are usually asked 
whether they require additional units, in order to provide for situations where 
replacements are required urgently. 
You are the VP of Sales for Excalibur, and it is your responsibility to 
negotiate a contract with Knight for the sale of the pistons that they desire. In order to 
determine the contract price, the following should be kept in mind: 
 
1.   The Swiss government was willing to pay $600 per piston before that particular 
contract was annulled. If the Swiss thought that this was a fair price, shouldn't Knight 






2.     The total cost to produce this type of piston at Excalibur is $480 per piston. 
Excalibur's list price for this type of piston is $560. 
3.  You are aware that some of your competitors sell inferior pistons of the same size 
for as low as $400 per piston. You believe that Excalibur's prices are justified due to 
the higher standards of quality that are maintained at your plants. However, there is a 
rumor that Knight will be using your company's pistons in order to build engines that 
will be sold to the government under government contract. If the government could 
be made aware of the high quality of your pistons, it might work to your advantage 
the next time the government requests submissions for the supply of engine parts. 
Obtaining such contracts would certainly stop the complaints of Excalibur's rather 
nervous shareholders. This goal could certainly be achieved if Knight were to indicate 
that their engines were fitted with quality Excalibur parts. It is likely that Knight will 
not to do this without some sort of concession on the part of Excalibur. Perhaps a cut 
in the profit margin today would reap greater benefits in the future. 
4.       As mentioned before, the market for this type of piston does not seem to be as 
large as originally projected. If this Knight deal falls through, Excalibur might 
be forced to sell it's pistons to the only other prospective customer who has 
shown any interest. Hank's Super Monster Tractors Inc., has offered to take all 
the Intensaflux pistons off Excalibur's hands for a paltry $100 per piston. 
 
Your success during the negotiation process will be determined by the total score that 
you achieve. The score is determined by multiplying the number of pistons 




__________ # of pistons 
 
X 




= ___________ Total Value (Score) 
 
 












ROLE INFORMATION FOR KNIGHT ENGINES 
KNIGHT ENGINES - EXCALIBUR ENGINE PARTS 
The government has recently invited submissions from the private sector for 
the supply of one thousand V-16Z (Class A) automobile engines. Although these 
particular engines only have eight cylinders, they can easily duplicate the speed and 
performance of a sixteen cylinder engine. Their compact size and durability make 
them ideal for military operations and it is fort his reason that the military has decided 
to incorporate them into their new line of All Terrain Vehicles (ATV's). For reasons 
that cannot be exposed without jeopardizing national security, the engines must be 
delivered within 60 days. 
Knight Engines Inc., has been involved in the manufacture of a wide variety 
of engines for nearly five years. Although Knight has managed to turn a healthy profit 
every year, sales for it's V-16Z engines has been lagging somewhat. It is for this 
reason that Knight is quite excited by the government's request for V-16Z engines. 
Knight has dealt with the government before and their established reputation would 
certainly be a bonus in their favor if per chance another company were to submit an 
equally low bid. There is, however, one problem: 
Although Knight does have the capacity to build one thousand V-16Z automobile 
engines, they do not have the pistons required to make the Class "A" engines. Their 
regular piston supplier only manufactures inferior "Class C" pistons, which would be 
unacceptable to the government.  Since one thousand engines are to be produced, 
eight thousand Class "A" pistons are required. If the Class "A" pistons could be 
acquired within two weeks, the two-month government deadline could be met. 
Knight made inquiries at several companies and only one showed any interest 
in supplying Knight with all the class "A" pistons that it needs on such short notice. 
The Excalibur Engine Parts Company stated that it would be possible to process such 
a rush order but that it would do so only on two conditions: First, that the chassis of 
any engine constructed with their pistons clearly states that it is fitted with Excalibur 
brand pistons.  Second, that a 5% a mark-up be applied due to the extra costs of 
processing such an order on short notice. 
Although the technical aspect of fitting these pistons into the engines presents 
no problems, the people in manufacturing are rather concerned about using a new 
type of piston from a company with which Knight has no previous experience. They 
stated that on the average, about 3 to 4% of the "Class C" pistons ordered in the past 
(from other suppliers) contained various structural flaws that rendered them unusable. 
There is no reason to believe that the "Class A" pistons should fare any differently. It 
is therefore essential that Excalibur provide some sort of guarantee in order to ensure 
that Knight does not have to pay for defective pistons. Even with such a guarantee, 
the inevitable delays for the delivery of are placement could hinder Knight's ability to 
complete its engines before the government deadline. In order to cushion against such 
a problem, it might be advisable to order extra pistons. Ideally, Excalibur would agree 
to take back all unused pistons as part of a guarantee package. 
You are Knight's Director of Purchasing and it is your responsibility to 
negotiate a contract with Excalibur for their Class "A" pistons, the Series 2.1 




engine and therefore affect the bid submitted to the government, it is paramount that 
the lowest possible price be paid. In order to strike a good deal, you must pay careful 
attention to the following points: 
1.    You have never before purchased Class "A" pistons. Your knowledge of the 
market for other pistons (for instance, the Class "C" pistons sell for $250 each) 
suggests that they should sell for about $500 per piston. The absolute 
maximum that could be paid per piston and still enable the submission of a 
competitive bid would be $600 per piston. 
2.    There is rumor that Excalibur has been trying to get its foot in the door with 
respect to government contracts. Many of your colleagues find it somewhat 
unreasonable that Excalibur should have a free ride on Knight's coattails by 
having their company name mentioned on all the Knight engines fitted with 
Excalibur pistons, especially when you consider that they are charging a 5% 
"rush" fee. Perhaps Excalibur should deduct 5%from their price in return for 
this advertising service. Still, you do not want to press this issue too far 
because your company president has told you that it might be in the interests 
of Knight to develop a good relationship with Excalibur's management since 
Knight may one day be in a position to acquire this smaller company. 
3.    A competitor of Excalibur's, Mordred Technologies Inc., has stated emphatically 
that it would in no way be able to fulfill such a rush order for a similar piston 
in 2 weeks time.  However, they did state that if Knight was willing to wait 4 
weeks for shipment, they would gladly supply all the pistons required for $470 
per piston. Although a 4 week delivery date would certainly not allow enough 
time to meet the government deadline, Knight could use these pistons to 
upgrade some engines in stock and await another government or private 
contract. 
 
Your success during the negotiation process will be determined by two factors: 




__________ # of pistons 
 
 
__________ Average price per piston 
 
 












Sample of FTF Instructions provided to Negotiators 
COMM 424 Universal Computer I & II Negotiation Exercises
Student's Name Email Phone Group Role Power Method
Here are the materials that you will need to complete the next two Negotiations with your partner listed below. 
Please schedule a time outside of class to meet with you partner IN PERSON to conduct the Universal 
Computer I Negotiation -- you may need to schedule additional meetings if you need more time to reach a 
conclusion or you may find that you are unable to come to a settlement.  The Universal Computer I 
Negotiation should be completed by Oct. 29th.  Once you have completed the Negotiation, complete the Post 
Negotiation Questionnaire and place all the materials back into the folder.  You will also need to respond the 
questions on the attached sheet -- the completion of the questionnaires is only required if you want to 
participate in the extra credit research, but the responses to the questions will be graded and included in your 
class participation grade.
You are then ready to complete the Universal Computer II Negotiation -- the materials are on the other side 
of your folder.  Please once again schedule an IN PERSON meeting with your partner to conduct this 
negotiation, once again you may find it necessary to schedule additional meetings to conclude the negotiation 
or you may find that you can not come to an agreement.  The Universal Computer II Negotiation should be 
completed by Nov. 7th.  Once you have completed the Negotiation, complete the Post Negotiation 
Questionnaire and place all the materials back into the folder.   You will also need to respond the questions 
on the attached sheet -- the completion of the questionnaires is only required if you want to participate in the 
extra credit research, but the responses to the questions will be graded and included in your class 
participation grade.
All of your materials should be returned in the folder at our Nov. 12th class.  Please remember that you 
must conduct this negotiation in person -- failure to do so would violate the goals of the assignment and 
create a possible violation of the Code of Academic Integrity.  I realize that you all have busy lives and that 
meeting outside class can be difficult, but several classes have been cancelled this semester to make up for 





Sample of Instructions Provided to E-mail Negotiators 
 COMM 424 Universal Computer I & II Negotiation Exercises 
         
 Here are the materials that you will need to complete the next two Negotiations with your partner listed 
below.  Please schedule a time outside of class to work with your partner VIA E-MAIL to conduct the 
Universal Computer I Negotiation -- you may need to email several times if you need more time to 
reach a conclusion or you may find that you are unable to come to a settlement.  The Universal 
Computer I Negotiation should be completed by Oct. 29th.  Once you have completed the Negotiation, 
complete the Post Negotiation Questionnaire and place all the materials back into the folder.  You will 
also need to respond the questions on the attached sheet -- the completion of the questionnaires is 
only required if you want to participate in the extra credit research, but the responses to the questions 
will be graded and included in your class participation grade. 
  
 You are then ready to complete the Universal Computer II Negotiation -- the materials are on the other 
side of your folder.  Please once again work with your partner via E-MAIL to conduct this negotiation, 
once again you may find it necessary to email several times to conclude the negotiation or you may 
find that you can not come to an agreement.  The Universal Computer II Negotiation should be 
completed by Nov. 7th.  Once you have completed the Negotiation, complete the Post Negotiation 
Questionnaire and place all the materials back into the folder.   You will also need to respond the 
questions on the attached sheet -- the completion of the questionnaires is only required if you want to 
participate in the extra credit research, but the responses to the questions will be graded and included 
in your class participation grade. 
  
 All of your materials should be returned in the folder at our Nov. 12th class.  Please remember 
that you must conduct this negotiation via e-mail -- failure to do so would violate the goals of the 
assignment and create a possible violation of the Code of Academic Integrity.  I realize that you all 
have busy lives and that meeting outside class can be difficult, but several classes have been 
cancelled this semester to make up for these out of class exercises. 
  
         
Student's Name Email Phone Group Role Power Method   





Universal Computer Company I 
 
(Adapted from exercise developed by Lewicki, Saunder, and Minton in Negotiation.  
McGraw-Hill, 1999.) 
 
Introduction:   
In this exercise, you will play the role of a plant manager who has to negotiate some 
arrangements with another plant manager.   You and the plant manager are both too 
busy to meet and have decided to conduct your negotiations via electronic mail. 
 
 
Advance Preparation:   
Prior to negotiating, read the Universal Computer Company Background Information 
section and the role information that the instructor has provided.  Do not discuss your 
role with other class members.  Plan how you will handle the forthcoming email 
exchange with the other plant manager.     
 
Procedure:  
The class will be divided into teams of two, with one person in each dyad 
representing the Crawley plant and the other representing the Phillips plant.  Each 
dyad of plant managers will conduct its email interactions and try to reach a solution.  
When an agreement is reached, both parties will record the outcome on the Final 
Settlement Agreement form.  Those of you involved in the research program should 
complete the survey and printout copies of your email messages generated by you and 
those sent to you from your partner. 
 
Background Information 
 The Universal Computer Company is one of the nation’s major producers of 
computers.  Plants in the company tend to specialize in producing a single line of 
products or, at the most, a limited range of products.  The company has considerable 
vertical integration -  parts made at the one plant are assembled into components at 
another, which in turn are assembled into final products at still another plant.  Each 
plant operates on a profit center basis (each plant is evaluated on its ability to make 
money independent of the other plants in the company.) 
The Crawley plant produces computer chips, modules, cable harnesses, and terminal 
boards which in turn are shipped to other company plants.  In addition to numerous 
computer chips, the Crawley plant makes more than 40 different modules for the 
Phillips plant.  The two plants are about five miles apart. 
 
The Quality Program 
 Production at the Phillips plant has been plagued by poor quality.  Upon 
examination it has been found that a considerable portion of this problem can be 




The Crawley plant maintains a final inspection operation.  There has been considerable 
dispute between the two plants as to whether the Crawley plant was to maintain a 95 
percent overall acceptance level for all modules shipped to the Phillips plant, or to 
maintain that standard for each of the 42 individual modules produced.  The Phillips plant 
manager has insisted that the standard had to be maintained for each of the 42 individual 
modules produced.  The Crawley plant manager maintains that the requirements mean 
that the 95 percent acceptance level has to be maintained overall for the sum of module 
types were consistently well above the 95 percent acceptance level, 12 types of modules 
had erratic quality and would often fall far below the 95 percent level.  As a result, while 
individual types of modules might fall below standard, the quality level for all modules 
was at or above the 95 percent level.  This raised serious problems at the Phillips plant, 
since the quality of its products is controlled by the quality of the poorest modules.  
 
The Interplant Dispute 
 The management of the Phillips plant felt that the quality problem of the modules 
received from the Crawley plant was causing them great difficulty.  It caused problems 
with the customers, who complained of improper operation of the products that contained 
the Crawley modules.  As a result, the Phillips plant operation had earlier added a 
secondary final inspection of its completed products.  More recently it had added an 
incoming inspection of 12 poor-quality modules received from the Crawley plant.  There 
were times when the number of modules rejected was large enough to slow or even 
temporarily stop production.  At those times, to maintain production schedules, the 
Phillips plant had to work overtime.  In addition, the Phillips plant had the expense of 
correcting all the faulty units received from the Crawley plant.   
Ideally the management of the Phillips plant would like to receive all modules free of 
defects.  While this was recognized as impossible, they felt that the Crawley plant should 
at least accept the expense of repairs, extra inspections, and overtime required by the poor 
quality of the parts.   
Since installing incoming inspection procedures on the 12 modules, the Phillips plant had 
been rejecting about $8,000 of modules a week.  For the most part, these had been put 
into storage pending settlement of the dispute as to which plant should handle repairing 
them.  Occasionally, when the supply of good modules had been depleted, repairs were 
made on the some of the rejected unites to keep production going.  The Phillips plant had 
continued to make repairs on the remaining 30 types of modules as the need for repairs 
was discovered in assembly of final inspection.   
From its perspective, the Crawley plant management felt that it was living up to its 
obligation by maintaining a 95 percent or better quality level on all its modules shipped 
to the Phillips plant.  Further, they pointed out that using sampling methods on inspection 
(only testing a small percentage of modules produced each time) meant that some below-
standard units were bound to get through, and that the expense of dealing with these was 
a normal business expense which the Phillips plant would have to accept as would any 
other plant.  They pointed out that when buying its parts from outside suppliers it was 
common practice in the company to absorb expenses from handling the normal level of 




The Phillips plant management argued that the Crawley plant management was ignoring 
its responsibility to the company by forcing the cost of repairs on to their plan, where 
only repairs could be made- rather than to have the cost borne by the Crawley plant, 




1.  What differences in strategy and tactics were followed in groups that reached 
negotiated settlements versus those that did not?  Were the relationships competitive or 
cooperative, conflicted, or problem solving? 
 
2.  What factors contributed most to the outcomes that various dyads reached? 
 
3.  Did the members of dyads change their feelings about the settlement after they learned 
how well they did relative to their initial goals for the negotiation?  Why?  What does this 




Role Information for Phillips Plant Manager 
Universal Computer I – [E-mail Equal Condition] 
 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer.  The quality problem on the modules coming from the Crawley plant has been 
the most frustrating problem you have had for some time.  Not only has the expense of 
rework and repairs, overtime and additional inspections increased the cost of operation of 
your plant, but complaints from customers and occasionally failing to meet productions 
schedules have gotten you a lot of unfavorable attention from higher management.  What 
is particularly frustrating is the fact that the difficulty comes from a single area, and also 
that there is so little you can do directly about the matter. 
 
You would like the additional expense resulting from these problems to be transferred to 
the Crawley plant.  The plant manager at the Crawley plant has been very stubborn about 
this matter and has refused to accept any of the costs.  While Crawley has been working 
on the problem and quality has improved somewhat, you have doubts that it will ever be 
of a desired level for all modules that you receive from their plant.  They have made the 
argument that expenses incurred because of faulty modules should be considered  a 
regular business expense the way they are for all products purchased outside.  While it is 
true that Phillips has repaired some poor quality items received from other vendors, this 
is usually done to avoid interrupting production by sending them back to the supplier.  
You do not know why the company does not charge the supplier for these costs, but 
assume that it is because it is difficult to write into a purchasing agreement.  In any event, 
when the materials received from an outside supplier do occasionally get bad enough, a 
shipment will be rejected and sent back.  You do not think it is to the company’s benefit 
to accept these costs on items made in its own plants.  If the supplying plant had to 
absorb the costs, pressure would be created within that plant to reduce, if not eliminate, 
these expenses. 
 
Because the company does not have this practice, however, you are not sure you can get 
the other plant to accept the repair expenses for all poor quality modules.  You are 
determined, however, that they will have to absorb the expenses on the cost of repairing 
faulty items of the twelve types of modules where quality has been found to be below the 
95% level.  You feel strongly that the plant manager of the Crawley plant is making an 
inaccurate and unfair interpretation of the way the 95% level of quality is to be applied.  
You are also troubled by the delays in production (often requiring overtime) when large 
numbers of rejects occur on the twelve types of modules often found with poor quality.  
You are not too optimistic about getting the Crawley plant manager to accept overtime 
costs for production, but you are going to insist that either they accept the faulty parts 
back to replace or repair them quickly, or that they pay you to put repair staff to work on 
them, even if overtime is necessary. 
 
Unfortunately, while this dispute has gone on, modules have been rejected in incoming 




that they should be handled by the Crawley plant.  They have refused to accept any 
responsibility for them.  Before long this will come to the attention of the Vice President 
of Manufacturing and you feel quite sure that both you and the Crawley plant manager 
will be called on the carpet for not having solved this problem.  You have set aside time 




Role Information for the Crawley Plant Manager 
Universal Computer Case [E-mail, Equal Condition] 
 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer.  You have been quite concerned about the quality problems on some of the 
modules your plant sends to the Phillips plant.  Over the last several months considerable 
progress has been made and you intend to keep pushing on the matter and expect some 
further improvement, although it will probably not be as great as that realized before.  
Some poor quality items are bound to occur with a product as complicated as a module.  
Given the volume at which these are produced, 100% inspection is impossible and 
sampling, especially at the 95% level of acceptance, is an accepted practice, even though 
it means that some faulty items will get through. 
 
You feel that the position taken by the Phillips plant manager that your plant accept the 
costs of repairing all faulty parts is ridiculous.  You have to bear the expense on repairing 
items from your outside vendors when faulty pieces are not returned to them, and you do 
not see why the same practice should not apply to within-company vendors too.  Of 
course, if shipments where refused because of poor quality they could be shipped back to 
your plant - just as faulty shipments are returned to outside suppliers occasionally.  You 
would like to avoid having the faulty shipments returned to you since you would also 
have to pick up transportation expenses.  If you had to repair a rejected lot of modules it 
might be cheaper to send a repair person to the Phillips plant. 
 
You are particularly puzzled and troubled that twelve types of modules are found to be 
below the desired quality level when they arrive at the Phillips plant even though they 
were apparently at the desired level when they left your plant.  It is a company policy that 
plants are responsible to see that products shipped meet stated quality levels, regardless 
of whether they go to an outside or a within-company buyer.  Overall, all modules 
shipped to the Phillips plant are above the 95% level, so you think that you are complying 
with company policy but you are nonetheless concerned about the twelve modules that at 
times do not measure up to the standard, first because you want to get the plant output to 
a high standard, and secondly because you fear that if this matter gets to higher 
management, they may revise the interpretation of how the 95% level of quality is to be 
applied, making it applicable to each individual type of product line rather than to the 
overall output of a plant. 
 
If you had to accept any of these expenses, you would like to charge part of them to the 
department in the plant that makes the faulty modules and part to the final inspection 
department, to give them feedback on their performance and to put pressure on both of 
them to improve.  In addition, the Phillips plant manager has been urging that you absorb 
overtime costs that come form delayed production, caused by shortages of modules when 
a great number of them have to be rejected.  You think Phillips is way out of line on this 
matter and would never accept any arrangement like that.  Unfortunately, while this 




plant at a rate of about $8,000 a week.  The plant manager at the Phillips plant is just 
letting them sit there while trying to get you to accept responsibility for them.  Before 
long, this will come to the attention of the Vice President of Manufacturing, and when it 
does you feel that both you and the Phillips plant manager will be called on the carpet for 
not having solved the problem. 
 
The Phillips plant manager has said that you will receive an email this afternoon in one 




Role Information for Phillips Plant Manager 
Universal Computer I [E-mail, Unequal Condition] 
 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer.  The quality problem on the modules coming from the Crawley plant has been 
the most frustrating problem you have had for some time.  Not only has the expense of 
rework and repairs, overtime and additional inspections increased the cost of operation of 
your plant, but complaints from customers and occasionally failing to meet productions 
schedules have gotten you a lot of unfavorable attention from higher management.  What 
is particularly frustrating is the fact that the difficulty comes from a single area, and also 
that there is so little you can do directly about the matter. 
 
You would like the additional expense resulting from these problems to be transferred to 
the Crawley plant.  The plant manager at the Crawley plant has been very stubborn about 
this matter and has refused to accept any of the costs.  While Crawley has been working 
on the problem and quality has improved somewhat, you have doubts that it will ever be 
of a desired level for all modules that you receive from their plant.  They have made the 
argument that expenses incurred because of faulty modules should be considered a 
regular business expense the way they are for all products purchased outside.  While it is 
true that Phillips has repaired some poor quality items received from other vendors, this 
is usually done to avoid interrupting production by sending them back to the supplier.  
You do not know why the company does not charge the supplier for these costs, but 
assume that it is because it is difficult to write into a purchasing agreement.  In any event, 
when the materials received from an outside supplier do occasionally get bad enough, a 
shipment will be rejected and sent back.  You do not think it is to the company’s benefit 
to accept these costs on items made in its own plants.  If the supplying plant had to 
absorb the costs, pressure would be created within that plant to reduce, if not eliminate, 
these expenses. 
 
Because the company does not have this practice, however, you are not sure you can get 
the other plant to accept the repair expenses for all poor quality modules.  You are 
determined, however, that they will have to absorb the expenses on the cost of repairing 
faulty items of the twelve types of modules where quality has been found to be below the 
95% level.  You feel strongly that the plant manager of the Crawley plant is making an 
inaccurate and unfair interpretation of the way the 95% level of quality is to be applied.  
You are also troubled by the delays in production (often requiring overtime) when large 
numbers of rejects occur on the twelve types of modules often found with poor quality.  
You are not too optimistic about getting the Crawley plant manager to accept overtime 
costs for production, but you are going to insist that either they accept the faulty parts 
back to replace or repair them quickly, or that they pay you to put repair staff to work on 
them, even if overtime is necessary. 
 
Unfortunately, while this dispute has gone on, modules have been rejected in incoming 




that they should be handled by the Crawley plant.  They have refused to accept any 
responsibility for them.  Before long this will come to the attention of the Vice President 
of Manufacturing and you feel quite sure that both you and the Crawley plant manager 
will be called on the carpet for not having solved this problem.  However, you a 
concerned that the VP of Manufacturing typically has backed Crawley in any dispute that 
you have had.  You believe that her past experiences have led her to favor the supplier 
rather than the purchaser in most disagreements.  The Crawley manager knows this and 
may use this to create an advantage.  You have set aside time this afternoon to email the 




Role Information for the Crawley Plant Manager 
Universal Computer Case [E-mail, Unequal Condition] 
 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer.  You have been quite concerned about the quality problems on some of the 
modules your plant sends to the Phillips plant.  Over the last several months considerable 
progress has been made and you intend to keep pushing on the matter and expect some 
further improvement, although it will probably not be as great as that realized before.  
Some poor quality items are bound to occur with a product as complicated as a module.  
Given the volume at which these are produced, 100% inspection is impossible and 
sampling, especially at the 95% level of acceptance, is an accepted practice, even though 
it means that some faulty items will get through. 
 
You feel that the position taken by the Phillips plant manager that your plant accept the 
costs of repairing all faulty parts is ridiculous.  You have to bear the expense on repairing 
items from your outside vendors when faulty pieces are not returned to them, and you do 
not see why the same practice should not apply to within-company vendors too.  Of 
course, if shipments where refused because of poor quality they could be shipped back to 
your plant - just as faulty shipments are returned to outside suppliers occasionally.  You 
would like to avoid having the faulty shipments returned to you since you would also 
have to pick up transportation expenses.  If you had to repair a rejected lot of modules it 
might be cheaper to send a repair person to the Phillips plant. 
 
You are particularly puzzled and troubled that twelve types of modules are found to be 
below the desired quality level when they arrive at the Phillips plant even though they 
were apparently at the desired level when they left your plant.  It is a company policy that 
plants are responsible to see that products shipped meet stated quality levels, regardless 
of whether they go to an outside or a within-company buyer.  Overall, all modules 
shipped to the Phillips plant are above the 95% level, so you think that you are complying 
with company policy but you are nonetheless concerned about the twelve modules that at 
times do not measure up to the standard, first because you want to get the plant output to 
a high standard, and secondly because you fear that if this matter gets to higher 
management, they may revise the interpretation of how the 95% level of quality is to be 
applied, making it applicable to each individual type of product line rather than to the 
overall output of a plant. 
 
If you had to accept any of these expenses, you would like to charge part of them to the 
department in the plant that makes the faulty modules and part to the final inspection 
department, to give them feedback on their performance and to put pressure on both of 
them to improve.  In addition, the Phillips plant manager has been urging that you absorb 
overtime costs that come form delayed production, caused by shortages of modules when 
a great number of them have to be rejected.  You think Phillips is way out of line on this 
matter and would never accept any arrangement like that.  Unfortunately, while this 




plant at a rate of about $8,000 a week.  The plant manager at the Phillips plant is just 
letting them sit there while trying to get you to accept responsibility for them.  Before 
long, this will come to the attention of the Vice President of Manufacturing, and when it 
does you feel that both you and the Phillips plant manager will be called on the carpet for 
not having solved the problem.  However, the VP of Manufacturing typically has backed 
Crawley in any dispute that you have had.  Her past experiences have led her to favor the 
supplier rather than the purchaser in most disagreements and this practice is an advantage 
that the Phillips plant manager will have to recognize. 
 
The Phillips plant manager has said that you will receive an email this afternoon in one 





Role Information for Phillips Plant Manager 
Universal Computer I [FTF, Equal Condition] 
 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer.  The quality problem on the modules coming from the Crawley plant has been 
the most frustrating problem you have had for some time.  Not only has the expense of 
rework and repairs, overtime and additional inspections increased the cost of operation of 
your plant, but complaints from customers and occasionally failing to meet productions 
schedules have gotten you a lot of unfavorable attention from higher management.  What 
is particularly frustrating is the fact that the difficulty comes from a single area, and also 
that there is so little you can do directly about the matter. 
 
You would like the additional expense resulting from these problems to be transferred to 
the Crawley plant.  The plant manager at the Crawley plant has been very stubborn about 
this matter and has refused to accept any of the costs.  While Crawley has been working 
on the problem and quality has improved somewhat, you have doubts that it will ever be 
of a desired level for all modules that you receive from their plant.  They have made the 
argument that expenses incurred because of faulty modules should be considered a 
regular business expense the way they are for all products purchased outside.  While it is 
true that Phillips has repaired some poor quality items received from other vendors, this 
is usually done to avoid interrupting production by sending them back to the supplier.  
You do not know why the company does not charge the supplier for these costs, but 
assume that it is because it is difficult to write into a purchasing agreement.  In any event, 
when the materials received from an outside supplier do occasionally get bad enough, a 
shipment will be rejected and sent back.  You do not think it is to the company’s benefit 
to accept these costs on items made in its own plants.  If the supplying plant had to 
absorb the costs, pressure would be created within that plant to reduce, if not eliminate, 
these expenses. 
 
Because the company does not have this practice, however, you are not sure you can get 
the other plant to accept the repair expenses for all poor quality modules.  You are 
determined, however, that they will have to absorb the expenses on the cost of repairing 
faulty items of the twelve types of modules where quality has been found to be below the 
95% level.  You feel strongly that the plant manager of the Crawley plant is making an 
inaccurate and unfair interpretation of the way the 95% level of quality is to be applied.  
You are also troubled by the delays in production (often requiring overtime) when large 
numbers of rejects occur on the twelve types of modules often found with poor quality.  
You are not too optimistic about getting the Crawley plant manager to accept overtime 
costs for production, but you are going to insist that either they accept the faulty parts 
back to replace or repair them quickly, or that they pay you to put repair staff to work on 





Unfortunately, while this dispute has gone on, modules have been rejected in incoming 
inspection at a rate of about $8,000 a week.  You have refused to work on these, arguing 
that they should be handled by the Crawley plant.  They have refused to accept any 
responsibility for them.  Before long this will come to the attention of the Vice President 
of Manufacturing and you feel quite sure that both you and the Crawley plant manager 
will be called on the carpet for not having solved this problem.  You have set up a 





Role Information for the Crawley Plant Manager 
Universal Computer Case [FTF, Equal Condition] 
 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer.  You have been quite concerned about the quality problems on some of the 
modules your plant sends to the Phillips plant.  Over the last several months considerable 
progress has been made and you intend to keep pushing on the matter and expect some 
further improvement, although it will probably not be as great as that realized before.  
Some poor quality items are bound to occur with a product as complicated as a module.  
Given the volume at which these are produced, 100% inspection is impossible and 
sampling, especially at the 95% level of acceptance, is an accepted practice, even though 
it means that some faulty items will get through. 
 
You feel that the position taken by the Phillips plant manager that your plant accept the 
costs of repairing all faulty parts is ridiculous.  You have to bear the expense on repairing 
items from your outside vendors when faulty pieces are not returned to them, and you do 
not see why the same practice should not apply to within-company vendors too.  Of 
course, if shipments where refused because of poor quality they could be shipped back to 
your plant - just as faulty shipments are returned to outside suppliers occasionally.  You 
would like to avoid having the faulty shipments returned to you since you would also 
have to pick up transportation expenses.  If you had to repair a rejected lot of modules it 
might be cheaper to send a repair person to the Phillips plant. 
 
You are particularly puzzled and troubled that twelve types of modules are found to be 
below the desired quality level when they arrive at the Phillips plant even though they 
were apparently at the desired level when they left your plant.  It is a company policy that 
plants are responsible to see that products shipped meet stated quality levels, regardless 
of whether they go to an outside or a within-company buyer.  Overall, all modules 
shipped to the Phillips plant are above the 95% level, so you think that you are complying 
with company policy but you are nonetheless concerned about the twelve modules that at 
times do not measure up to the standard, first because you want to get the plant output to 
a high standard, and secondly because you fear that if this matter gets to higher 
management, they may revise the interpretation of how the 95% level of quality is to be 
applied, making it applicable to each individual type of product line rather than to the 
overall output of a plant. 
 
If you had to accept any of these expenses, you would like to charge part of them to the 
department in the plant that makes the faulty modules and part to the final inspection 
department, to give them feedback on their performance and to put pressure on both of 
them to improve.  In addition, the Phillips plant manager has been urging that you absorb 
overtime costs that come form delayed production, caused by shortages of modules when 
a great number of them have to be rejected.  You think Phillips is way out of line on this 
matter and would never accept any arrangement like that.  Unfortunately, while this 




plant at a rate of about $8,000 a week.  The plant manager at the Phillips plant is just 
letting them sit there while trying to get you to accept responsibility for them.  Before 
long, this will come to the attention of the Vice President of Manufacturing, and when it 
does you feel that both you and the Phillips plant manager will be called on the carpet for 
not having solved the problem. 
 
The Phillips plant manager has set an appointment with you this afternoon at your plant, 





Role Information for Phillips Plant Manager 
Universal Computer I [FTF, Unequal Condition] 
 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer.  The quality problem on the modules coming from the Crawley plant has been 
the most frustrating problem you have had for some time.  Not only has the expense of 
rework and repairs, overtime and additional inspections increased the cost of operation of 
your plant, but complaints from customers and occasionally failing to meet productions 
schedules have gotten you a lot of unfavorable attention from higher management.  What 
is particularly frustrating is the fact that the difficulty comes from a single area, and also 
that there is so little you can do directly about the matter. 
 
You would like the additional expense resulting from these problems to be transferred to 
the Crawley plant.  The plant manager at the Crawley plant has been very stubborn about 
this matter and has refused to accept any of the costs.  While Crawley has been working 
on the problem and quality has improved somewhat, you have doubts that it will ever be 
of a desired level for all modules that you receive from their plant.  They have made the 
argument that expenses incurred because of faulty modules should be considered a 
regular business expense the way they are for all products purchased outside.  While it is 
true that Phillips has repaired some poor quality items received from other vendors, this 
is usually done to avoid interrupting production by sending them back to the supplier.  
You do not know why the company does not charge the supplier for these costs, but 
assume that it is because it is difficult to write into a purchasing agreement.  In any event, 
when the materials received from an outside supplier do occasionally get bad enough, a 
shipment will be rejected and sent back.  You do not think it is to the company’s benefit 
to accept these costs on items made in its own plants.  If the supplying plant had to 
absorb the costs, pressure would be created within that plant to reduce, if not eliminate, 
these expenses. 
 
Because the company does not have this practice, however, you are not sure you can get 
the other plant to accept the repair expenses for all poor quality modules.  You are 
determined, however, that they will have to absorb the expenses on the cost of repairing 
faulty items of the twelve types of modules where quality has been found to be below the 
95% level.  You feel strongly that the plant manager of the Crawley plant is making an 
inaccurate and unfair interpretation of the way the 95% level of quality is to be applied.  
You are also troubled by the delays in production (often requiring overtime) when large 
numbers of rejects occur on the twelve types of modules often found with poor quality.  
You are not too optimistic about getting the Crawley plant manager to accept overtime 
costs for production, but you are going to insist that either they accept the faulty parts 
back to replace or repair them quickly, or that they pay you to put repair staff to work on 
them, even if overtime is necessary. 
 
Unfortunately, while this dispute has gone on, modules have been rejected in incoming 




that they should be handled by the Crawley plant.  They have refused to accept any 
responsibility for them.  Before long this will come to the attention of the Vice President 
of Manufacturing and you feel quite sure that both you and the Crawley plant manager 
will be called on the carpet for not having solved this problem.  However, you a 
concerned that the VP of Manufacturing typically has backed Crawley in any dispute that 
you have had.  You believe that her past experiences have led her to favor the supplier 
rather than the purchaser in most disagreements.  The Crawley manager knows this and 
may use this to create an advantage.  You have set up a meeting with the Crawley plant 




Role Information for the Crawley Plant Manager 
Universal Computer Case [FTF, Unequal Condition] 
 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer.  You have been quite concerned about the quality problems on some of the 
modules your plant sends to the Phillips plant.  Over the last several months considerable 
progress has been made and you intend to keep pushing on the matter and expect some 
further improvement, although it will probably not be as great as that realized before.  
Some poor quality items are bound to occur with a product as complicated as a module.  
Given the volume at which these are produced, 100% inspection is impossible and 
sampling, especially at the 95% level of acceptance, is an accepted practice, even though 
it means that some faulty items will get through. 
 
You feel that the position taken by the Phillips plant manager that your plant accept the 
costs of repairing all faulty parts is ridiculous.  You have to bear the expense on repairing 
items from your outside vendors when faulty pieces are not returned to them, and you do 
not see why the same practice should not apply to within-company vendors too.  Of 
course, if shipments where refused because of poor quality they could be shipped back to 
your plant - just as faulty shipments are returned to outside suppliers occasionally.  You 
would like to avoid having the faulty shipments returned to you since you would also 
have to pick up transportation expenses.  If you had to repair a rejected lot of modules it 
might be cheaper to send a repair person to the Phillips plant. 
 
You are particularly puzzled and troubled that twelve types of modules are found to be 
below the desired quality level when they arrive at the Phillips plant even though they 
were apparently at the desired level when they left your plant.  It is a company policy that 
plants are responsible to see that products shipped meet stated quality levels, regardless 
of whether they go to an outside or a within-company buyer.  Overall, all modules 
shipped to the Phillips plant are above the 95% level, so you think that you are complying 
with company policy but you are nonetheless concerned about the twelve modules that at 
times do not measure up to the standard, first because you want to get the plant output to 
a high standard, and secondly because you fear that if this matter gets to higher 
management, they may revise the interpretation of how the 95% level of quality is to be 
applied, making it applicable to each individual type of product line rather than to the 
overall output of a plant. 
 
If you had to accept any of these expenses, you would like to charge part of them to the 
department in the plant that makes the faulty modules and part to the final inspection department, 
to give them feedback on their performance and to put pressure on both of them to improve.  In 
addition, the Phillips plant manager has been urging that you absorb overtime costs that come 
form delayed production, caused by shortages of modules when a great number of them have to 
be rejected.  You think Phillips is way out of line on this matter and would never accept any 
arrangement like that.  Unfortunately, while this dispute has gone on, modules have been 




manager at the Phillips plant is just letting them sit there while trying to get you to accept 
responsibility for them.  Before long, this will come to the attention of the Vice President of 
Manufacturing, and when it does you feel that both you and the Phillips plant manager will be 
called on the carpet for not having solved the problem.  However, the VP of Manufacturing 
typically has backed Crawley in any dispute that you have had.  Her past experiences have led 
her to favor the supplier rather than the purchaser in most disagreements and this practice is an 
advantage that the Phillips plant manager will have to recognize.   
 
The Phillips plant manager has set an appointment with you this afternoon at your plant, on what 










In this exercise you will play the role of a plant manager who has to negotiate the price of a new 
A25 computer chip. You will be in a potentially competitive situation where cooperation is 
clearly desirable. Your task is to find some way to cooperate, when to do so might seem to put 




Prior to class, read the Universal Computer Company Background Information section and the 
role information that the instructor has provided. Do not discuss your role with other class 
members. Plan how you will handle the forthcoming meeting with the other plant manager. 
 
PROCEDURE 
Step 1: 5 Minutes 
 
The class will be divided into teams of two, with one person in each dyad representing the 
Crawley plant and the other representing the Phillips plant. 
 
Step 2: 20-30 Minutes 
 
Each dyad of plant managers will conduct its meeting and try to reach a solution.  When an 
agreement is reached, both parties should record the final outcome. 
 
Step 3: 15-20 Minutes 
 
The instructor will poll each dyad for the value of their final agreement. The instructor will also 
ask any groups who have not reached an agreement where they were at the time negotiations 




The Universal Computer Company is one of the nation's major producers of computers. Plants in 
the company tend to specialize in producing a single line of products or, at the most, a limited 




assembled into components at another, which in turn are assembled into final products at still 
another plant. Each plant operates on a profit-center basis. 
The Crawley plant produces computer chips, modules, cable harnesses, and terminal boards, 
which in turn are shipped to other company plants. In addition to numerous computer chips, the 
Crawley plant makes more than 40 different modules for the Phillips plant. The two plants are 





The A25 Computer Chip 
 
Phillips purchases over 30 different computer chips from Crawley. Computer chip 
A25 represents the most advanced engineering and manufacturing technologies 
available at the Crawley plant, and is an important advance in multimedia hardware 
design for personal computers. Phillips will integrate the A25 chip into its mother 
boards, and in turn will sell the mother boards to Universal Computer (the parent 
company) and to other computer companies. Since the prices on all purchases 
between Phillips and Crawley have been previously negotiated, the price of the A25 
chip is currently the only computer chip up for negotiation. 
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 
 
1. What differences in strategy and tactics were followed in groups that reached 
negotiated settlements versus those that did not? Were relationships competitive or 
co-operative, conflicted, or problem solving? 
 
2. What factors contributed most to the outcomes that various dyads reached? 
3. Did the members of dyads change their feelings about the settlement after they 
learned how well they did relative to their initial goals for the negotiation? Why? 




ROLE INFORMATION FOR THE PHILLIPS PLANT 
MANAGER UNIVERSAL COMPUTER (II) 
 [E-mail, Equal Condition] 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer. As Manager of the Phillips Plant, you are charged with negotiating the 
price of the new A25 computer chips. You will meet with a representative of the 
Crawley Plant to negotiate the unit price for the A25 chip. 
Your accountants have assessed the price of the mother boards in which these 
computer chips will be located, and determined that you must fully absorb the price 
of these new chips -- that is, you cannot pass additional costs for the A25 chip along 
to the customer.  In previous negotiations you have felt that Crawley inflates their 
prices significantly, but you have no way to prove this. The prices of computers chips 
vary greatly, from pennies to well over $20 per chip. Your best estimate is that the 
value of the A25 is in the $5-$15 range. 
The accountants have determined that you can spend up to $11.30 per A25 chip, and 
you need one for each mother board where you decide to use it. You have no idea 
how much Crawley will ask for this chip. It is possible to use other chips instead of 
the A25, but they are not as good for multi-media applications. At this price, you do 
not make any "profit" on this particular item in the mother board. A price over $11.30 
means that you will be purchasing the chip at a loss; any price under $11.30 means 
that the difference will be an additional contribution to your overall profit on the sale 
of the mother board. 
You believe that you will require approximately 100,000 chips in the next 12 months.  
Although Crawley has never agreed to do so, it is not uncommon for other suppliers 
to discount the price from 10-30 percent for all purchases over 50,000 chips. Thus, 
you may also wish to encourage Crawley to give you an additional discount for all 
chips purchased over the first 50,000. 
Finally, since you are entering the high season for your mother boards, you need 
almost immediate delivery of approximately 50,000 chips. Crawley may or may not 
have these in stock, and it is not uncommon for companies to charge extra for high 
priority deliveries. You want to ensure that this delivery is guaranteed, and that there 
are minimal rush charges. 
In this negotiation, your primary objective is to purchase the chips at the lowest 
possible price in order to maximize the contribution to profit made to the mother 




ROLE INFORMATION FOR THE CRAWLEY PLANT 
MANAGER UNIVERSAL COMPUTER (II) 
[E-mail, Equal Condition] 
 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer. As Manager of the Crawley Plant, you are charged with the responsibility 
of negotiating the price of the new A25 computer chips. You will meet with a 
representative of the Phillips Plant to negotiate the unit price for the A25 chip. 
Your accountants have thoroughly assessed the material and labor costs associated 
with producing the A25 computer chip. They have determined that each chip costs 
you $7.00to produce. Any negotiated price above $7.00 will produce a profit for you, 
while any negotiated price below that will produce a loss. There will be a 5% cost 
savings to you if Phillips agrees to purchase more than 50,000 chips in the next 12 
months. 
You have recently learned that another computer manufacturer has published 
specifications for a computer using a computer chip similar to the A25. They have 
contacted you and are willing to purchase between 50,000 and 100,000 chips at a 
price of $8.00 per chip, and indicated that the price is "not negotiable". Your 
maximum capacity for producing the A25 chip over the next year is 100,000 units 
and you have none currently in stock. If everything works the way that it is supposed 
to, you can produce up to 50,000 A25 chips within a month by delaying the 
production of other products. In the spirit of your Universal Computer's policy, you 
would prefer to sell to Phillips if an agreement can be reached, but you may sell 
outside the company if necessary.   
In this negotiation, your objective is to sell the A25 chips at the highest possible price 
so that you can maximize your profits. You may not sell more than 100,000 chips, 




ROLE INFORMATION FOR THE PHILLIPS PLANT 
MANAGER UNIVERSAL COMPUTER (II) 
[E-mail, Unequal Condition] 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer. As Manager of the Phillips Plant, you are charged with negotiating the 
price of the new A25 computer chips. You will meet with a representative of the 
Crawley Plant to negotiate the unit price for the A25 chip. 
Your accountants have assessed the price of the mother boards in which these 
computer chips will be located, and determined that you must fully absorb the price 
of these new chips -- that is, you cannot pass additional costs for the A25 chip along 
to the customer.  In previous negotiations you have felt that Crawley inflates their 
prices significantly, but you have no way to prove this. Unfortunately, even if you 
could prove this, the Vice President of Manufacturing who oversees the operations of 
both plants has always backed the Crawley plant whenever a problem gets to her 
level.  The prices of computers chips vary greatly, from pennies to well over $20 per 
chip. Your best estimate is that the value of the A25 is in the $5-$15 range. 
The accountants have determined that you can spend up to $11.30 per A25 chip, and 
you need one for each mother board where you decide to use it. You have no idea 
how much Crawley will ask for this chip. It is possible to use other chips instead of 
the A25, but they are not as good for multi-media applications. At this price, you do 
not make any "profit" on this particular item in the mother board. A price over $11.30 
means that you will be purchasing the chip at a loss; any price under $11.30 means 
that the difference will be an additional contribution to your overall profit on the sale 
of the mother board. 
You believe that you will require approximately 100,000 chips in the next 12 months.  
Although Crawley has never agreed to do so, it is not uncommon for other suppliers 
to discount the price from 10-30 percent for all purchases over 50,000 chips. Thus, 
you may also wish to encourage Crawley to give you an additional discount for all 
chips purchased over the first 50,000. 
Finally, since you are entering the high season for your mother boards, you need 
almost immediate delivery of approximately 50,000 chips. Crawley may or may not 
have these in stock, and it is not uncommon for companies to charge extra for high 
priority deliveries. You want to ensure that this delivery is guaranteed, and that there 
are minimal rush charges. 
In this negotiation, your primary objective is to purchase the chips at the lowest 
possible price in order to maximize the contribution to profit made to the mother 
boards by the A25 chip.  However, the VP of Manufacturing has made it clear that 
given the currently purchasing environment that she will carefully review any order 
that purchases supplies from outside the company when there is an “in-house” option 
regardless of the price.  You know that if you can not work out a successful deal with 




ROLE INFORMATION FOR THE CRAWLEY PLANT 
MANAGER UNIVERSAL COMPUTER (II) 
[E-mail, Unequal Condition] 
 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer. As Manager of the Crawley Plant, you are charged with the responsibility 
of negotiating the price of the new A25 computer chips. You will meet with a 
representative of the Phillips Plant to negotiate the unit price for the A25 chip. 
Your accountants have thoroughly assessed the material and labor costs associated 
with producing the A25 computer chip. They have determined that each chip costs 
you $7.00to produce. Any negotiated price above $7.00 will produce a profit for you, 
while any negotiated price below that will produce a loss. There will be a 5% cost 
savings to you if Phillips agrees to purchase more than 50,000 chips in the next 12 
months. 
You have recently learned that another computer manufacturer has published 
specifications for a computer using a computer chip similar to the A25. They have 
contacted you and are willing to purchase between 50,000 and 100,000 chips at a 
price of $8.00 per chip, and indicated that the price is "not negotiable". Your 
maximum capacity for producing the A25 chip over the next year is 100,000 units 
and you have none currently in stock. If everything works the way that it is supposed 
to, you can produce up to 50,000 A25 chips within a month by delaying the 
production of other products. In the spirit of your Universal Computer's policy, you 
would prefer to sell to Phillips if an agreement can be reached, but you may sell 
outside the company if necessary.  Typically the VP for Manufacturing who oversees 
the operations of both the Crawley and Phillips plant prefers that supplies be 
purchased in-house when possible.  She will ask the tough questions if an agreement 
can not be reached, but she has always favored the supplier (Crawley in this case) and 
you are confident that she would support your decision to sell outside the company if 
it is in the best interest of Crawley. 
In this negotiation, your objective is to sell the A25 chips at the highest possible price 
so that you can maximize your profits. You may not sell more than 100,000 chips, 




ROLE INFORMATION FOR THE PHILLIPS PLANT 
MANAGER UNIVERSAL COMPUTER (II) 
[FTF, Equal Condition] 
 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer. As Manager of the Phillips Plant, you are charged with negotiating the 
price of the new A25 computer chips. You will meet with a representative of the 
Crawley Plant to negotiate the unit price for the A25 chip. 
Your accountants have assessed the price of the mother boards in which these 
computer chips will be located, and determined that you must fully absorb the price 
of these new chips -- that is, you cannot pass additional costs for the A25 chip along 
to the customer.  In previous negotiations you have felt that Crawley inflates their 
prices significantly, but you have no way to prove this. The prices of computers chips 
vary greatly, from pennies to well over $20 per chip. Your best estimate is that the 
value of the A25 is in the $5-$15 range. 
The accountants have determined that you can spend up to $11.30 per A25 chip, and 
you need one for each mother board where you decide to use it. You have no idea 
how much Crawley will ask for this chip. It is possible to use other chips instead of 
the A25, but they are not as good for multi-media applications. At this price, you do 
not make any "profit" on this particular item in the mother board. A price over $11.30 
means that you will be purchasing the chip at a loss; any price under $11.30 means 
that the difference will be an additional contribution to your overall profit on the sale 
of the mother board. 
You believe that you will require approximately 100,000 chips in the next 12 months.  
Although Crawley has never agreed to do so, it is not uncommon for other suppliers 
to discount the price from 10-30 percent for all purchases over 50,000 chips. Thus, 
you may also wish to encourage Crawley to give you an additional discount for all 
chips purchased over the first 50,000. 
Finally, since you are entering the high season for your mother boards, you need 
almost immediate delivery of approximately 50,000 chips. Crawley may or may not 
have these in stock, and it is not uncommon for companies to charge extra for high 
priority deliveries. You want to ensure that this delivery is guaranteed, and that there 
are minimal rush charges. 
In this negotiation, your primary objective is to purchase the chips at the lowest 
possible price in order to maximize the contribution to profit made to the mother 




ROLE INFORMATION FOR THE CRAWLEY PLANT 
MANAGER UNIVERSAL COMPUTER (II) 
[FTF, Equal Condition] 
 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer. As Manager of the Crawley Plant, you are charged with the responsibility 
of negotiating the price of the new A25 computer chips. You will meet with a 
representative of the Phillips Plant to negotiate the unit price for the A25 chip. 
Your accountants have thoroughly assessed the material and labor costs associated 
with producing the A25 computer chip. They have determined that each chip costs 
you $7.00to produce. Any negotiated price above $7.00 will produce a profit for you, 
while any negotiated price below that will produce a loss. There will be a 5% cost 
savings to you if Phillips agrees to purchase more than 50,000 chips in the next 12 
months. 
You have recently learned that another computer manufacturer has published 
specifications for a computer using a computer chip similar to the A25. They have 
contacted you and are willing to purchase between 50,000 and 100,000 chips at a 
price of $8.00 per chip, and indicated that the price is "not negotiable". Your 
maximum capacity for producing the A25 chip over the next year is 100,000 units 
and you have none currently in stock. If everything works the way that it is supposed 
to, you can produce up to 50,000 A25 chips within a month by delaying the 
production of other products. In the spirit of your Universal Computer's policy, you 
would prefer to sell to Phillips if an agreement can be reached, but you may sell 
outside the company if necessary. 
In this negotiation, your objective is to sell the A25 chips at the highest possible price 
so that you can maximize your profits. You may not sell more than 100,000 chips, 




ROLE INFORMATION FOR THE PHILLIPS PLANT 
MANAGER UNIVERSAL COMPUTER (II) 
[FTF, Unequal Condition] 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer. As Manager of the Phillips Plant, you are charged with negotiating the 
price of the new A25 computer chips. You will meet with a representative of the 
Crawley Plant to negotiate the unit price for the A25 chip. 
Your accountants have assessed the price of the mother boards in which these 
computer chips will be located, and determined that you must fully absorb the price 
of these new chips -- that is, you cannot pass additional costs for the A25 chip along 
to the customer.  In previous negotiations you have felt that Crawley inflates their 
prices significantly, but you have no way to prove this. Unfortunately, even if you 
could prove this, the Vice President of Manufacturing who oversees the operations of 
both plants has always backed the Crawley plant whenever a problem gets to her 
level.  The prices of computers chips vary greatly, from pennies to well over $20 per 
chip. Your best estimate is that the value of the A25 is in the $5-$15 range. 
The accountants have determined that you can spend up to $11.30 per A25 chip, and 
you need one for each mother board where you decide to use it. You have no idea 
how much Crawley will ask for this chip. It is possible to use other chips instead of 
the A25, but they are not as good for multi-media applications. At this price, you do 
not make any "profit" on this particular item in the mother board. A price over $11.30 
means that you will be purchasing the chip at a loss; any price under $11.30 means 
that the difference will be an additional contribution to your overall profit on the sale 
of the mother board. 
You believe that you will require approximately 100,000 chips in the next 12 months.  
Although Crawley has never agreed to do so, it is not uncommon for other suppliers 
to discount the price from 10-30 percent for all purchases over 50,000 chips. Thus, 
you may also wish to encourage Crawley to give you an additional discount for all 
chips purchased over the first 50,000. 
Finally, since you are entering the high season for your mother boards, you need 
almost immediate delivery of approximately 50,000 chips. Crawley may or may not 
have these in stock, and it is not uncommon for companies to charge extra for high 
priority deliveries. You want to ensure that this delivery is guaranteed, and that there 
are minimal rush charges. 
In this negotiation, your primary objective is to purchase the chips at the lowest 
possible price in order to maximize the contribution to profit made to the mother 
boards by the A25 chip.  However, the VP of Manufacturing has made it clear that 
given the currently purchasing environment that she will carefully review any order 
that purchases supplies from outside the company when there is an “in-house” option 
regardless of the price.  You know that if you can not work out a successful deal with 




ROLE INFORMATION FOR THE CRAWLEY PLANT 
MANAGER UNIVERSAL COMPUTER (II) 
[FTF, Unequal Condition] 
 
Phillips and Crawley are two separate plants and profit centers owned by Universal 
Computer. As Manager of the Crawley Plant, you are charged with the responsibility 
of negotiating the price of the new A25 computer chips. You will meet with a 
representative of the Phillips Plant to negotiate the unit price for the A25 chip. 
Your accountants have thoroughly assessed the material and labor costs associated 
with producing the A25 computer chip. They have determined that each chip costs 
you $7.00to produce. Any negotiated price above $7.00 will produce a profit for you, 
while any negotiated price below that will produce a loss. There will be a 5% cost 
savings to you if Phillips agrees to purchase more than 50,000 chips in the next 12 
months. 
You have recently learned that another computer manufacturer has published 
specifications for a computer using a computer chip similar to the A25. They have 
contacted you and are willing to purchase between 50,000 and 100,000 chips at a 
price of $8.00 per chip, and indicated that the price is "not negotiable". Your 
maximum capacity for producing the A25 chip over the next year is 100,000 units 
and you have none currently in stock. If everything works the way that it is supposed 
to, you can produce up to 50,000 A25 chips within a month by delaying the 
production of other products. In the spirit of your Universal Computer's policy, you 
would prefer to sell to Phillips if an agreement can be reached, but you may sell 
outside the company if necessary.  Typically the VP for Manufacturing who oversees 
the operations of both the Crawley and Phillips plant prefers that supplies be 
purchased in-house when possible.  She will ask the tough questions if an agreement 
can not be reached, but she has always favored the supplier (Crawley in this case) and 
you are confident that she would support your decision to sell outside the company if 
it is in the best interest of Crawley. 
In this negotiation, your objective is to sell the A25 chips at the highest possible price 
so that you can maximize your profits. You may not sell more than 100,000 chips, 







































Reliability Statistics for Negotiator’s Perceptions of Partner’s   
Relational Communication Behaviors 
 
Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s Dominance Scale Post Knight Negotiation 
(P1) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 




He/She had the 





coldness rather than 
warmth. 
2.61 1.302 148
He/She created a 
sense of distance 
between us. 
2.86 1.283 148
He/she did not treat 



























not treat me 
as an equal. 
He/She tried to 
control the 
interactions. 
1.000 .486 .347 .389 .353
He/She had the 
upper hand in the 
conversations. 
.486 1.000 .532 .466 .440
He/She 
communicated 
coldness rather than 
warmth. 
.347 .532 1.000 .573 .495
He/She created a 
sense of distance 
between us. 
.389 .466 .573 1.000 .454
He/she did not treat 
me as an equal. .353 .440 .495 .454 1.000
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/She tried to 
control the 
interactions. 
10.85 17.066 .499 .280 .795
He/She had the 
upper hand in the 
conversations. 
11.32 15.919 .633 .414 .755
He/She 
communicated 
coldness rather than 
warmth. 
11.76 15.723 .643 .452 .751
He/She created a 
sense of distance 
between us. 
11.51 16.061 .617 .403 .760
He/she did not treat 
me as an equal. 12.03 15.958 .563 .325 .777
 
 




Deviation N of Items 






Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s Depth Scale Post Knight Negotiation (P1) 
 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
He/she made me feel similar 
to him/her. 4.82 1.113 148
He/she tried to move our 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
3.28 1.380 148
He/she acted like we were 
good friends. 4.03 1.372 148
He/she desired to 
communicate further. 3.97 1.360 148
He/she seemed to care if I 













He/she tried to 
move our 
interactions to a 
deeper level. 
He/she acted 







care if I 
liked 
him/her. 
He/she made me feel similar 
to him/her. 1.000 .295 .454 .302 .241
He/she tried to move our 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
.295 1.000 .311 .424 .355
He/she acted like we were 
good friends. .454 .311 1.000 .573 .433
He/she desired to 
communicate further. .302 .424 .573 1.000 .476
He/she seemed to care if I 
liked him/her. .241 .355 .433 .476 1.000
 
 







He/she tried to 
move our 
interactions to a 
deeper level. 
He/she acted 







care if I 
liked 
him/her. 
He/she made me feel similar 
to him/her. 1.239 .453 .693 .458 .334
He/she tried to move our 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
.453 1.905 .589 .797 .609
He/she acted like we were 
good friends. .693 .589 1.883 1.069 .738
He/she desired to 
communicate further. .458 .797 1.069 1.850 .804
He/she seemed to care if I 






 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she made me feel similar 
to him/her. 15.59 16.394 .430 .232 .749
He/she tried to move our 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
17.12 14.706 .463 .235 .743
He/she acted like we were 
good friends. 16.37 13.446 .614 .437 .685
He/she desired to 
communicate further. 16.43 13.404 .628 .432 .680
He/she seemed to care if I 
liked him/her. 16.11 14.995 .516 .288 .722
 
 




Deviation N of Items 









 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 







 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
He/she was intensely 
involved in our 
interactions. 
5.1351 1.13478 148
He/she seemed to find 
exchanges stimulating. 4.4527 1.26348 148
He/she showed 
enthusiasm while 
communicating with me. 
5.1284 1.11441 148
He/she showed 
interested in working 
with me. 
5.3514 .94664 148
He/she seemed bored by 

































He/she was intensely 
involved in our 
interactions. 
1.000 .313 .282 .228 .206
He/she seemed to find 
exchanges stimulating. .313 1.000 .422 .298 .181
He/she showed 
enthusiasm while 
communicating with me. 
.282 .422 1.000 .640 .544
He/she showed 
interested in working 
with me. 
.228 .298 .640 1.000 .518
He/she seemed bored by 
our interactions. (reverse 
coded) 


































He/she was intensely 
involved in our 
interactions. 
1.288 .449 .357 .245 .316
He/she seemed to find 
exchanges stimulating. .449 1.596 .595 .357 .309
He/she showed 
enthusiasm while 
communicating with me. 
.357 .595 1.242 .676 .821
He/she showed 
interested in working 
with me. 
.245 .357 .676 .896 .664
He/she seemed bored by 
our interactions. (reverse 
coded) 
.316 .309 .821 .664 1.834
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she was intensely 
involved in our 
interactions. 
20.2095 12.412 .342 .132 .735
He/she seemed to find 
exchanges stimulating. 20.8919 11.417 .400 .226 .719
He/she showed 
enthusiasm while 
communicating with me. 
20.2162 10.293 .685 .530 .606
He/she showed 
interested in working 
with me. 
19.9932 11.653 .601 .454 .651
He/she seemed bored by 
our interactions. (reverse 
coded) 
20.0676 10.376 .484 .352 .688
 
 




Deviation N of Items 










 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
He/she made the 
interactions formal. 3.1959 1.57212 148
He/she wanted the 




He/she wanted the 






























He/she made the 
interactions formal. 1.000 .246 .436
He/she wanted the 




He/she wanted the 



























He/she made the 
interactions formal. 2.472 .434 .930
He/she wanted the 




He/she wanted the 









 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she made the 
interactions formal. 5.9797 4.619 .404 .191 .657
He/she wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse 
code) 
6.4122 6.176 .428 .250 .602
He/she wanted the 
interactions to be 
informal. (reverse 
code) 
5.9595 4.597 .580 .353 .378
 
 




Deviation N of Items 




Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s Trust Scale Post Knight Negotiation (P1) 
 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 







 Item Statistics 
 




interested in working 
with me. 
5.20 1.170 148
He/she was sincere. 5.25 1.068 148
He/she was willing to 
listen to me. 5.68 .841 148
P1 Partner Open to My 
Ideas 5.57 .920 148
P1 Partner Honest in 
Communicating 5.42 .997 148
 
 












listen to me. 
P1 Partner 







interested in working 
with me. 
1.000 .407 .513 .440 .232
He/she was sincere. .407 1.000 .452 .492 .565
He/she was willing to 
listen to me. .513 .452 1.000 .683 .346
He/she was open to my 
ideas. .440 .492 .683 1.000 .399
He/she was honest in 
communicating with me. .232 .565 .346 .399 1.000
 
 












listen to me. 
He/she was 







interested in working 
with me. 
1.370 .509 .505 .473 .271
He/she was sincere. .509 1.141 .406 .483 .602
He/she was willing to 
listen to me. .505 .406 .708 .528 .290
He/she was open to my 
ideas. .473 .483 .528 .846 .366
He/she was honest in 






 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she seemed 
interested in working 
with me. 
21.92 9.041 .499 .309 .789
He/she was sincere. 21.86 8.784 .632 .442 .739
He/she was willing to 
listen to me. 21.43 9.757 .658 .529 .739
He/she was open to my 
ideas. 21.55 9.379 .657 .519 .735
He/she was honest in 
communicating with me. 21.70 9.873 .488 .342 .784
 
 




Deviation N of Items 





Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s Task Orientation Scale Post Knight 
Negotiation (P1) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 







 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
He/she wanted to 
stick to the main 
purpose of the 
interactions. 
5.5270 1.02649 148
He/she was very 
work oriented. 4.8716 1.19682 148
He/she was more 
interested in 
working on the tasks 
at hand than having 
a social exchange. 
4.9797 1.19790 148
He/she was more 
interested in social 
conversation than in 









to stick to the 



















n than in 




He/she wanted to 
stick to the main 
purpose of the 
interactions. 
1.000 .205 .407 .349 
He/she was very 
work oriented. .205 1.000 .354 .078 
He/she was more 
interested in 
working on the tasks 
at hand than having 
a social exchange. 
.407 .354 1.000 .384 
He/she was more 
interested in social 
conversation than in 
the task at hand. 
(reverse coded) 










to stick to the 



















n than in 




He/she wanted to 
stick to the main 
purpose of the 
interactions. 
1.054 .252 .501 .475 
He/she was very 
work oriented. .252 1.432 .508 .124 
He/she was more 
interested in 
working on the tasks 
at hand than having 
a social exchange. 
.501 .508 1.435 .610 
He/she was more 
interested in social 
conversation than in 
the task at hand. 
(reverse coded) 
.475 .124 .610 1.760 
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she wanted to 
stick to the main 
purpose of the 
interactions. 
15.3919 7.111 .448 .216 .524
He/she was very 
work oriented. 16.0473 7.420 .271 .136 .641
He/she was more 
interested in 
working on the tasks 
at hand than having 
a social exchange. 
15.9392 5.949 .554 .308 .429
He/she was more 
interested in social 
conversation than in 
the task at hand. 
(reverse coded) 










Deviation N of Items 
20.9189 10.619 3.25872 4
 
 
Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s Dominance Scale Post Universal Computer 
I Negotiation (P2) 
 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 




He/She had the 





coldness rather than 
warmth. 
2.64 1.294 148
He/She created a 
sense of distance 
between us. 
2.91 1.201 148
He/she did not treat 



























not treat me 
as an equal. 
He/She tried to 
control the 
interactions. 
1.000 .465 .260 .469 .245
He/She had the 
upper hand in the 
conversations. 
.465 1.000 .340 .432 .305
He/She 
communicated 
coldness rather than 
warmth. 
.260 .340 1.000 .548 .532
He/She created a 
sense of distance 
between us. 
.469 .432 .548 1.000 .361
He/she did not treat 
me as an equal. .245 .305 .532 .361 1.000
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/She tried to 
control the 
interactions. 
10.75 14.325 .476 .308 .742
He/She had the 
upper hand in the 
conversations. 
11.19 14.372 .520 .298 .726
He/She 
communicated 
coldness rather than 
warmth. 
11.51 13.816 .569 .434 .708
He/She created a 
sense of distance 
between us. 
11.24 13.896 .629 .433 .689
He/she did not treat 
me as an equal. 11.91 14.658 .480 .305 .740
 
 




Deviation N of Items 










 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
He/she made me feel similar 
to him/her. 4.79 1.300 148
He/she tried to move our 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
3.18 1.480 148
He/she acted like we were 
good friends. 4.07 1.395 148
He/she desired to 
communicate further. 3.82 1.508 148
He/she seemed to care if I 













He/she tried to 
move our 
interactions to a 
deeper level. 
He/she acted 







care if I 
liked 
him/her. 
He/she made me feel similar 
to him/her. 1.000 .296 .219 .105 .224
He/she tried to move our 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
.296 1.000 .372 .497 .314
He/she acted like we were 
good friends. .219 .372 1.000 .466 .561
He/she desired to 
communicate further. .105 .497 .466 1.000 .523
He/she seemed to care if I 
liked him/her. .224 .314 .561 .523 1.000
 
 







He/she tried to 
move our 
interactions to a 
deeper level. 
He/she acted 







care if I 
liked 
him/her. 
He/she made me feel similar 
to him/her. 1.691 .569 .397 .206 .398
He/she tried to move our 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
.569 2.191 .769 1.108 .636
He/she acted like we were 
good friends. .397 .769 1.947 .980 1.070
He/she desired to 
communicate further. .206 1.108 .980 2.273 1.079
He/she seemed to care if I 






 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she made me feel similar 
to him/her. 15.32 19.565 .273 .127 .769
He/she tried to move our 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
16.93 16.042 .520 .321 .687
He/she acted like we were 
good friends. 16.03 16.019 .576 .378 .665
He/she desired to 
communicate further. 16.29 15.378 .571 .423 .666
He/she seemed to care if I 
liked him/her. 15.86 16.158 .579 .413 .665
 
 




Deviation N of Items 




Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s Affect/Immediacy Scale Post Universal 
Computer I Negotiation (P2) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 







 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
He/she was intensely 
involved in our 
interactions. 
4.9459 1.23323 148
He/she seemed to find 
exchanges stimulating. 4.2568 1.23510 148
He/she showed 
enthusiasm while 
communicating with me. 
4.8919 1.21854 148
He/she showed 
interested in working 
with me. 
5.2297 .96253 148
He/she seemed bored by 
































He/she was intensely 
involved in our 
interactions. 
1.000 .447 .517 .544 .391
He/she seemed to find 
exchanges stimulating. .447 1.000 .498 .391 .268
He/she showed 
enthusiasm while 
communicating with me. 
.517 .498 1.000 .677 .477
He/she showed 
interested in working 
with me. 
.544 .391 .677 1.000 .453
He/she seemed bored by 
our interactions. (reverse 
coded) 



































He/she was intensely 
involved in our 
interactions. 
1.521 .681 .776 .645 .581
He/she seemed to find 
exchanges stimulating. .681 1.525 .749 .464 .398
He/she showed 
enthusiasm while 
communicating with me. 
.776 .749 1.485 .794 .700
He/she showed 
interested in working 
with me. 
.645 .464 .794 .926 .526
He/she seemed bored by 
our interactions. (reverse 
coded) 
.581 .398 .700 .526 1.451
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she was intensely 
involved in our 
interactions. 
19.3108 12.651 .612 .387 .765
He/she seemed to find 
exchanges stimulating. 20.0000 13.429 .507 .297 .799
He/she showed 
enthusiasm while 
communicating with me. 
19.3649 12.016 .715 .555 .731
He/she showed 
interested in working 
with me. 
19.0270 13.754 .680 .521 .753
He/she seemed bored by 
our interactions. (reverse 
coded) 
19.3243 13.676 .495 .274 .801
 
 




Deviation N of Items 






Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s Formality Scale Post Universal Computer I 
Negotiation (P2) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 
Items N of Items 
.726 .744 3
 
 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
He/she made the 
interactions formal. 3.3514 1.64488 148
He/she wanted the 




He/she wanted the 






























He/she made the 
interactions formal. 1.000 .357 .370
He/she wanted the 




He/she wanted the 



























He/she made the 
interactions formal. 2.706 .778 .842
He/she wanted the 




He/she wanted the 









 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she made the 
interactions formal. 5.9392 6.411 .389 .152 .855
He/she wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse 
code) 
6.4527 6.304 .646 .566 .534
He/she wanted the 
interactions to be 
informal. (reverse 
code) 
6.1892 6.018 .652 .571 .517
 
 




Deviation N of Items 
9.2905 12.357 3.51528 3
 
 
Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s Trust Scale Post Universal Computer I 
Negotiation (P2) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 







 Item Statistics 
 




interested in working 
with me. 
5.14 1.037 148
He/she was sincere. 5.30 1.053 148
He/she was willing to 
listen to me. 5.65 .925 148
He/she was open to my 
ideas. 5.59 1.002 148
He/she was honest in 
communicating with me. 5.55 .819 148
 
 












listen to me. 
He/she was 







interested in working 
with me. 
1.000 .404 .372 .311 .156
He/she was sincere. .404 1.000 .506 .392 .346
He/she was willing to 
listen to me. .372 .506 1.000 .719 .247
He/she was open to my 
ideas. .311 .392 .719 1.000 .305
He/she was honest in 
communicating with me. .156 .346 .247 .305 1.000
 
 












listen to me. 
He/she was 







interested in working 
with me. 
1.075 .441 .356 .323 .133
He/she was sincere. .441 1.108 .493 .414 .299
He/she was willing to 
listen to me. .356 .493 .855 .666 .187
He/she was open to my 
ideas. .323 .414 .666 1.005 .251
He/she was honest in 






 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she seemed 
interested in working 
with me. 
22.09 8.258 .420 .203 .746
He/she was sincere. 21.93 7.438 .573 .356 .687
He/she was willing to 
listen to me. 21.58 7.578 .669 .584 .654
He/she was open to my 
ideas. 21.64 7.526 .601 .535 .676
He/she was honest in 
communicating with me. 21.68 9.429 .345 .157 .762
 
 




Deviation N of Items 
27.23 11.838 3.441 5
 
 
Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s Task Orientation Scale Post Universal 
Computer I Negotiation (P2) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 







 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
He/she wanted to 
stick to the main 
purpose of the 
interactions. 
5.5405 1.07145 148
He/she was very 
work oriented. 4.9324 1.12281 148
He/she was more 
interested in 
working on the tasks 
at hand than having 
a social exchange. 
5.0000 1.28836 148
He/she was more 
interested in social 
conversation than in 









to stick to the 



















n than in 




He/she wanted to 
stick to the main 
purpose of the 
interactions. 
1.000 .183 .419 .361 
He/she was very 
work oriented. .183 1.000 .475 .102 
He/she was more 
interested in 
working on the tasks 
at hand than having 
a social exchange. 
.419 .475 1.000 .207 
He/she was more 
interested in social 
conversation than in 
the task at hand. 
(reverse coded) 










to stick to the 



















n than in 




He/she wanted to 
stick to the main 
purpose of the 
interactions. 
1.148 .220 .578 .564 
He/she was very 
work oriented. .220 1.261 .687 .167 
He/she was more 
interested in 
working on the tasks 
at hand than having 
a social exchange. 
.578 .687 1.660 .388 
He/she was more 
interested in social 
conversation than in 
the task at hand. 
(reverse coded) 
.564 .167 .388 2.121 
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she wanted to 
stick to the main 
purpose of the 
interactions. 
15.2838 7.524 .464 .255 .495
He/she was very 
work oriented. 15.8919 7.988 .339 .226 .575
He/she was more 
interested in 
working on the tasks 
at hand than having 
a social exchange. 
15.8243 6.432 .506 .341 .444
He/she was more 
interested in social 
conversation than in 
the task at hand. 
(reverse coded) 










Deviation N of Items 





Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s Dominance Scale Post Universal Computer 
II Negotiation (P3) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 147 99.3
  Excluded(a) 1 .7
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
He/She tried to control the 
interactions. 3.29 1.299 147
He/She had the upper hand 
in the conversations. 2.82 1.255 147
He/She communicated 
coldness rather than warmth. 2.46 1.289 147
He/She created a sense of 
distance between us. 2.90 1.369 147
He/she did not treat me as an 


























not treat me 
as an equal. 
He/She tried to control the 
interactions. 1.000 .621 .266 .337 .244
He/She had the upper hand 
in the conversations. .621 1.000 .408 .499 .323
He/She communicated 
coldness rather than warmth. .266 .408 1.000 .528 .451
He/She created a sense of 
distance between us. .337 .499 .528 1.000 .291
He/she did not treat me as an 
equal. .244 .323 .451 .291 1.000
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/She tried to control the 
interactions. 10.56 16.070 .483 .389 .737
He/She had the upper hand 
in the conversations. 11.03 14.978 .641 .500 .684
He/She communicated 
coldness rather than warmth. 11.39 15.376 .569 .386 .708
He/She created a sense of 
distance between us. 10.95 14.991 .559 .376 .711
He/she did not treat me as an 
equal. 11.47 15.812 .428 .229 .760
 
 




Deviation N of Items 






Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s Depth Scale Post Universal Computer II 
Negotiation (P3) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 147 99.3
  Excluded(a) 1 .7
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
He/she made me feel similar 
to him/her. 4.87 1.184 147
He/she tried to move our 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
3.14 1.345 147
He/she acted like we were 
good friends. 4.10 1.445 147
He/she desired to 
communicate further. 3.71 1.544 147














He/she tried to 
move our 
interactions to a 
deeper level. 
He/she acted 






Cared If I 
Liked 
He/she made me feel similar 
to him/her. 1.000 .270 .171 .152 .221
He/she tried to move our 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
.270 1.000 .501 .657 .392
He/she acted like we were 
good friends. .171 .501 1.000 .627 .560
He/she desired to 
communicate further. .152 .657 .627 1.000 .519
P3 Partner Cared If I Liked 
.221 .392 .560 .519 1.000
 
 







He/she tried to 
move our 
interactions to a 
deeper level. 
He/she acted 






Cared If I 
Liked 
He/she made me feel similar 
to him/her. 1.401 .430 .293 .278 .360
He/she tried to move our 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
.430 1.808 .973 1.363 .726
He/she acted like we were 
good friends. .293 .973 2.087 1.397 1.114
He/she desired to 
communicate further. .278 1.363 1.397 2.384 1.103
P3 Partner Cared If I Liked 
.360 .726 1.114 1.103 1.895
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she made me feel similar 
to him/her. 15.19 21.525 .248 .096 .827
He/she tried to move our 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
16.92 16.856 .632 .470 .719
He/she acted like we were 
good friends. 15.97 16.006 .654 .478 .710
He/she desired to 
communicate further. 16.35 14.982 .693 .573 .693
P3 Partner Cared If I Liked 










Deviation N of Items 




Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s Affect/Immediacy Scale Post Universal 
Computer II Negotiation (P3) 
 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 147 99.3
  Excluded(a) 1 .7
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
He/she was intensely 
involved in our 
interactions. 
4.8231 1.31743 147
He/she seemed to find 
exchanges stimulating. 4.4694 1.21241 147
He/she showed 
enthusiasm while 
communicating with me. 
4.9796 1.24124 147
P3 Partner Interested In 
Comm W/me 5.5918 4.16238 147
He/she seemed bored by 



































He/she was intensely 
involved in our 
interactions. 
1.000 .554 .513 .165 .489
He/she seemed to find 
exchanges stimulating. .554 1.000 .562 .201 .423
He/she showed 
enthusiasm while 
communicating with me. 
.513 .562 1.000 .184 .546
P3 Partner Interested In 
Comm W/me .165 .201 .184 1.000 .110
He/she seemed bored by 
our interactions. (reverse 
coded) 
.489 .423 .546 .110 1.000
 
 



























He/she was intensely 
involved in our 
interactions. 
1.736 .885 .839 .907 .770
He/she seemed to find 
exchanges stimulating. .885 1.470 .845 1.015 .613
He/she showed 
enthusiasm while 
communicating with me. 
.839 .845 1.541 .951 .810
P3 Partner Interested In 
Comm W/me .907 1.015 .951 17.325 .546
He/she seemed bored by 
our interactions. (reverse 
coded) 






 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she was intensely 
involved in our 
interactions. 
20.1361 31.324 .461 .407 .407
He/she seemed to find 
exchanges stimulating. 20.4898 31.676 .492 .420 .406
He/she showed 
enthusiasm while 
communicating with me. 
19.9796 31.431 .495 .453 .402
P3 Partner Interested In 
Comm W/me 19.3673 15.700 .207 .050 .809
He/she seemed bored by 
our interactions. (reverse 
coded) 
19.8639 32.954 .399 .360 .440
 
 




Deviation N of Items 





Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s Formality Scale Post Universal Computer 
II Negotiation (P3) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 147 99.3
  Excluded(a) 1 .7
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 







 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
He/she made the 
interactions formal. 3.1361 1.60751 147
He/she wanted the 




He/she wanted the 



























He/she made the 
interactions formal. 1.000 .463 .605
He/she wanted the 




He/she wanted the 



























He/she made the 
interactions formal. 2.584 .904 1.224
He/she wanted the 




He/she wanted the 









 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she made the 
interactions formal. 5.6667 5.224 .579 .368 .829
He/she wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse 
code) 
6.0000 6.616 .636 .504 .740
He/she wanted the 
interactions to be 
informal. (reverse 
code) 
5.9388 5.866 .757 .599 .616
 
 




Deviation N of Items 
8.8027 12.064 3.47326 3
 
 




 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 147 99.3
  Excluded(a) 1 .7
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 







 Item Statistics 
 




interested in working 
with me. 
5.14 1.120 147
He/she was sincere. 5.46 1.015 147
He/she was willing to 
listen to me. 5.67 .886 147
He/she was open to my 
ideas. 5.74 .803 147
He/she was honest in 
communicating with me. 5.67 .847 147
 
 












listen to me. 
He/she was 







interested in working 
with me. 
1.000 .504 .515 .389 .294
He/she was sincere. .504 1.000 .622 .475 .547
He/she was willing to 
listen to me. .515 .622 1.000 .638 .526
He/she was open to my 
ideas. .389 .475 .638 1.000 .577
He/she was honest in 
communicating with me. .294 .547 .526 .577 1.000
 
 












listen to me. 
He/she was 







interested in working 
with me. 
1.255 .574 .511 .350 .279
He/she was sincere. .574 1.031 .559 .388 .470
He/she was willing to 
listen to me. .511 .559 .785 .454 .395
He/she was open to my 
ideas. .350 .388 .454 .645 .393
He/she was honest in 






 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she seemed 
interested in working 
with me. 
22.54 8.497 .525 .329 .835
He/she was sincere. 22.21 8.168 .686 .496 .778
He/she was willing to 
listen to me. 22.01 8.555 .741 .569 .765
He/she was open to my 
ideas. 21.93 9.365 .645 .492 .794
He/she was honest in 
communicating with me. 22.01 9.390 .592 .439 .806
 
 




Deviation N of Items 
27.67 13.180 3.630 5
 
 
Negotiator’s Perception of Partner’s Task Orientation Scale Post Universal 
Computer II Negotiation (P3) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 147 99.3
  Excluded(a) 1 .7
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 







 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
He/she wanted to 
stick to the main 
purpose of the 
interactions. 
5.4966 .96069 147
He/she was very 
work oriented. 5.0816 1.13783 147
He/she was more 
interested in 
working on the tasks 
at hand than having 
a social exchange. 
5.1973 1.15058 147
He/she was more 
interested in social 
conversation than in 









to stick to the 



















n than in 




He/she wanted to 
stick to the main 
purpose of the 
interactions. 
1.000 .357 .617 .344 
He/she was very 
work oriented. .357 1.000 .506 .266 
He/she was more 
interested in 
working on the tasks 
at hand than having 
a social exchange. 
.617 .506 1.000 .507 
He/she was more 
interested in social 
conversation than in 
the task at hand. 
(reverse coded) 










to stick to the 



















n than in 




He/she wanted to 
stick to the main 
purpose of the 
interactions. 
.923 .391 .682 .419 
He/she was very 
work oriented. .391 1.295 .662 .384 
He/she was more 
interested in 
working on the tasks 
at hand than having 
a social exchange. 
.682 .662 1.324 .741 
He/she was more 
interested in social 
conversation than in 
the task at hand. 
(reverse coded) 
.419 .384 .741 1.613 
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
He/she wanted to 
stick to the main 
purpose of the 
interactions. 
15.6871 7.806 .556 .385 .687
He/she was very 
work oriented. 16.1020 7.544 .460 .259 .733
He/she was more 
interested in 
working on the tasks 
at hand than having 
a social exchange. 
15.9864 6.219 .727 .546 .576
He/she was more 
interested in social 
conversation than in 
the task at hand. 
(reverse coded) 










Deviation N of Items 









Negotiator Dominance Scale Post Knight Negotiation (P1) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0
(a)  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I tried to control the 
interactions. 4.54 1.362 148
I had the upper hand in the 
negotiations. 3.96 1.394 148
I communicated coldness 
rather than warmth. 2.20 1.159 148
I tried to create a sense of 
distance between us. 2.93 1.341 148
I did not treat him/her as an 






 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
  
I tried to 
control the 
interactions. 
I had the 






I tried to create 
a sense of 
distance 
between us. 




I tried to control the 
interactions. 1.000 .592 .187 .328 .289
I had the upper hand in the 
negotiations. .592 1.000 .085 .159 .188
I communicated coldness 
rather than warmth. .187 .085 1.000 .373 .510
I tried to create a sense of 
distance between us. .328 .159 .373 1.000 .386
I did not treat him/her as an 
equal. .289 .188 .510 .386 1.000
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I tried to control the 
interactions. 11.26 12.658 .526 .417 .604
I had the upper hand in the 
negotiations. 11.84 13.846 .369 .354 .675
I communicated coldness 
rather than warmth. 13.61 14.648 .409 .298 .657
I tried to create a sense of 
distance between us. 12.88 13.468 .442 .239 .642
I did not treat him/her as an 
equal. 13.62 12.999 .489 .327 .622
 
 




Deviation N of Items 
15.80 19.614 4.429 5
 
 
Negotiator Depth Scale Post Knight Negotiation (P1) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0











Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I tried to make him/her feel 
similar to me. 5.16 1.117 148
I tried to move the 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
2.84 1.369 148
I acted like we were good 
friends. 4.10 1.384 148
I wanted to communicate 
further. 4.09 1.409 148
I cared whether he/she liked 
me. 4.37 1.444 148
 
 
 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
  
I tried to make 
him/her feel 
similar to me. 
I tried to move 
the interactions 
to a deeper 
level. 
I acted like we 
were good 
friends. 







I tried to make him/her feel 
similar to me. 1.000 .194 .386 .246 .390
I tried to move the 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
.194 1.000 .281 .473 .322
I acted like we were good 
friends. .386 .281 1.000 .494 .481
I wanted to communicate 
further. .246 .473 .494 1.000 .489
I cared whether he/she liked 






 Inter-Item Covariance Matrix 
 
  
I tried to make 
him/her feel 
similar to me. 
I tried to move 
the interactions 
to a deeper 
level. 
I acted like we 
were good 
friends. 







I tried to make him/her feel 
similar to me. 1.248 .296 .596 .388 .629
I tried to move the 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
.296 1.874 .533 .912 .636
I acted like we were good 
friends. .596 .533 1.915 .964 .962
I wanted to communicate 
further. .388 .912 .964 1.985 .994
I cared whether he/she liked 
me. .629 .636 .962 .994 2.085
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I tried to make him/her feel 
similar to me. 15.41 17.862 .404 .205 .747
I tried to move the 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
17.72 16.300 .430 .237 .742
I acted like we were good 
friends. 16.46 14.903 .572 .358 .690
I wanted to communicate 
further. 16.47 14.428 .609 .412 .675
I cared whether he/she liked 
me. 16.19 14.399 .588 .361 .683
 
 




Deviation N of Items 
20.56 22.928 4.788 5
 
 
Negotiator Affect/Immediacy Scale Post Knight Negotiation (P1) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 147 99.3
  Excluded(a.) 1 .7
  Total 148 100.0











Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I was intensely involved in 
our interactions. 5.1769 1.18032 147
I found our exchanges 
stimulating. 4.7211 1.29161 147
I was enthusiastic while 
interacting with my partner. 5.2721 1.03737 147
I was interested in 
communicating with my 
partner. 
5.5578 .98710 147
I was bored by our 
interactions. (reverse coded) 5.0952 1.19550 147
 
 



























I was intensely involved in 
our interactions. 1.000 .419 .531 .385 .177
I found our exchanges 
stimulating. .419 1.000 .461 .461 .221
I was enthusiastic while 
interacting with my partner. .531 .461 1.000 .346 .200
I was interested in 
communicating with my 
partner. 
.385 .461 .346 1.000 .355
I was bored by our 


































I was intensely involved in 
our interactions. 1.393 .639 .650 .449 .250
I found our exchanges 
stimulating. .639 1.668 .618 .588 .342
I was enthusiastic while 
interacting with my partner. .650 .618 1.076 .354 .248
I was interested in 
communicating with my 
partner. 
.449 .588 .354 .974 .419
I was bored by our 
interactions. (reverse coded) .250 .342 .248 .419 1.429
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I was intensely involved in 
our interactions. 20.6463 10.285 .525 .344 .666
I found our exchanges 
stimulating. 21.1020 9.613 .546 .333 .657
I was enthusiastic while 
interacting with my partner. 20.5510 10.838 .547 .357 .661
I was interested in 
communicating with my 
partner. 
20.2653 11.059 .551 .318 .662
I was bored by our 
interactions. (reverse coded) 20.7279 11.706 .308 .134 .751
 
 




Deviation N of Items 





Negotiator Formality Scale Post Knight Negotiation (P1) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0
  Excluded(a.) 0 .0
  Total 148 100.0
a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I made the 
interactions formal. 3.0541 1.60265 148
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse code) 
2.6081 1.07940 148
I wanted the 






 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
  

















I made the 
interactions formal. 1.000 .417 .552
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse code) 
.417 1.000 .652
I wanted the 








 Inter-Item Covariance Matrix 
 
  

















I made the 
interactions formal. 2.568 .722 1.243
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse code) 
.722 1.165 .990
I wanted the 






 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I made the 
interactions formal. 5.5135 5.122 .542 .310 .773
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse code) 
5.9595 7.032 .598 .430 .707
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
informal. (reverse 
code) 
5.6622 5.178 .698 .520 .558
 
 




Deviation N of Items 
8.5676 11.621 3.40900 3
 
 
Negotiator Trust Scale Post Knight Negotiation (P1) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 





a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 








Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I was interested in working 
with him/her. 5.32 1.012 148
I was sincere. 5.59 .910 148
I was willing to listen to 
him/her. 5.88 .807 148
I was open to his/her ideas. 5.72 .815 148




I wanted him/her to trust 
me. 5.61 .892 148
 
 









I was willing 
to listen to 
him/her. 










I was interested in working 
with him/her. 1.000 .316 .299 .316 .085 .380
I was sincere. .316 1.000 .459 .450 .575 .498
I was willing to listen to 
him/her. .299 .459 1.000 .620 .402 .359
I was open to his/her ideas. .316 .450 .620 1.000 .541 .404
I was honest in 
communicating with 
him/her. 
.085 .575 .402 .541 1.000 .438
I wanted him/her to trust 















I was willing 
to listen to 
him/her. 










I was interested in working 
with him/her. 1.023 .291 .244 .261 .098 .343
I was sincere. .291 .829 .337 .334 .600 .405
I was willing to listen to 
him/her. .244 .337 .652 .408 .372 .259
I was open to his/her ideas. .261 .334 .408 .664 .506 .294
I was honest in 
communicating with 
him/her. 
.098 .600 .372 .506 1.318 .448
I wanted him/her to trust 
me. .343 .405 .259 .294 .448 .796
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I was interested in working 
with him/her. 28.40 12.187 .350 .248 .813
I was sincere. 28.14 10.920 .654 .461 .740
I was willing to listen to 
him/her. 27.84 11.792 .585 .431 .759
I was open to his/her ideas. 28.00 11.415 .655 .511 .744
I was honest in 
communicating with 
him/her. 
28.13 10.317 .549 .481 .770
I wanted him/her to trust 
me. 28.11 11.390 .581 .356 .758
 
 




Deviation N of Items 





Negotiator Task Orientation Scale Post Knight Negotiation (P1) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 





a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I wanted to stick to the 
main purpose of the 
interactions. 
5.5270 1.02649 148
I was very work 
oriented. 5.0203 1.16333 148
I was more interested in 
working on the tasks at 
hand than having a 
social exchange. 
5.1081 1.28378 148
I was more interested in 
social conversations 
than in the tasks at 







 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
  
I wanted to 
stick to the 
main purpose of 
the interactions. 
I was very 
work 
oriented. 
I was more 
interested in 
working on the 
tasks at hand 
than having a 
social 
exchange. 









I wanted to stick to the 
main purpose of the 
interactions. 
1.000 .338 .416 .500 
I was very work 
oriented. .338 1.000 .531 .394 
I was more interested in 
working on the tasks at 
hand than having a 
social exchange. 
.416 .531 1.000 .470 
I was more interested in 
social conversations 
than in the tasks at 
hand. (reverse code) 
.500 .394 .470 1.000 
 
 
 Inter-Item Covariance Matrix 
 
  
I wanted to 
stick to the 
main purpose of 
the interactions. 
I was very 
work 
oriented. 
I was more 
interested in 
working on the 
tasks at hand 
than having a 
social 
exchange. 









I wanted to stick to the 
main purpose of the 
interactions. 
1.054 .404 .548 .643 
I was very work 
oriented. .404 1.353 .794 .575 
I was more interested in 
working on the tasks at 
hand than having a 
social exchange. 
.548 .794 1.648 .756 
I was more interested in 
social conversations 
than in the tasks at 
hand. (reverse code) 
.643 .575 .756 1.571 
 
 

















Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I wanted to stick to the 
main purpose of the 
interactions. 
15.6216 8.822 .523 .297 .722
I was very work 
oriented. 16.1284 8.167 .533 .315 .715
I was more interested in 
working on the tasks at 
hand than having a 
social exchange. 
16.0405 7.223 .608 .383 .674
I was more interested in 
social conversations 
than in the tasks at 
hand. (reverse code) 
15.6554 7.547 .573 .347 .694
 
 




Deviation N of Items 
21.1486 13.066 3.61472 4
 
 
Negotiator Dominance Scale Post Universal Computer I Negotiation (P2) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 





a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 







 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I tried to control the 
interactions. 4.29 1.508 148
I had the upper hand in the 
negotiations. 3.95 1.416 148
I communicated coldness 
rather than warmth. 2.51 1.487 148
I tried to create a sense of 
distance between us. 2.88 1.340 148
I did not treat him/her as an 
equal. 2.19 1.306 148
 
 
 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
  
I tried to 
control the 
interactions. 
I had the 






I tried to create 
a sense of 
distance 
between us. 




I tried to control the 
interactions. 1.000 .593 .116 .280 .155
I had the upper hand in the 
negotiations. .593 1.000 .170 .291 .226
I communicated coldness 
rather than warmth. .116 .170 1.000 .540 .465
I tried to create a sense of 
distance between us. .280 .291 .540 1.000 .379
I did not treat him/her as an 
equal. .155 .226 .465 .379 1.000
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I tried to control the 
interactions. 11.53 15.652 .402 .366 .676
I had the upper hand in the 
negotiations. 11.86 15.533 .465 .377 .648
I communicated coldness 
rather than warmth. 13.31 15.318 .446 .374 .656
I tried to create a sense of 
distance between us. 12.94 15.214 .547 .360 .615
I did not treat him/her as an 










Deviation N of Items 
15.82 22.722 4.767 5
 
 
Negotiator Depth Scale Post Universal Computer I Negotiation (P2) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 





a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I tried to make him/her feel 
similar to me. 5.08 1.128 148
I tried to move the 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
2.91 1.475 148
I acted like we were good 
friends. 4.01 1.375 148
I wanted to communicate 
further. 3.78 1.470 148
I cared whether he/she liked 






 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
  
I tried to make 
him/her feel 
similar to me. 
I tried to move 
the interactions 
to a deeper 
level. 
I acted like we 
were good 
friends. 







I tried to make him/her feel 
similar to me. 1.000 .319 .284 .327 .463
I tried to move the 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
.319 1.000 .376 .631 .348
I acted like we were good 
friends. .284 .376 1.000 .651 .425
I wanted to communicate 
further. .327 .631 .651 1.000 .537
I cared whether he/she liked 
me. .463 .348 .425 .537 1.000
 
 
 Inter-Item Covariance Matrix 
 
  
I tried to make 
him/her feel 
similar to me. 
I tried to move 
the interactions 
to a deeper 
level. 
I acted like we 
were good 
friends. 







I tried to make him/her feel 
similar to me. 1.272 .531 .441 .542 .776
I tried to move the 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
.531 2.176 .763 1.368 .763
I acted like we were good 
friends. .441 .763 1.891 1.316 .869
I wanted to communicate 
further. .542 1.368 1.316 2.161 1.172
I cared whether he/she liked 
me. .776 .763 .869 1.172 2.205
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I tried to make him/her feel 
similar to me. 14.86 20.934 .444 .247 .796
I tried to move the 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
17.03 17.761 .551 .417 .768
I acted like we were good 
friends. 15.93 18.118 .579 .437 .758
I wanted to communicate 
further. 16.17 15.828 .752 .638 .698
I cared whether he/she liked 










Deviation N of Items 
19.95 26.786 5.176 5
 
 
Negotiator Affect/Immediacy Scale Post Universal Computer I Negotiation (P2) 
 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 





a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I was intensely involved in 
our interactions. 5.0685 1.16060 146
I found our exchanges 
stimulating. 4.4521 1.40973 146
I was enthusiastic while 
interacting with my partner. 4.8562 1.22609 146
I was interested in 
communicating with my 
partner. 
5.3425 .89780 146
I was bored by our 

































I was intensely involved in 
our interactions. 1.000 .474 .477 .474 .396
I found our exchanges 
stimulating. .474 1.000 .561 .449 .344
I was enthusiastic while 
interacting with my partner. .477 .561 1.000 .515 .420
I was interested in 
communicating with my 
partner. 
.474 .449 .515 1.000 .497
I was bored by our 
interactions. (reverse coded) .396 .344 .420 .497 1.000
 
 



























I was intensely involved in 
our interactions. 1.347 .776 .679 .494 .546
I found our exchanges 
stimulating. .776 1.987 .969 .568 .576
I was enthusiastic while 
interacting with my partner. .679 .969 1.503 .567 .612
I was interested in 
communicating with my 
partner. 
.494 .568 .567 .806 .530
I was bored by our 






 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I was intensely involved in 
our interactions. 19.7329 13.356 .588 .349 .763
I found our exchanges 
stimulating. 20.3493 11.925 .593 .385 .766
I was enthusiastic while 
interacting with my partner. 19.9452 12.535 .651 .436 .743
I was interested in 
communicating with my 
partner. 
19.4589 14.567 .630 .408 .761
I was bored by our 
interactions. (reverse coded) 19.7192 13.748 .514 .301 .786
 
 




Deviation N of Items 




Negotiator Formality Scale Post Universal Computer I Negotiation (P2) 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 





a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 







 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I made the 
interactions formal. 3.1622 1.66621 148
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse code) 
2.7973 1.40436 148
I wanted the 






 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
  

















I made the 
interactions formal. 1.000 .511 .523
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse code) 
.511 1.000 .819
I wanted the 






 Inter-Item Covariance Matrix 
 
  

















I made the 
interactions formal. 2.776 1.196 1.185
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse code) 
1.196 1.972 1.563
I wanted the 









 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I made the 
interactions formal. 5.6216 6.944 .542 .295 .900
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse code) 
5.9865 6.993 .743 .680 .678
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
informal. (reverse 
code) 
5.9595 7.141 .757 .686 .670
 
 




Deviation N of Items 




Negotiator Trust Scale Post Universal Computer I Negotiation (P2) 
 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 





a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 







 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I was interested in working 
with him/her. 5.17 1.006 148
I was sincere. 5.63 .921 148
I was willing to listen to 
him/her. 5.77 .919 148
I was open to his/her ideas. 5.78 .895 148




I wanted him/her to trust 
me. 5.64 .991 148
 
 









I was willing 
to listen to 
him/her. 










I was interested in working 
with him/her. 1.000 .208 .344 .269 .234 .369
I was sincere. .208 1.000 .614 .493 .457 .261
I was willing to listen to 
him/her. .344 .614 1.000 .682 .446 .333
I was open to his/her ideas. .269 .493 .682 1.000 .493 .399
I was honest in 
communicating with 
him/her. 
.234 .457 .446 .493 1.000 .343
I wanted him/her to trust 















I was willing 
to listen to 
him/her. 










I was interested in working 
with him/her. 1.012 .192 .318 .242 .214 .368
I was sincere. .192 .847 .519 .406 .382 .238
I was willing to listen to 
him/her. .318 .519 .845 .561 .372 .303
I was open to his/her ideas. .242 .406 .561 .800 .400 .353
I was honest in 
communicating with 
him/her. 
.214 .382 .372 .400 .824 .308
I wanted him/her to trust 
me. .368 .238 .303 .353 .308 .982
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I was interested in working 
with him/her. 28.59 11.984 .383 .194 .802
I was sincere. 28.14 11.342 .561 .422 .758
I was willing to listen to 
him/her. 27.99 10.673 .690 .587 .727
I was open to his/her ideas. 27.99 10.939 .663 .530 .735
I was honest in 
communicating with 
him/her. 
27.98 11.489 .545 .326 .762
I wanted him/her to trust 
me. 28.13 11.541 .467 .252 .781
 
 




Deviation N of Items 






Negotiator Task Orientation Scale Post Universal Computer I Negotiation (P2) 
 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 





a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I wanted to stick to the 
main purpose of the 
interactions. 
5.6351 .99076 148
I was very work 
oriented. 5.2027 1.12461 148
I was more interested in 
working on the tasks at 
hand than having a 
social exchange. 
5.3446 1.12916 148
I was more interested in 
social conversations 
than in the tasks at 







 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
  
I wanted to 
stick to the 
main purpose of 
the interactions. 
I was very 
work 
oriented. 
I was more 
interested in 
working on the 
tasks at hand 
than having a 
social 
exchange. 









I wanted to stick to the 
main purpose of the 
interactions. 
1.000 .500 .399 .462 
I was very work 
oriented. .500 1.000 .523 .419 
I was more interested in 
working on the tasks at 
hand than having a 
social exchange. 
.399 .523 1.000 .395 
I was more interested in 
social conversations 
than in the tasks at 
hand. (reverse code) 
.462 .419 .395 1.000 
 
 
 Inter-Item Covariance Matrix 
 
  
I wanted to 
stick to the 
main purpose of 
the interactions. 
I was very 
work 
oriented. 
I was more 
interested in 
working on the 
tasks at hand 
than having a 
social 
exchange. 









I wanted to stick to the 
main purpose of the 
interactions. 
.982 .557 .446 .571 
I was very work 
oriented. .557 1.265 .664 .588 
I was more interested in 
working on the tasks at 
hand than having a 
social exchange. 
.446 .664 1.275 .556 
I was more interested in 
social conversations 
than in the tasks at 
hand. (reverse code) 
.571 .588 .556 1.555 
 
 

















Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I wanted to stick to the 
main purpose of the 
interactions. 
16.1014 7.711 .572 .338 .703
I was very work 
oriented. 16.5338 6.958 .610 .390 .678
I was more interested in 
working on the tasks at 
hand than having a 
social exchange. 
16.3919 7.233 .549 .322 .712
I was more interested in 
social conversations 
than in the tasks at 
hand. (reverse code) 
16.1824 6.858 .525 .285 .730
 
 




Deviation N of Items 




Negotiator Dominance Scale Post Universal Computer II Negotiation (P3) 
 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 





a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 







 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I tried to control the 
interactions. 4.35 1.569 147
I had the upper hand in the 
negotiations. 3.95 1.512 147
I communicated coldness 
rather than warmth. 2.37 1.278 147
I tried to create a sense of 
distance between us. 2.82 1.255 147
I did not treat him/her as an 
equal. 2.28 1.333 147
 
 
 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
  
I tried to 
control the 
interactions. 
I had the 






I tried to create 
a sense of 
distance 
between us. 




I tried to control the 
interactions. 1.000 .626 .214 .280 .159
I had the upper hand in the 
negotiations. .626 1.000 .255 .276 .245
I communicated coldness 
rather than warmth. .214 .255 1.000 .603 .557
I tried to create a sense of 
distance between us. .280 .276 .603 1.000 .456
I did not treat him/her as an 
equal. .159 .245 .557 .456 1.000
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I tried to control the 
interactions. 11.41 15.655 .450 .406 .714
I had the upper hand in the 
negotiations. 11.82 15.434 .505 .417 .690
I communicated coldness 
rather than warmth. 13.39 16.405 .548 .466 .675
I tried to create a sense of 
distance between us. 12.95 16.525 .550 .407 .675
I did not treat him/her as an 










Deviation N of Items 




Negotiator Depth Scale Post Universal Computer II Negotiation (P3) 
 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 





a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I tried to make him/her feel 
similar to me. 5.10 1.213 147
I tried to move the 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
2.97 1.521 147
I acted like we were good 
friends. 4.13 1.416 147
I wanted to communicate 
further. 3.82 1.479 147
I cared whether he/she liked 






 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
  
I tried to make 
him/her feel 
similar to me. 
I tried to move 
the interactions 
to a deeper 
level. 
I acted like we 
were good 
friends. 







I tried to make him/her feel 
similar to me. 1.000 .202 .232 .155 .251
I tried to move the 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
.202 1.000 .498 .634 .412
I acted like we were good 
friends. .232 .498 1.000 .721 .581
I wanted to communicate 
further. .155 .634 .721 1.000 .610
I cared whether he/she liked 
me. .251 .412 .581 .610 1.000
 
 
 Inter-Item Covariance Matrix 
 
  
I tried to make 
him/her feel 
similar to me. 
I tried to move 
the interactions 
to a deeper 
level. 
I acted like we 
were good 
friends. 







I tried to make him/her feel 
similar to me. 1.470 .372 .399 .277 .473
I tried to move the 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
.372 2.314 1.072 1.427 .974
I acted like we were good 
friends. .399 1.072 2.004 1.509 1.278
I wanted to communicate 
further. .277 1.427 1.509 2.188 1.400
I cared whether he/she liked 
me. .473 .974 1.278 1.400 2.411
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I tried to make him/her feel 
similar to me. 15.21 24.236 .255 .093 .843
I tried to move the 
interactions to a deeper 
level. 
17.33 18.744 .584 .415 .759
I acted like we were good 
friends. 16.18 18.229 .705 .561 .720
I wanted to communicate 
further. 16.48 17.334 .749 .658 .703
I cared whether he/she liked 










Deviation N of Items 




Negotiator Affect/Immediacy Scale Post Universal Computer II Negotiation (P3) 
 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 





a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I was intensely involved in 
our interactions. 4.9932 1.30067 147
I found our exchanges 
stimulating. 4.5714 1.39471 147
I was enthusiastic while 
interacting with my partner. 5.0272 1.17009 147
I was interested in 
communicating with my 
partner. 
5.3878 1.01664 147
I was bored by our 
interactions. (reverse coded) 5.0952 1.19550 147
 
 






























I was intensely involved in 
our interactions. 1.000 .429 .563 .365 .366
I found our exchanges 
stimulating. .429 1.000 .607 .413 .382
I was enthusiastic while 
interacting with my partner. .563 .607 1.000 .527 .429
I was interested in 
communicating with my 
partner. 
.365 .413 .527 1.000 .460
I was bored by our 
interactions. (reverse coded) .366 .382 .429 .460 1.000
 
 



























I was intensely involved in 
our interactions. 1.692 .778 .856 .482 .569
I found our exchanges 
stimulating. .778 1.945 .991 .585 .637
I was enthusiastic while 
interacting with my partner. .856 .991 1.369 .626 .600
I was interested in 
communicating with my 
partner. 
.482 .585 .626 1.034 .559
I was bored by our 
interactions. (reverse coded) .569 .637 .600 .559 1.429
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I was intensely involved in 
our interactions. 20.0816 13.774 .556 .344 .774
I found our exchanges 
stimulating. 20.5034 12.909 .597 .399 .763
I was enthusiastic while 
interacting with my partner. 20.0476 13.320 .720 .539 .723
I was interested in 
communicating with my 
partner. 
19.6871 15.299 .566 .351 .772
I was bored by our 










Deviation N of Items 




Negotiator Formality Scale Post Universal Computer II Negotiation (P3) 
 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 





a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I made the 
interactions formal. 3.0068 1.61541 147
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse code) 
2.7415 1.39514 147
I wanted the 









 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
  

















I made the 
interactions formal. 1.000 .548 .626
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse code) 
.548 1.000 .735
I wanted the 






 Inter-Item Covariance Matrix 
 
  

















I made the 
interactions formal. 2.610 1.235 1.453
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse code) 
1.235 1.946 1.472
I wanted the 






 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I made the 
interactions formal. 5.6599 6.952 .631 .409 .847
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
casual. (reverse code) 
5.9252 7.577 .705 .553 .767
I wanted the 
interactions to be 
informal. (reverse 
code) 










Deviation N of Items 




Negotiator Trust Scale Post Universal Computer II Negotiation (P3) 
 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 





a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 




 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I was interested in working 
with him/her. 5.18 1.060 147
I was sincere. 5.66 .895 147
I was willing to listen to 
him/her. 5.76 .911 147
I was open to his/her ideas. 5.79 .796 147




I wanted him/her to trust 















I was willing 
to listen to 
him/her. 










I was interested in working 
with him/her. 1.000 .384 .352 .493 .197 .423
I was sincere. .384 1.000 .586 .600 .681 .475
I was willing to listen to 
him/her. .352 .586 1.000 .646 .458 .409
I was open to his/her ideas. .493 .600 .646 1.000 .572 .508
I was honest in 
communicating with 
him/her. 
.197 .681 .458 .572 1.000 .304
I wanted him/her to trust 
me. .423 .475 .409 .508 .304 1.000
 
 









I was willing 
to listen to 
him/her. 










I was interested in working 
with him/her. 1.124 .364 .340 .416 .206 .387
I was sincere. .364 .801 .478 .428 .603 .367
I was willing to listen to 
him/her. .340 .478 .830 .469 .412 .322
I was open to his/her ideas. .416 .428 .469 .633 .450 .349
I was honest in 
communicating with 
him/her. 
.206 .603 .412 .450 .978 .260
I wanted him/her to trust 






 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I was interested in working 
with him/her. 28.52 12.265 .461 .314 .843
I was sincere. 28.04 11.533 .737 .609 .783
I was willing to listen to 
him/her. 27.95 11.942 .642 .480 .802
I was open to his/her ideas. 27.91 11.958 .767 .608 .782
I was honest in 
communicating with 
him/her. 
28.00 11.973 .564 .533 .818
I wanted him/her to trust 
me. 28.09 12.698 .548 .339 .820
 
 




Deviation N of Items 
33.70 16.814 4.100 6
 
 
Negotiator Task Orientation Scale Post Universal Computer II Negotiation (P3) 
 
 
 Case Processing Summary 
 





a.  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 





Alpha Based on 
Standardized 







 Item Statistics 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
I wanted to stick to the 
main purpose of the 
interactions. 
5.5548 1.06370 146
I was very work 
oriented. 5.1370 1.09941 146
I was more interested in 
working on the tasks at 
hand than having a 
social exchange. 
5.2877 1.12009 146
I was more interested in 
social conversations 
than in the tasks at 




 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
  
I wanted to 
stick to the 
main purpose of 
the interactions. 
I was very 
work 
oriented. 
I was more 
interested in 
working on the 
tasks at hand 
than having a 
social 
exchange. 









I wanted to stick to the 
main purpose of the 
interactions. 
1.000 .577 .566 .413 
I was very work 
oriented. .577 1.000 .500 .311 
I was more interested in 
working on the tasks at 
hand than having a 
social exchange. 
.566 .500 1.000 .546 
I was more interested in 
social conversations 
than in the tasks at 
hand. (reverse code) 






 Inter-Item Covariance Matrix 
 
  
I wanted to 
stick to the 
main purpose of 
the interactions. 
I was very 
work 
oriented. 
I was more 
interested in 
working on the 
tasks at hand 
than having a 
social 
exchange. 









I wanted to stick to the 
main purpose of the 
interactions. 
1.131 .675 .674 .622 
I was very work 
oriented. .675 1.209 .615 .484 
I was more interested in 
working on the tasks at 
hand than having a 
social exchange. 
.674 .615 1.255 .866 
I was more interested in 
social conversations 
than in the tasks at 
hand. (reverse code) 
.622 .484 .866 2.006 
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
I wanted to stick to the 
main purpose of the 
interactions. 
15.7671 8.401 .639 .447 .702
I was very work 
oriented. 16.1849 8.717 .547 .378 .744
I was more interested in 
working on the tasks at 
hand than having a 
social exchange. 
16.0342 7.909 .684 .470 .676
I was more interested in 
social conversations 
than in the tasks at 
hand. (reverse code) 
15.9795 7.524 .508 .314 .783
 
 




Deviation N of Items 






Correlations of Negotiator and Their Partner’s Change in Relational 
Behavior Variables and E-mail Rank 
 
Variable Correlation Significance 
Dominance Change .071 .392 
Depth Change -.028 .735 
Affect/Immediacy Change .129 .121* 
Formality Change .028 .741 
Trust Change .214 .010* 
Task Orientation Change -.034 .685 
Self Dominance Change -.137 .098* 




Self Formality Change .062 .458 
Self Trust Change .265 .001* 
Self Task Orientation 
Change 
.211 .010* 
   
E-mail Rank .071 .437 
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